

Governing the Global World Order: Looking Through Realist and Liberal Paradigms



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ABSTRACT: Unlike national societies and systems, it is generally assumed that international society of nations lack formal institutional framework of governance comparable to notion of state sovereignty. To a large extent, this assumption is quite plausible as exact replication of state sovereignty has not been achieved in international system. Thus, there is no supra sovereign governing the nation states constituting the international community.

But on the contrary, there is myriad of international institutions, organizations, conventions, protocols which are able to establish a set of rule-settings for state actions greatly eclipsing the classical idea and exercise of state sovereignty.

This is an undeniable fact that at no point of time of human civilization, people and communities spread across the globe in concrete national and state identities have been so close due to epic revolution in the fields of information and communication technology. As a resultant factor, there is a definite paradigm of global world order. Globe has shrunk to the extent that interaction among these national communities has achieved greater speed and volume.

Every activity of these national communities are getting governed and regulated by a framework of rules commonly agreed by the majority of them. From seas to space, war to peace, trade to commerce, postal to aviation, one can imagine any possible areas of those international interactions among the states, one finds a voluminous amount of international treaties, conventions, protocols, organizations, international non-governmental organizations, mass and digital media, global public opinion which restrict the unbridled exercise of state sovereignty and bound it to the global rules of governance in a profound manner.

The notion of the global world order has gained wide currency and has received extensive academic acceptability as a viable theoretical construct to make sense of the type of the world we are placed in at the moment. If there is a global world order then in what ways this order has been achieved? It has been achieved through definite, conscious and historic growth towards global governance both in its theoretical and institutional forms.

Within various theoretical attempts to grasp this phenomenon of global governance, Realist and Liberal paradigms provide two broad prisms to understand the theoretical viability and institutional infrastructure of global governance. This research paper is a humble attempt to explain the main concerns of the theoretical stands of realist and liberal paradigms and various sub-streams emerging with them.

REALISM AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Realism is the oldest perspective on international affairs tracing its roots to Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. In the contemporary period, Hedley Bull, E.H. Carr, Kenneth Waltz, Martin Wright, Reinhold Niebuhr Hans Morgenthau etc. have been the most influential realist thinkers. They shared fundamental perspectives or assumptions regarding the nature of international politics despite having disagreement on many aspects of current affairs and foreign policy.

Realism constitutes a way of thinking about analyzing and understanding international politics and affairs. Following basic assumptions are made and shared among its proponents regarding the nature of international affairs:

(a) State assumes the central position in the international system and the principal actor in the world politics. Since international system is anarchic and has no supreme political authority, realism regards the state as the principal actor in international affairs. The state is said to be sovereign and not subordinate to any higher temporal power.

Although the state is the primary actor in international affairs, realism does not ignore the importance of non-state actors such as multinational firms, international organisations and non-governmental organisations in the determination of international affairs.

(b) The central concerns of the state are the promotion and protection of its national interests defined principally in terms of military security and political independence. Power and power relations play the major role in international

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affairs. Power can assume the form of military, economic, and even psychological relationship among states.¹ But, realism does not, necessarily reject the significance of moral and value considerations in determining national behavior.

- (c) Realism also assumes that national security is and always will be the principal concern of states. Concern with security means that power is vitally important in international affairs. State must be constantly attentive towards changes in power relations and to the consequences for their own national interests in the wake of shifts in the international balance of power among the members of the international political system.
- (d) For realists, the territorial state continues to be primary actor in both domestic and international affairs. National governments within their sovereign right still make the primary decisions regarding their internal and external economic and political matters. The states still set the rules within which other actors function. These also continue to be important actors within their regional arrangements.

Based on these basic premises, realism poses a direct challenge to the idea of global governance which takes an anti-state centric position on the conduct of international affairs.

The realist interpretation of international affairs rejects the popular belief held by many scholars that economic and technological forces have eclipsed the nation-state and are creating a global economy and society in which political/national boundaries and national loyalties based on sacrosanct idea of sovereignty are no longer relevant.

It is certainly true that economic and technological forces are profoundly reshaping international system and influencing the behavior of states, however, even in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favourable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizens. For realism, geopolitics remains essential to understanding the conduct and dynamics of global governance. Governance beyond the state is largely contingent on the policies and interests of the most powerful states.

International institutions are principally devoid of autonomous power and function largely as instruments for the advancement of the interests of the most dominant states or coalitions of states. Even in a very vibrant globalizing era, the perspectives on global governance cannot overlook the continued existence of the inequalities of power between states. The hierarchy of power moulds the architecture as well as the substantive purposes and priorities of global governance.

