A Study on the Terrorist State and the Terrorist Movements: A Case Study of Egypt

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ABSTRACT: Researchers have consistently delved into the study of terrorist movements within societies and states, yet few have explored the primary instigators behind their emergence, which is the focus of this research: the State. This study examines the emergence of the most influential terrorist movements, their treatment, and their relationship with the state. By scrutinising the reasons behind the emergence of terrorist movements, this research also discusses strategies to prevent and dismantle them. A critical aspect to note is that many terrorist movements originated within state prisons, underscoring the state's failure to prevent terrorism and inadvertently contributing to its proliferation within society. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective counterterrorism policies and addressing the root causes of terrorism. It also highlights techniques such as decapitation and negotiation, as well as providing emancipation for moderate Islamic movements to play a role and represent the image of Islam. Additionally, terrorist movements often promote their ideology through emotional propaganda to recruit Islamic youths, many of whom come from moderate Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood.

KEYWORDS: Terrorist State, Terrorist Movements, the Muslim Brotherhood, Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is often viewed through large-scale emotional, reprisal, and denial perspectives. The pursuit of academicians to combat terrorism through written books and conducting field studies has seemingly universally failed due to states neglecting to adhere to a pattern of violence against terrorists—rejecting negotiation or political discourse in favours of violence and tit-for-tat techniques to assert state ascendency and send a message to the people that nobody is above the state.

The study of terrorism is important for understanding the motivations of people not just to join the movement but to – understand their cause, and most importantly to stray them away. A book like "How Terrorism End" for Audrey Kurth Cronin highlights how the state treats terrorism- it looks through thematic analysis on the negotiation and decapitation and violence against terrorist movements.[1] Also, many field studies examined the motivation behind joining terrorist movement and the shift between normal citizen to terrorist as discussed in journal article "The life of extremists: a comparison between Mohamed Atta and Shukri Mostafa" by Sivamurugan Pandian, Omar Gomaa & Nur Hafeeza.[2]

In this research, I aim to explore the relationship between state terror and the emergence and motivation of terrorist movements, focusing on the new republic of Egypt from 1952 to 2023. To examine this dynamic, I will conduct an analysis study aimed at providing essential insights through sociological analysis. This study will investigate how prison conditions have contributed to terrorism and will also examine the state's utilisation of political emancipation, which may have unintended consequences leading to terrorism.

The Terrorist State of Nasserism

The definition of terrorism has been subjected to numerous interpretations in political, sociological, and psychological sciences. Researchers have often deliberately avoided examining state terrorism to evade criticism from the targeted state and its supporters. The apartheid regime in South Africa, perpetrated by the White Government against the majority of black South Africans, represented a trajectory of terror. However, the state's ascendancy overshadowed the long struggle led by the African National Congress (ANC) as a perceived terrorist movement. Fortunately, the success of Nelson Mandela and his comrade Oliver Tambo transformed the narrative of the struggle from terrorism to a fight for freedom. This shift opened the gates for freedom for all struggle movements worldwide. Many books and research studies have delved into the intricacies of that prolonged struggle and its eventual success.

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In the case of Egypt, the terrorist state was marginalised and not included in political discussions. However, most discussions have focused on the terrorist movements that emerged during Anwar al-Sadat's presidency as a result of Gamal Abdel Nasser's oppression towards his political dissidents. The violence that occurred during Sadat's presidency prompts us to examine whether similar violence occurred prior to the 1950s, and if so, against whom? Perpetrated by whom? And most importantly, what was the motivation behind such incidents?

In his book, "*Hikayat min Daftar alWatan*" (Stories from the Countries Draft) by Salah Eissa, the Denshawai Incident is described as horrific, where women and children were forced to witness their husbands being lashed on their backs and executed by hanging in 1906 by the British occupation.[3] This should not be considered merely an incident, but rather the first instance of terrorist violence against peaceful inhabitants in the 1900s century. However, the aftermath of this terrorism stirred Egyptians to find the courage to stand against British occupation. It was one of the catalysts leading to the assassination of Boutros Ghali, the judge in the Denshawai Court, and Ibrahim Helbawy, the so-called British defendant lawyer and the most powerful lawyer at that time, became ostracised by Egyptians until his death. This state-sponsored terrorism did not succeed in instilling obedience to the British troops among Egyptians; instead, it instigated resistance, which culminated in the 1919 popular revolution across Egypt. With this, the state terrorist techniques were not subjected to humanitarian accountability or declared as a war on freedom. An excuse could be made for Egypt as it was wholly under British control. However, terrorism under Nasserism was another issue that was not merely neglected or forgiven, but justifications were made by Nasserism to imprison its dissidents – Islamists, communists, and people with no ideologies.

