

Deradicalization of Pesantren Education in Indonesia



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ABSTRACT: This study seeks to uncover the structure of the practice of deradicalization of *pesantren* education carried out by Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyyah (RMI) in Indonesia. This study is critical because Indonesia's increasing radicalism encourages several institutions' intensification of deradicalization. RMI is an autonomous body of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), one of Indonesia's largest community organizations, with interest in eliminating radicalism. This research is field research with a qualitative approach and uses data collection by interview, observation, and documentation. The researchers analyzed the data using the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens. The practice of *pesantren* education deradicalization of RMI was constructed by three structures, namely the significance of the basic principles of RMI and the *pesantren* principles established by NU, dominance in the form of political and cultural facilities, and legitimacy in the form of norms and sanctions based on the basic principles of RMI and the tenets of *Pesantren* established by Nahdlatul Ulama.

KEYWORDS: Structure, Deradicalization Practice, *Pesantren* Education, Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyyah

INTRODUCTION

The shift from Industrial society to postindustrial (M.A. Ghufroon, 2018) gave rise to various social changes, including in the context of religion (Anizoba, 2022). Turner stated that the postindustrial era is the era of world desecularization. This era was marked by the emergence of revivalism and religious fundamentalism (Turner, 2008).

Several studies have shown increased religious revivalism and radicalism in Southeast Asia (Manurnoor, 2009), including Indonesia. This tendency is manifested in the form of political Islam displayed by revivalist and radical social and religious organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the

Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) (Shadi, 2017), Laskar Jihad (Asghar, 2015; Santosa and Sjuhro, 2019; Yahya and Sahidin, 2022), and Jama'ah Tabligh (Ma'mun, 2019).

Radicalism is a worrying phenomenon in Indonesia (Misbah, 2019a). It can be seen from Setara Institute's research which shows that throughout 2017 there were

155 cases of religious intolerance and violence (Habibie, 2017). While in August 2017, the Wahid Institute said 11 million people were willing to take radical action, 0.4% of Indonesia's population had acted radically, and 7.7% were ready to serve radically if possible (Aziz, 2018).

The phenomenon of radicalism even reaches the world of education as the target of infiltration of its radical doctrine (Suprpto, 2014; Yudha, 2019). The Setara Institute survey of high school students in Jakarta and Bandung in 2016 showed that 2.4 percent of students were categorized as active or radical intolerant, and 0.3 percent were potential terrorists (Institute, 2016). A BNPT poll in 2017 showed that 39% of students in 15 provinces were interested in radicalism, and Riau was included in the 15 regions studied. Some other areas are West Java, Lampung, Banten, Southeast Sulawesi, and Central Kalimantan (Aziz, 2018).

Even BNPT also released that *pesantren* as a place to study religious knowledge is also not free from radicalism. Nineteen *pesantren* in Indonesia are indicated to teach doctrines that contain radicalism (Armenia, 2016).

This reality encourages the government to intensify the deradicalization program by cooperating with various elements of society, both social organizations and non-governmental organizations (Widiyanto, 2016; Hernawati, 2019). The government cooperates with NU to carry out national deradicalization programs in the communities and educational institutions, including in *pesantren* (Darmadji, 2011; Online, 2010).

NU's involvement in the deradicalization program is strategic because its social ethics are based on moderation and tolerance (Baso, 2006; Nur et al., 2020). As one of the largest socio-religious organizations in Indonesia, NU agrees with a moderate ideology

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represented by a theological standpoint of non-violence, acceptance of the Republic of Indonesia and modern values such as human rights and democracy, and develops a tradition of pluralism and religious tolerance (Hilmy, 2013).

Considering that one of the factors driving radicalism is a conservative and exclusive understanding of religion (A'la, 2008; Jati, 2013; Yunanto, 2018), moderate religiosity is vital to eliminate religious manipulation to justify terrorism and the use of violence that is contrary to Islamic teachings (Azra, 2005; Widiyanto, 2022).

In addition, NU has affiliations with the majority of pesantren (Ghufron, 2014), so the range of its intervention in developing moderate religiosity is broader compared to other religious organizations. NU has an autonomous body that handles religious education and pesantren, Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyyah (RMI), spread across 33 provinces and 340 districts throughout Indonesia (RMI-NU Kab. Malang, 2018).