The present liberal world order of free trade and unhindered capital flows – is primarily a product of US global hegemony, although it relies on the consent of other leading industrial powers. The structural power of the US is expressed in the very existence of global institutions and the liberal constitution of world order. This however, does not apply that global governance is simply an extension of US policies, or western interests because same institutions also serve as arenas of the contestations of their dominance. Nevertheless, realists hold this position that geopolitics based on the central role of the states; retains a disproportionate sway in shaping the structures, patterns and outcomes of global governance.

In recent times, there have been attempts regarding formulation of a system or mechanism of international governance for the international economy within the realist perspective. Neo-liberal institutionalism, new medievalism and trans- governmentalism are the three broad approaches with emphasis on economic cooperation which examine the possibilities of international governance within the dominant premises of the realism.

Neo-liberal institutionalism based on the continued importance of the state, assumes that formal international regimes, rules and institutions can govern international affairs, or at least, significant aspects of it. It has been concerned primarily with the governance of the international economy. Its proponents believe that international rules, regimes and institutions have become sufficiently strong enough to meet the challenges of an overtly globalized international economy. The replacement of GATT in 1995 by WTO sets an example of a substantial reform of an existing international institution found deficient. The IMF and World Bank are on the way to reforms and new international conventions on environmental and other important matters are being implemented.³

But, in this neo-liberal institutionalist's paradigm of regime or rule based international economy, the vital issue of compliance comes into the forefront and poses a challenge. It continues to limit the effectiveness of international organisations. Moreover, there are few generally accepted principles and policy prescriptions on which regimes can be constructed.

The post-Second World War Bretton Woods regimes dealing with trade and monetary affairs were based on such western legal and economic ideas as the transparency of commercial dealings and limited state intervention in the economy. The triumph of neoliberalism in the late 1980s further reinforced such liberal principles. However, as economic integration among national economies has deepened around the world, fundamental differences among national systems of political economy regarding economic principles and legitimate policy have challenged western legal and economic ideals.

Another issue which has occupied prominence in the aftermath of Seattle protests against the WTO in Nov. 1999 is the issue of democratic deficit. International economic institutions are criticized because they are not directly accountable to any democratic electorate. If they are not responsible to national governments, then to whom or to what should international organisations be accountable?

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If it were a governance system based on one person, one vote, then Indians and Chinese would rule the world. It is difficult to believe that many Americans, Japanese or West Europeans would accept such a solution to the democratic deficit, they would undoubtedly prefer a system of weighted voting in accordance with their share of global wealth.

Closely linked to the issue of democratic deficit is the increasing mismatch between the distribution of authority within and among existing institutions and the changing distribution of power in the international system.

Despite the significant shift in global economic power towards East Asia and certain developing economies that has occurred over the last half century, decision making authority in the IMF, WTO and World Bank continues to reside mainly with the United States and Western Europe. As the power of these institutions has grown, these new emerging economic giants have intensified their demands for a greater say. Resolution of this conflict over who controls the world's international economic institutions will not be achieved easily and smoothly.

The third prominent issue is that of institutional reforms of these international economic institutions. The demand for reform has become very strong. In the United States, these institutions have been attacked by both the political left and political right. More and more Americans believe that these institutions should be weakened or even eliminated rather than strengthened. The left argues that these institutions serve only the interests of multinational corporations and the ruling capitalist elite. The right argues that the functions of these organizations are unnecessary in a global economy based on free markets. Opinion in the United States is moving away from and not towards the idea of international governance, unless of course it suits one's own particular interests. Indeed, the most important issue to be resolved is determination of the purpose of international governance.⁴

The "new medievalism" a term attributed to Hadley Bull⁵ assumes that the world is experiencing the end of national sovereignty. Adherents to this position believe that this historic moment has been reached because of transnational economic forces (trade, finance etc.) and because of such contemporary technological developments as the computer, information technologies, and advances in transportation. Proponents of the new medievalism allege that in the era of the internet, governments have been increasingly losing their monopoly over information and thus are prone to challenges by the non-governmental actors.

Concluding that such changes erode hierarchical organisations and undermine centralized power structures, new medievalists see the once dominant hierarchic order of nation states being supplanted by horizontal networks composed of states, non-governmental organisations and international institutions.

This revolutionary development, in turn, is leading to cooperative problem-solving by concerned individuals and groups from around the world. They envision a world of multiple allegiances and responsibilities replacing the undivided loyalty formerly owed by the citizenry to the sovereign. Subnational, national and supranational institutions will share authority over individuals in this new world.