The terrorist state of Nasser was built on Arab nationalism ideology, which gave it strength and popularity[4] in contrast to previous regimes that relied on no ideology but rather on popular promises from the British occupation of Egypt through Egyptian governments. Negotiations with the British troops failed, and King Farouk's reckless behaviours signalled the end of that period, casting a shadow over Egypt as portrayed in Nasserism's media. To understand the link between terrorism and Nasserism, we have to consider the first clash between the state and its dissidents, the first victim of Nasserism was the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954. In fact, in 1954, Nasserism or Arab nationalism ideology was not shaped or even born as Gamal Abdel Nasser, the ex-member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the leader among the Free Officers Organisation was still in talk with the Muslim Brotherhood to have their support in promoting the military coup and the topple of Farouk among Egyptians. [5] With the mutual-talk between the two parts that sought to adhere to Islamic principles to fulfill political promises, tensions escalated to the point of no return. Nasser accused the Muslim Brotherhood of abortive attempt to assassinate him during his speech in Alexandria in 1954 among thousands of Egyptians. Despite this abortive attempt of assassinating Nasser, but in his book Mahmoud Abdelhalim *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Aḥdāth Ṣanaʿat al-Tārikh, Ruʾyā men al-Dākhel (The Muslim Brotherhood, Events that Shaped the History, a View from Inside)* stressed that the Muslim Brotherhood met Abdel Nasser more than 15 times in different places at the leaders houses and other places.[6] This exemplifies that the Muslim Brotherhood had the chance to murder Nasser if they wanted to. The other point is that, Nasser was in a good relationship with Saleh Ashmawy and Abdel Rahman al-Sanadi, the leaders of the *al-Nizam al-Khas* the special organisation which was the armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. This all lead us now to ask was this abortive attempt become the justification of prisoning and killing the Muslim Brotherhood behind bars?

The assumption of whether the Muslim Brotherhood intentionally targeted Nasser or neglected to attack him raises questions about why thousands of Egyptians would pay the price and face unfair treatment behind bars. While this alleged attempt produced state terrorism, it also instilled fear and injustice. There could have been alternative methods to prevent the clash with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Nasser's resort to violence left no room for politics or democracy, ushering in a new era of oppression reminiscent of the Mamluks, who enslaved Egyptians, marginalised them, refused to marry their women, and treated them as a lower class.[7] Nasser's actions mirrored this oppression; he prioritised spreading his sovereignty over the state without concern for whether his motivated violence would bring prosperity or political emancipation to Egypt.

The terrorist state of Nasser allowed historians to distort the Egyptian monarchy. Historians were compelled to write negatively about King Farouk, and movies were produced to serve this purpose. Even academics were banned from documenting what they had witnessed during the monarchy of Egypt. Journalism was banned from criticising Nasserism, as it portrayed a two-faced image of the victory and glory of Nasserism while accusing political dissidents of Nasser as culprits of ignorance regarding the previous monarchy regime. Even Mostafa Amin, a journalist and nationalist without a political ideological background, was imprisoned, tortured, and accused of being a quisling.[8]

No space for political discourse was given, nor was there negotiation with political dissidents. Nasser considered himself akin to King Louis XIV, proclaiming "*L'état c'est moi*" – The State is Me.[9] This dictatorship resulted in the stifling of creativity in social sectors and led Egyptians to become spies, with individuals spying on their own families and accusing them of being quislings. Many believed that working for the dictatorship was beneficial for their nationalism. The terrorist state of Nasser recognised the potential influence of religion in shaping people's perceptions of democracy and politics. Consequently, they restricted the influence of Al-Azhar and allowed Western media to have a significant impact on Egyptians. Women were compelled to remove their scarves, and clerics were only permitted to speak about religion, prohibited from delving into politics or mentioning the history of tyrants. Thus, Western influences, especially American fashion and style, became prevalent in Egypt under Nasserism.