For this reason, the deradicalization program in religious education and pesantren is very dependent on RMI's work. Some programs are carried out to minimize the influence of radicalism in *pesantren* so that *pesantren* avoid radicalism exposure and students have moderate religiosity. Accordingly, research on this is significant to reveal the structure of its deradicalization practice.

THEORETICAL REVIEW

Radicalization, according to Azra, was one of them triggered by national and global political realities which marginalized and repressed the people and Islamic countries. The religious roots of political radicalism are related to moral decline due to Western and Christian domination, post-independence political dissatisfaction that does not accommodate Islamic sharia and repressive and anti-Islamic New Order authority. The problem of radicalism lies in the manipulation of religious teachings to justify terrorism and the use of violence contrary to the mission of Islamic education (Azra, 2005).

Radicalism is classified into three models: first, the Islamic purification of the interpretations of the scholars; second, the teachings of Islam are interpreted conservatively as a basis for building society and the state; and third, theological legitimacy of acts of violence carried out to achieve its objectives (building an Islamic state and global caliphate) (Jati, 2013).

Radicalism has three main tendencies: resistance to old thought and order both socially and institutionally, efforts to carry out institutional and social transformations that are considered deviant, and the use of doctrinal or ideological justifications that stimulate emotional reactions and violence (Muzakki, 2014). Through the framing model, Hiariej argues that the collective identity of radical groups is Muslim activists who fight for the values and teachings of true religion. The group chooses to uphold the truth of religion and carry the sacred mission of faith (the implementation of shari'a strictly and comprehensively because Islam is holistic in both ethical and practical levels, jihad) (Hiariej, 2010).

Radicalism is related to issues of religious understanding, social, cultural, and political-economic aspects. Hence, the movement of radicalism has several orientations, namely political (power struggles and criticism of globalization which is far from idealism), religious and cultural (cultural revival/counterdominant culture). Thus, the approach to dealing with radicalism is multidisciplinary. Several strategies for deradicalization, therefore, can be carried out through military channels, counter-arguments, dialogues, cooperation, empowerment, and social, economic, political, and cultural improvement (Hibban, 2014).

Several studies have shown that the emergence of radicalism among young Indonesians is influenced by psychological factors, national and international political conditions, textual religious texts, the loss of role models, and the search for new charismatic figures (Widyaningsih et al., 2017).

According to Rokhmad's research, formal education institutions become very vulnerable to radical teachings due to a lack of students' religious understanding, Islamic study units in schools are handled by outsiders, and textbooks still contain extreme content. Some strategies are necessary to carry out. The first is to carry out preventive deradicalization by comprehensively understanding Islam and promoting the concept of *Islam rahmatan lil alamin* and brotherhood). The second is deradicalization with moderate Islamic preservation and anti-radicalism campaign. The third is curative deradicalization with intensive dialogue and counseling (Rokhmad, 2012).

Muchith also proposed several efforts to eliminate radicalism in the education institution. The first is teaching the ideology of *ahlussunnah wal jama'ah*, namely moderation (*tawasuth*), balance (*tawazun*), justice (*tidal*), and universality (*tatharruf*). The second is strengthening the network of cooperation with internal and external schools. The third is optimizing the application of the Teacher and Lecturer Law number 14 of 2015, which guarantees the protection of teachers in carrying out their duties and functions as educators (Muchith, 2016).

Other research on the relationship between *pesantren* and radicalism shows internal *pesantren* efforts to design a moderate and tolerant *pesantren* education system and culture. There prevails a dialectical mechanism in the *pesantren's* internal to prevent radicalism in the *pesantren*, both discursive and practical. The dialectic of radicalism and anti-radicalism in *pesantren* shows that with the perspective of the Hegelian dialectic theory, the existence of radicalism in *pesantren* automatically indicates the presence of anti-radicalism (Kusmanto, Fauzi and Jamil, 2015; Yahya and Sahidin, 2022).

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RESEARCH METHODS

This research includes field research (Hadeli, 2006) using a qualitative approach (Sugiyono, 2006), with its object being The Structure of Deradicalisation Practices of Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyyah. Using the purposive sampling technique, we took three samples of RMI administrators and two *pesantren* leaders.