The new medievalism asserts that non-governmental organisations have, or at least should have central role in governance of international or post-national affairs. Organised primarily around such basic issues as safeguarding the environment, protecting human rights and promoting a safer and peaceful world, NGOs have indeed become a significant force in particular issue areas of global common concerns. Although, they were initially involved primarily in domestic issues, they are now increasingly becoming concerned over the negative affects of globalization on the environment and other matters. NGOs have now become force in the contemporary world and now possess the potential to influence the policies of national governments and international institutions in a number of areas. One of the most notable accomplishments of this influence was the Earth Summit (1992) in Rio-de-Janeiro where NGOs exerted enough pressure to achieve agreements intended to eliminate greenhouse gases. Other prominent examples of effective NGO campaigns at global scale include Seattle Protest against World Bank and IMF, treaty to eliminate landmines, the agreement to reduce the huge indebtedness of many less developed countries, and the derailment of the American sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investment.

Unlike the new medievalism, transgovernmentalism accepts the continued existence of nation-states. However, like the new medievalism, it assumes that the governance functions of the state can be separated from one another and delegated to intergovernmental bodies or networks dealing with specific policy issues. Many transgovernmental organisations already exist to deal with such matters as banking regulations (the Basel Accord), anti-trust regulation and judicial matters.

Transnational networks composed of technical experts, business executives and public officials are needed to manage an increasingly complex and integrated world in which extensive technical input is required. Trans governmentalism assumes that technical issues can be separated from politics and then solved independently by technocrats, regulatory matters, for example, can be isolated from national economic priorities and from the pressures of powerful interests.

This approach to international governance may apply to certain relatively depoliticized areas. However, transgovernmentalism tends to ignore the more sensitive matters such as national security, interests and foreign policy. They also appear to assume that there is no hierarchy of national interests in which some issues of vital interest to governments, cannot be delegated to transnational bodies. Proponents of transgovernmentalism argue as if concerns over proliferation of nuclear weapons and the future of the NATO alliance were of no greater importance than the regulation of ocean fisheries.

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Transgovernmentalism foresees a world stripped of power, national interests and interstate conflict; its proponents envision a world nearly devoid of either domestic or international politics, a world in which technocrats, bureaucrats and experts can solve issues outside the realm of domestic and international politics.

Transgovernmental networks can be very useful in solving many different issues. But this approach to governance of the international system is severely limited by the political rivalries and conflicting interests of both nation-states and their domestic constituencies. Any effort to resolve the governance issue must, however, recognize that this is still a world of states, power and national interests.

The above discussed three approaches to governance of the global economy within broad realist domain make a useful contribution but in the end suffers from certain deficiencies. As proponents of neoliberal institutionalism correctly argue, formal international institutions and agreed – on rules or regimes have greatly facilitated cooperation among sovereign nation states and been a significant factor in the management of the international economy over a half century. Yet, the continuing resistance of states to restrictions on their sovereignty, the limited coverage of international regimes/institutions and serious problems of compliance mean that neoliberal institutionalism alone cannot govern the global economy.

The argument of the new medievalism focusing on the NGOs becoming more important in solving the world's pressing problems draws its strength from the fact that the strong commitment and concentrated energy of these associations have been on the whole, a positive force for dealing with the world's many serious issues. Yet, these groups cannot function without the national governments and international institutions on which they bring pressure to achieve their goals.

Finally, the approach of transgovernmentalism is an important component to the other two approaches. Cooperation and information sharing among the agencies and branches of national governments can be an effective means to deal with many complex technical issues at both the domestic and international levels. However, the legalistic and technocratic approach of transgovernmentalism suffers not only from a democratic deficit, but its usefulness declines steeply as issues become more entwined with matters of national security, domestic partisan politics and distributive matters.

Although all three approaches can facilitate the governance of the global economy, none of these approaches can fulfill the many demands placed on international governance. Most importantly, each lacks the one crucial component of government, that is, the capacity to enforce decisions. The nation-state still continues to be the only institution in this contemporary world that possesses this capacity.⁶

LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM AND THE PROSPECTS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Since the end of Cold War, liberal internationalism has experienced a renaissance as a new generation of western scholars and political elites seek either to understand, or to manage, world affairs in a globalizing era.