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The terrorism associated with Nasserism raises unanswered questions about negotiations with political dissidents and why they were often accused of being quislings. Moreover, if they were considered as such, who were they accused of collaborating with? Some theories point to various actors, including:

- **The United States:** Some argue that American interests celebrated the assassination of figures like Hassan al-Banna, as suggested by Sayyid Qutb during his travels to the US. This perspective suggests collusion with political dissidents to further American agendas in the region.
- **Israel:** The Muslim Brotherhood's opposition to Zionism and recruitment of Arabs to fight against Israeli forces in 1948 might lead some to accuse dissidents of collaboration with Israel. This accusation could stem from ideological or strategic conflicts.
- **The Soviet Union:** Given the Soviet Union's stance against religion and Christianity, it's plausible to speculate how they might view Islam. Dissidents accused of collaborating with the Soviet Union could be seen as betraying Islamic principles for political gain.

The analysis suggests that Nasserism promoted false ideologies to gain popularity, successfully garnering temporary support that ultimately dissipated after the defeat in 1967. This indicates that accusations of collaboration were often used to discredit political opponents and maintain power rather than being based on concrete evidence.

Another question that should be asked is: What are the consequences of the Nasserist terrorist state? Sociological scholars believe that the role of prisons in individuals' lives is to resocialise them, stripping away their previous norms and values to adapt new ones.[10] Did this context apply to political prisoners in Nasserism's prisons? Many members disowned the Muslim Brotherhood due to the torture and aggressive behaviours behind bars. Women of the Muslim Sisterhood were raped in front of their husbands and children.[11] All of this occurred under the guise of the state's glory and pride. However, the conceptual understanding of resocialisation failed to apply in the prisons. It did not produce new inhabitants who supported Nasser and obeyed the state's guidelines. The sudden death of Nasser in 1970 opened a new era for political emancipation. However, political dissidents, mostly Islamists, did not study democracy or engage in political discourse in prisons. Despite torture and oppression, they developed abomination and antagonism against the state. According to Mahmoud Abdel Halim, this posed a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood, as seeking vindictiveness from the state was considered heresy among them.[12] The group of recusants, known as "*monshaqeen*," not only disowned the Muslim Brotherhood but also disowned the idea of the nation. They believed that being in the state and working within it was disbelief (*Kufr*). This idea gained popularity among many youths.

Face the Music

The recusants, who mostly called themselves *al-Takfir wal-Hijrah*, did not seek revenge from Nasserism. Historically, it is not mentioned whether they assassinated those who tortured them, nor did they target Nasserism or its supporters. Instead, they sought revenge from the state, particularly Anwar al-Sadat's regime. Al-Sadat did not align himself with ideologies like Nasserism or communism; he was adept at navigating politics to avoid making more enemies than friends. However, his popularity soared after Egypt's victory in the 1973 war with Israel, leading Egyptians to view him as a saviour and an Islamic President.

Examining al-Sadat's personality during his tenure with the Free Officers Organisation, it becomes evident that he lacked a distinct ideology like Khaled Mohey El-Din the communist or Kamal Mohey al-Din, who had an Islamic background. Instead, he followed Nasser's lead and was one of the judges who presided over the execution of the Muslim Brotherhood members in *Mahkamit al-Sha'ab* in 1954.[13] This act of vengeance was never forgotten by the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately led to al-Sadat's demise in 1981 when he was assassinated in the air. The Muslim Brotherhood was aware of the plan but clandestinely chose not to inform al-Sadat.

If we examine affiliation with Nasserism, we rarely see few links to the ideology. However, this raises the question: why did *al-Takfir wal-Hijrah* fight against al-Sadat? What was al-Sadat's response to this movement, and was it motivated in a terrorist direction like Nasserism?

In fact, al-Sadat gave political discourses and emancipation for Islamists, releasing many from prison. Despite claims that the Muslim Brotherhood was released due to money paid to al-Sadat by businessman and Muslim Brotherhood leader Abdel Azim Loqmah, this is not truly mentioned in Muslim Brotherhood literature. However, it could be a plausible argument as to why al-Sadat would release the Muslim Brotherhood after having executed members in 1954. Moreover, the claim that al-Sadat released the Muslim Brotherhood to counteract the influence of Nasserism in universities and social life could potentially be true.

*Al-Takfir wal-Hijra*h refused to engage in religious discourses, and many clerics refused to associate with them.[14] The organisation's argument was that if they argued with a cleric and he did not follow them, he would fall into the category of a kafir (infidel) and must be killed. Al-Sadat's regime was not aware of such an ideology and did not understand the psychological pain experienced by members of *al-Takfir wal-Hijrah* in Nasser's prisons.