Liberal internationalism conjoins two rather discrete discourses: that of liberalism and that of internationalism. Liberalism as a political philosophy seeks to explicate the conditions for the realization of political liberty and liberal government, while internationalism is concerned with the promotion of transnational or global solidarity and international government. Though related, in so far as human freedom is conceived as a core universal value, neither necessarily implies the other; not all liberals are internationalists, while not all internationalists are liberals and whereas liberalism advocates limited government, internationalism seeks government's extension to the international sphere. It seems intellectually and ethically, the conjunction of liberalism and internationalism is therefore not surprisingly somewhat problematic.

Just as the hubris of the „end of history“ produced a resurgence of liberal internationalist rhetoric, expressed in President George Bush Sr's vision of a „new world order“, so globalization has encouraged a revival of liberal internationalist thought. To this extent, liberal internationalism no longer appears as a „utopian edifice“ once described by E.H. Carr⁷ but on the contrary constitutes, in the absence of any secular ideological competitors, the dominant discourse of the emerging post-Cold War world order.⁸

Liberal internationalism lays a special claim to what world politics is and can be: a state of peace.⁹ Since the early 20th century, the discourse of liberal internationalism has constituted a principal intellectual alternative to realism and geopolitics not only for explaining world order as it is, but also prescribing how it should be. For it offers an account of the possibility of the transcendence of power politics – or the anarchy problematic – in international relations.

This primacy attached to peace arises from a conviction that the achievement of ultimate human freedom is only feasible in the absence of war or the conditions that give rise to it. Since conflict and war are an endemic feature of a system of states in which sovereigns seek to maximize their power, liberal internationalism holds that it is only through the governance or transcendence of power politics that the necessary conditions for the promotion and realization of human freedom can be effectively achieved.

The overall crux of liberal internationalism rests on certain presumptions. Firstly, that reason and rationality are necessary and sufficient requirements for the effective conduct and management of international affairs. In essence, through the pursuit of enlightened self-interest and rational deliberation, conflicts of interests between states can be resolved or mediated

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without recourse to force or war.

Secondly, international co-operation is rationally as well as ethically preferable to conflict. Furthermore, growing material interdependence between states and peoples promotes the necessity for the international regulation of their common affairs as well as the rational and cognitive basis for increased cooperation. Thirdly, international institutions contribute to peace and world order in two ways: they tame the powerful by creating international norms, incentives and new patterns of multilateral politics which limit the scope for power politics; and they also provide mechanisms for preventing or managing interstate conflict.

Fourthly, progress is possible in world politics in so far as power politics is not regarded as an immutable property of the interstate order (as realism presumes) but on the contrary can be mitigated, if not transcended, through the progressive reform or domestication of international affairs (the rule of law, universal human rights, etc.). In this respect, liberal institutionalism reflects a distinctly Enlightenment commitment to the improvement of the human and global condition.

These assumptions inform the central explanatory logic of the liberal internationalist argument captured in the simple notion of the virtuous cycle. This implies that the mutually reinforcing dynamics of transnational economic integration, the diffusion of liberal democracy and the growth of international governance creates the conditions for an expanding liberal zone of peace in which war increasingly becomes an irrational or unthinkable instrument of interstate politics.¹⁰ Under these conditions liberty and prosperity can be fully realized.

In its contemporary resurgence passing through a long period of intellectual and philosophical discourses; the liberal internationalism has its origins in attempts to grapple two issues: the essential liberal logic of international cooperation, and the implication of globalization for world order.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, increased global interdependence appeared to be transforming international relations. It created simultaneously the potential for a more cooperative world order and a proliferation of new regimes of international governance to manage collective problems. As the cold war ended and globalization further intensified, the liberal inheritors of the Enlightenment seemed once again poised to establish peace.¹¹

The burgeoning literature on liberal internationalism is characterized by certain broad themes. Firstly, there has been a primary interest in explicating, by contrast with realism, the specifically liberal logic of international cooperation and international governance. Secondly, there is an expressed desire to re-establish the credibility of liberal theory by reformulating it in ways that meet the requirements of more formal and positivistic social science. One consequence of this development has been the tendency for overtly normative analysis to be displaced in favour of more descriptive or empirically verifiable theory.

Thirdly, there is a widely held assumption among liberal internationalists that the state-centric conception of world politics is no longer adequate for understanding the complexities of post-Cold War global politics and even less for understanding how the world is actually governed. States are no longer considered the dominant or even the principal agents in global politics but operate alongside a plurality of bodies, from international organisations through multinational corporations to the agencies of transnational civil society, embracing NGOs, advocacy networks and transnational pressure groups. Central to management of global affairs is an evolving system of global governance complex, with the UN and its agencies at its core, coordinating and regulating extensive areas of transnational and global activity. Lastly, though global governance is generally considered a progressive force, there is a genuine concern with its poor democratic credentials and the unrepresentative nature of transnational civil society.

Contemporary liberal internationalist scholarship is divided into its four main variants namely liberal institutionalism, structural liberalism, liberal reformism and liberal cosmopolitanism which in the long run provide a very useful heuristic framework for exploring and capturing different liberal voices.

Liberal institutionalism constitutes the principal liberal theory of why and how governance beyond the state is such a dominant feature of the current global political landscape. Drawing on the importance of institutions within liberal thought, Robert Keohane in particular has advanced a seminal theory of liberal institutionalism to examine why and how the international cooperation or governance flourishes even in the absence of a hegemonic power imposing order on state.¹² He tries to question whether hegemony alone can really explain the continuing widening and deepening of multilateral cooperation throughout the post-war period.

Central to liberal institutionalist theory is a line of reasoning which suggests that far from international cooperation being a product of hegemony or altruistic motivation on the part of states, it is a rational response to conflict between states among whom there is considerable interdependence.¹³

Conflict drives cooperation, for in its absence – a condition of international harmony – there would be no need for states to cooperate to achieve their objectives since this would occur automatically. Harmony is apolitical. No communication is necessary and no influence need be exercised. Cooperation by contrast, is highly political, without the spectre of conflict; there is no need to cooperate.¹⁴

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Keohane dismisses the classical liberal notion of a harmony of interests as an explanation for international cooperation. Using rational choice theory and realist assumptions about state motivation, he attempts to demonstrate why cooperation is both rational and functional for states and thus why in the absence of hegemony, it will continue to develop.

International institutions provide important benefits for states since they facilitate the achievement of national goals while also reducing uncertainty, enhancing trust and generally minimizing the risks of cooperation. In these respects, international institutions, whether formal organisations such as the WTO or looser arrangements of international regimes, such as that covering the prevention of international terrorism or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, empower governments rather than shackle them.¹⁵

Realism, by contrast, predicts that states will always resist being constrained by international arrangements because the self-help or anarchic structure of the international system is such that states constantly seek to maximize their relative advantage or superiority over their competitors. Liberal institutionalism on the contrary, demonstrates that states, as rational actors, are comfortable with realizing absolute gains from cooperative arrangements.¹⁶

Liberal institutionalism therefore provides a rationalist validation of the classical liberal assumption that power politics – the condition of anarchy in the international system – can be mitigated, by demonstrating why and how international institutions are necessary in order to achieve state purposes.¹⁷ However, Keohane is careful to point out that the theory is principally applicable to relations among states which share a high degree of interdependence and may be less relevant in explaining cooperation where there are considerable disparities of power.

Since the original publication of Keohane's theory in *After Hegemony* in 1984, the world has witnessed profound structural changes, including the ending of the Cold War, unprecedented globalization with a concomitant deepening of international interdependence and the global spread of democracy. In these circumstances, liberal institutionalism appears to have acquired much greater explanatory power and therefore wider relevance than its many advocates and critics anticipated.

Although liberal institutionalism presents a distinctively liberal theory of international institutions, according to structural liberalism, it fails adequately to explain the origins of the existing system of global governance.¹⁸ Taking issue with liberal institutionalism's dismissal of hegemony and its functional account of cooperation, structural liberalism seeks to demonstrate why hegemony matters and why international institutions, precisely because they do constrain state power, have prospered in the postwar era.¹⁹

It does so relying on a historical-institutionalist approach – rather than the rational choice approach of liberal institutionalism – which contends that institutions have to be understood as structures which evolve overtime, constraining and shaping patterns of state behavior, and which tend to persist even after the original reasons for their establishment have expired.²⁰ Institutions, in this view, lock states into patterns of cooperation that acquire their own imperatives.

In explaining the origins of the post-war multilateral order, structural liberalism highlights the importance of the specifically liberal character of US hegemony.²¹ It explains why despite its hegemonic power, the US chose an institutional strategy of the construction of a multilateral order as opposed to a strategy of domination or hegemonic control or alternatively a return to the balance of power in order to maintain international order.²² The liberal character of American hegemony allows the United States unusual capacities to make commitments and restrain power.²³

In effect, its sheer dominance gave the US the capacity to employ institutions to lock in a favourable order while simultaneously being in an advantaged position to exchange restraints on its power for institutional agreements and to trade off short term gains for long term gains.²⁴

As a democratic state, it was also in a strong position to legitimize to its citizens an institutional order which would necessarily restrain its power. This restraint, in turn, created significant incentives for less powerful states to participate in a multilateral order given that, for them it significantly reduced the risks of domination or abandonment.²⁵

In contrast to the liberal institutionalist argument, significant power asymmetries are an important component of the liberal structuralist explanation of why global governance structures arise to regulate international order.