Therefore, this movement, as Joshua Gleis called it, is seen as a root of Salafism and a return to the true Islamic society – the Islamic Caliphate.[15] However, there seems to be a misunderstanding of the true nature of Islam, as members and their leader Shukri Mostafa

did not receive Islamic education nor graduate from Islamic universities. They engaged in terrorist attacks and refused to communicate with their former friends in the Muslim Brotherhood. They even engaged in religious discussions with Sheikh al-Zahabi, the Minister of Endowments, who was later kidnapped and executed by them. It is important to note that one of the kidnappers was an ex-police officer. Thus, the motivation of the movement was not truly Islamic but rather seeking vindictiveness from the state at any cost. Please review and confirm the changes. This also highlights that al-Sadat's regime did not address the movement accordingly by limiting their movements or by decapitating its leaders. Decapitation could have been effective for newly born movements, as seen with the communist movement in Peru led by Abimael Guzman and Mickey McKevit, as well as the Real Irish Republican Army.[16]

However, al-Sadat's regime could be seen as moderate; it did not employ the state terrorist techniques witnessed in Nasserism, such as extrajudicial killings and unjust imprisonment without fair trial. The political emancipation during al-Sadat's rule signalled a move towards democracy, allowing political elites to engage in politics and oppose views contrary to their own.

This environment of emancipation did not last long. After al-Sadat signed the Camp David Accords, which established peace with Israel, Egyptians protested and rejected this peace agreement.[17] Al-Sadat, viewing himself as the leader of all Egyptians, ultimately met his demise. He believed that his victory in 1973 would afford him greater freedom of action, but this led to rigorous crackdowns on dissent, resulting in the arrest of political dissidents including Muslims, Christians, political leaders, Islamists, and even socialists. The prisons became filled with a diverse array of individuals.

However, it was too late for al-Sadat to repent, as his policies ultimately led to his assassination by intelligent officers in 1981. Once again, al-Sadat's terrorist state was one of the factors that led to the emergence of al-*Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* in Egypt. Although it was founded in the 1970s by Najeh Ibrahim, its actual emergence in politics occurred after the signing of the Camp David Accord.[18]

Hosni Mubarak's Rule

To consider a state as a coherent regime, we can cite examples such as communism in North Korea, Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran, the Saud Family in Saudi Arabia, and even Nasserism. A coherent regime is one that is established based on ideology or popular victory. However, Hosni Mubarak's regime has been subject to debate regarding its political foundation and coherence during its thirty-year tenure from 1981 to 2011.

This leads us to question whether the opposition was too weak to overthrow Mubarak's regime, or if Mubarak himself was adept at managing political dissidents and avoiding conflicts that could have hastened his downfall. Additionally, was Mubarak a contributing factor to the emergence of terrorist movements? If so, how did he address the threat posed by these movements?

Same as al-Sadat inherited *al-Takfir wal-Hijrah* from Nasser, Mubarak inherited al-*Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* from al-Sadat. The aim of al-*Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* was also to establish the Islamic caliphate, same goal as the most Islamic movements without asking if they were qualified to serve their purpose! But the difference between al-*Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* and *al-Takfir wal-Hijrah* did not revolve on the religious legitimacy nor the utilised method to apply their agenda but it was regarding the role in society. *Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* recruited students, military officers and even professors. It was a strong actor in Islamism with a vivid framework that serves and plays on the emotion of the youths. For Mubarak's the communication with Islamists was his red line – he shut down all direct communication channels with them including the Muslim Brotherhood – even upon his collapse in 2011; he refused to negotiate with them, leaving his political pride not to get in a talk with his permanent enemy.

The relationship between *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* and Mubarak's regime initially encountered a stark contrast. *Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* embraced violence and sought reprisal through various tactics, including attacks on tourists, civilians, and cinemas. Negotiation with terrorists was not an option at this juncture, as it was deemed too late for such discussions. However, strategies such as tit-for-tat and decapitation failed to yield results, even after the arrest of movement leaders such as Najih Ibrahim, who was already incarcerated following al-Sadat's assassination, and Assem Abdel Majid, who orchestrated a violent attack on the Directory of Assuit's Security.[19]

Another approach utilised by Mubarak's regime was through the media. Egypt produced numerous films that depicted the violence perpetrated by *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah*. This direction aimed to sway Egyptians away from terrorism, succeeding in raising awareness about the consequences of terrorism and its detrimental impact on society.

In reality, Islamic movements like *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* found it challenging, if not impossible, to comprehend the complexities of Egyptian society and the extensive reforms required to transform Egypt into an Islamic state. Additionally, with its overt violence, *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* was ill-positioned to represent Egyptian Muslims effectively. While movements like the Muslim Brotherhood shared similar goals with *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah*, their previous experiences with Nasser and[20] al-Sadat led to a reluctance to engage in confrontations with Mubarak, fearing imprisonment and political exclusion.

For Mubarak's regime, the violent attacks on citizens and tourists served as a condemnation of *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah*. However, despite the movement's founder Najih Ibrahim disavowing violence, and attempts to distance themselves from such tactics, Mubarak's regime remained unconvinced of their suitability for political inclusion. Consequently, they were marginalised, deprived of political and human rights, and subjected to incarceration.

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On the other hand, the relationship between Mubarak's politics and the Muslim Brotherhood has been shrouded in ambiguity. Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to operate within certain limitations, refusing to grant them access to newspapers, political parties, or television channels where their voices could be amplified. However, Mubarak failed to recognise that the Muslim Brotherhood's influence could still permeate through their presence in mosques, educational institutions, farms, and factories. Despite their restricted political participation, the Muslim Brotherhood remained one of the most influential players in Egyptian politics during Mubarak's regime, primarily focusing on social welfare assistance.[21]

The State Security apparatus also had a complex relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, with both parties recognising certain boundaries. However, in 2003, the arrest and subsequent death of Mosa'ad Kutb due to torture sent shockwaves throughout the Egyptian community. His death prompted protests and widespread anger, with the National Security being held responsible. In a revealing interview with a Muslim Brotherhood leader in Imbaba Giza, where Mosa'ad lived, it was disclosed that the National Security mistook Mosa'ad for a member of *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* rather than the Muslim Brotherhood. This suggests that the National Security had the authorisation to target *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah* under anti-terrorism laws, highlighting the legitimacy given by Mubarak's regime to use extrajudicial measures against perceived threats.

Mubarak's regime did not implement state terrorism to the extent seen during Nasser's era. Instead, it fostered a climate of fear surrounding political engagement. While Mubarak's regime did not spawn numerous terrorist movements like those seen under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, it generated concealed discontent due to corruption[22] and the dominance of the National Party in politics.

The problematic aspect of Mubarak's regime lay in its unfair and biased political practices. However, for the Muslim Brotherhood, it provided opportunities for participation in Parliament, local elections, and political discourse, opportunities that were largely absent during Nasser's rule. Nonetheless, the oppression experienced under Mubarak's regime culminated in the January 2011 revolution, ushering in a new democratic phase in Egyptian politics.

The January Revolution was not solely aimed at toppling Mubarak; it heralded a new era of civilian and Islamist collaboration to shape a new constitution and internal policies. This democratic transition brought the Muslim Brotherhood to the forefront, ultimately resulting in the election of Mohamed Morsi as president in June 2012.

This paper will not delve into Morsi's presidency, as his tenure in office 2012-2013 is insufficient to assess whether his rule constituted dictatorship or fell under the category of a terrorist state.

Al-Sisi's Rule

On the 3rd of July 2013, the Egyptian dream of transitioning towards democracy was shattered as military tanks rolled into the streets, quashing protests and claiming the lives of innocent civilians advocating for democratic reforms. Minister of Defence Abdelfattah al-Sisi ousted President Mohamed Morsi and imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood. He portrayed himself as the saviour of Egypt, claiming to rescue the nation from Islamic extremism, and garnered support from civilian movements opposed to Morsi and Islamist rule.

The coup led by Sisi not only targeted the Muslim Brotherhood and pro-democracy activists but also resulted in widespread violence and casualties inflicted by the military and police under the guise of a "war on terrorism."[23] This propaganda campaign, however, paradoxically fostered the emergence of new terrorist movements within the Egyptian political landscape.