Liberal structuralism is not just interested in explaining why the post-war order took an institutional form but also why, despite the end of the cold war, it has remained so durable. For liberal institutionalism, it is the functional logic of international cooperation which explains its persistence whereas for structural liberalism, the explanation is to be found in the way in which the postwar multilateral institutional order has become embedded or constitutionalized.

Constitutions set the rules of the power game and set constraints on power. As it has evolved over the postwar era, the Western multilateral order has increasingly taken on the characteristics of a constitutional order in so far as it is an institutionalized settlement that binds states together so as to limit and constrain state power, including the power of the leading or hegemonic state.²⁶

Structural liberalism is an explanatory account of how power politics (anarchy) has been tamed, if not transcended,

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within the contours of the postwar western liberal international order. It is not simply concerned, as is liberal institutionalism, with explaining the functional imperatives of international cooperation *per se* but rather with explaining the structural factors which have given rise to the distinctive western liberal international order and its corresponding system of global governance.²⁷

It is a theory, which in simpler language, explains how the liberal international order came to be – and is – governed. But, it also explains why, as the balance between liberal and non-liberal states in the global system shifts in favour of the former, the governance and constitutionalisation of world order is likely to be universalised.²⁸ To the extent which the liberal order has been globalized, structural liberalism is therefore implicitly an account of why contemporary global governance is necessarily best described as liberal global governance.

Reform of liberal global governance is a key theme in contemporary studies of international organization pronounced as liberal reformism.²⁹ It is concerned with elucidating the key defects of the present system and elaborating the necessary conditions for more effective and legitimate global governance.

Global governance in the liberal reformist view, constitutes the key arena within which the interests of both states and the agencies of civil society are articulated and reconciled in the process of global policy formulation. A proliferation of transnational policy networks and multilateral institutions give form and substance to global governance and are central to the formulation and implementation of effective and legitimate global public policy.

Liberal reformism accepts that this system has defects but that nevertheless, it is vital to the effective management of global affairs and the maintenance of world order. Its principal advocates believe that democratic reform of global governance is not only feasible and desirable but that it is also absolutely necessary, since only a more democratic system of global governance can ensure that the benefits of globalization are more widely diffused and that its undesirable consequences are mitigated. Global governance requires a more enhanced system of voluntary pluralism under conditions of maximum transparency.³⁰ A more pluralistic system of global governance, in this view, implies more democratic global governance.

In effect, liberal reformists advocate the reconstruction of aspects of liberal pluralist democracy at the international level shorn of the requirements of electoral politics. Democratizing global governance is conceived principally in rather limited terms as enhancing the procedures for making and legitimizing global public policy.

Liberal cosmopolitanism questions the very purposes and practices of liberal global governance, not just its institutional form. It is concerned principally with the matter of global justice. It is a normative theory of global justice. It is a doctrine about the basis on which institutions and practices should be justified or criticized. It applies to the whole world the maxim that choices about what policies we should prefer, or what institutions we should establish, should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected.³¹

Since it takes the well being of individuals as central, it accords primacy to global distributive justice, not just to „bounded justice“ within societies or international justice between states.³² In so doing, it presents a radical critique of the existing world order and global governance arrangements in so far as they perpetuate global inequalities and therefore global injustices.

Demands of social justice cannot be limited by relatively arbitrary national, ethnic or territorial boundaries, but on the contrary transcend them.³³ Globalization and the structures of global politics have bound the fate of communities and individuals together such that it is increasingly misleading to describe the international environment as a realm of states knit together by an array of mutual assistance schemes in which any individual state may participate, or not, as it wishes.³⁴

Taking into account a new reality of a globalized world order, liberal cosmopolitanism is concerned with establishing the principal philosophical justifications and ethical grounds for the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor across the globe.³⁵

Liberal cosmopolitanism is a normative theory which is privileging the principle of global distributive justice, delivers a radical critique of the current constitution and conduct of global governance. In this respect, it shares with some of its classical liberal progenitors a genuine commitment to the emancipation of humankind from arbitrary power and injustice of all kinds.

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