It is crucial to note that Sisi's rule was not founded on a specific ideology like Nasserism, nor did he achieve the same level of popularity as Sadat, who gained legitimacy through his perceived victory against Israel. Characterising Sisi's regime as similar to Mubarak's, who was supported by the National Party, or Sadat's, who was bolstered by his military success, would not be entirely accurate for the purposes of this academic research. However, describing Sisi's rule as a "terrorist state" can aptly illustrate the shift Egypt underwent from a nascent democracy after the January Revolution to a state characterised by fear and repression.

While the fight against terrorism was initially presented as a temporary measure, it became a pervasive propaganda tool, particularly as Egypt faced economic challenges under Sisi's leadership.

Hasm Movement is one of the terrorist movements that emerged in the Egyptian political scene urging youths to join it and seeking vindictiveness from Sisi's terrorist state. Hasm was founded in 2016 attacking Egyptians interests and bombing many places in Cairo. The movement had called for establishing Islamic state and ending military fascism. Sisi's military fascism stressed Hasm belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood the claim that gave Sisi's military control to kill Hasm members out of the law and arresting some to protest on the T.V their link with the Muslim Brotherhood.[24] The claim regarding whether Hasm belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood or not opens the discussion for delving into the number of arrests by Egyptian intelligence. According to statements by Egyptian intelligence, the number of arrested members of Hasm does not exceed 50, while the number of members in the Muslim Brotherhood could exceed millions. This raises the critical question: if the Muslim Brotherhood adopted and founded Hasm, why would it only have 100 members? Additionally, the argument is made that the Muslim Brotherhood declared a peaceful struggle against al-Sisi[25] and remained committed to this declaration, refusing to declare war on Sisi's state. Such a declaration could have turned Egypt into another Syria, drawing Muslim Brotherhood members from around the world to fight in Egypt. Sisi's technique to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood has provided him the opportunity to kill their members through incarceration, on the streets, and even through execution.[26] Prisoners in al-Sisi's regime have reported torture and deprivation of human rights, with some being

denied the opportunity to see their families for more than 5 years. This historical repetition echoes when Nasser employed similar strategies, leading to the emergence of terrorist movements.

Wilayat Sinai is another terrorist movement that emerged in 2014 with Islamism[27] and Qubtism ideologies, focusing on instituting violence in Sinai, Egypt. Wilayat Sinai is actually a movement that rejects democracy and political discourse. It has affiliations with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS),[28] promoting its ideology online and targeting Islamic youths, especially those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement emphasises that democracy has not brought prosperity or strengthened the Islamic community; rather, it has resulted in loss and weakness for the ummah. Unfortunately, Wilayat Sinai's propaganda has succeeded in recruiting members from the Muslim Brotherhood who agree that violence is the path to achieving Islamic victory. Believing in such an ideology poses a threat to the Islamic movement more than Sisi's state.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of establishing an Islamic movement is likely a reaction to oppression or to fulfill a religious desire. By examining Egypt under Nasser and Sisi, it becomes apparent that Islamic movements were provided with a platform to pursue their agendas. However, during Nasser's era, this led to the emergence of many terrorist movements as a response to state terrorism. Similarly, after Sisi's downfall or if his tight security grip is loosened, it is likely that such movements may resurface. It is understood that dictatorships exert rigorous control over the state to ensure their survival, but in doing so, they often neglect the social problems that may give rise to terrorism.

Terrorist movements could be confronted through decapitation or negotiation, but this does not necessarily signify their end. Another technique, which has been neglected by the Egyptian state, is to provide opportunities for moderate Islamic movements to play a role in mobilisation and recruitment. As exemplified by the Muslim Brotherhood, it managed to fill the state's role in welfare assistance. This approach could prove useful and potentially open the field for democracy and religious discourses. The examined terrorist movements have lacked religious legitimacy in promoting their ideology, failed to establish effective channels of communication and mobilisation, faced oppressive authorities seeking to quash their emergence in the political scene, and encountered a populace that consistently rejects violence except in response to external invasion or aggression.

The most significant failure of terrorist movements is their lack of a clear ideology that can be articulated in books and pamphlets for their supporters. They have primarily relied on emotional techniques to promote an elusive goal – establishing Islamic states. This leaves many questions unanswered by Egyptians, particularly regarding their understanding of what an Islamic state entails and how it would be implemented in a country with diverse religious beliefs. Towards the end, the re-emergence of terrorist movements is likely, highlighting the need for the state to provide opportunities for moderate Islamic movements to act in society and promote religious emancipation. This should involve ceasing the arrest of political prisoners and opening the field for political discourses.

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