Data collection methods used were in-depth interviews with RMI administrators and *pesantren* figures using unstructured in-depth interviews (Sugiyono, 2006), document studies, and moderate participant observation of various phenomena in the field (Sugiyono, 2006). In other words, in this data collection, researchers used the triangulation method (Emmert et al., 1971; Sugiyono, 2015) and the triangulation technique of data sources. This method is used to obtain data about the profile of RMI and the deradicalization practice of *pesantren*.

All data obtained in the process of collecting data (through observation, interviews, and documentation) are processed through several steps (a) taking notes in a logbook, (b) doing the electronic recording and organizing according to their categories. In addition, the data is organized by giving code to each data subsystem, according to their respective classifications.

After the data is collected, the organization and processing of data are carried out through Miles and Huberman's analysis stages cited by Sugiyono (Kaelan, 2005; Sugiyono, 2006), namely; data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification (Laverty, 2016). The theory used to analyze data is Anthony Giddens's structuration theory.

RESULTS

The practice of deradicalization conducted by RMI is produced in the social context and thus affected by the existing social structures. RMI uses a variety of structures in the dimension of significance, domination, and legitimacy, including the various modalities derived from the historical and social context surrounding them.

Signification Structure

RMI has characterized radicalism based on its fundamental principles. They are the principle of *taṭawwur* (development in gradual), *tawasut* (moderate), *i'tidāl* (straight, the middle attitude with the essence of justice in fairness), *tawazun* (balanced), and *Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (commanding the right and forbidding the wrong) (Baharun, 2017). Radicalism is then understood in some indications. First, radical groups are extreme and are not in a moderate position. Second, claim the truth and consider the other opinion false and heretical. These two characteristics contradict the Medina charter doctrine that emphasizes moderation, fairness, and tolerance of differences. Third, the curriculum and its organization are not affiliated with large organizations, such as NU or Muhammadiyah, so they are categorized as Salafi. Fourth is the use of the veil (*cadar*) for women. Fifth, the building is closed and exclusive, so it is not accessible to the broader community (Nur et al., 2020).

Suppose referring to Qodir stating that radicalism emerged because of several factors, namely religious, social, cultural, and political understanding (Qodir, 2014; Sila & Fealy, 2022). From the description, the radicalism in the RMI view is more due to the religious understanding factor, affecting the practice of deradicalization that tends to concern the spiritual aspects alone. While social, cultural, and political factors are not part of RMI's interpretive scheme in radicalism discourse and its deradicalization.

The interpretation scheme of radicalism by RMI constitutes its deradicalization practice. The intolerant and sectarian attitudes of the radical group (Shahzad et al., 2022) arose because of the absence of knowledge and internalization of the doctrine of *aswaja / Ahl asl-sunnah wa al-jama'ah* (the group that holds on the Prophet, his followers, and the previous religious scholars) in the collective cognition and consciousness of the individuals. The doctrine of *aswaja* must be implanted in the form of knowledge and practical attitude of the *santris* (students in Islamic boarding schools)—the more intensive and collective the planting, the more influential the result. (Misbah, 2019b). It is in line with Muchith's statement that eliminating radicalism in education is necessary some efforts, one of which is the teaching of the ideology of the Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah consisting of five things, namely: *tawasuth* (moderation), *tawazun* (balance), *i'tidal* (justice), *tasamuh* (toleration) and *tatharruf* (develop gradually) (Muchith, 2016). RMI also emphasized the importance of organizational introduction and planting NU to protect the *santris* from exposure to radicalism. By collaborating with IPNU, RMI took the initiative to develop new students at the *pesantren* senior high school. Since 2019, RMI has held MAKESTA activities (Member Loyalty Period) for 2-3 days to introduce NU as an organization. It also accommodates students as members of IPNU (Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama / Nahdlatul Ulama Student Association) and IPPNU (Ikatan Pelajar Puteri Nahdlatul Ulama / Nahdlatul Ulama Women's Student Association) members (Andrik et al., 2021). In cooperation with IPNU, RMI forms the commission of IPNU in boarding schools or the commission of *Pesantren*. The program is a strategic effort to organizationally mainstream doctrines and practices of *aswaja* and NU. Mainstreaming *Aswaja* and NU are considered able to equip the students to have a moderate ideology, tolerant, appreciate and accept a difference of opinion under religious life in plural Indonesia.

Although radicalism's religious roots are more political, Azra confirms that deradicalization can be done by mainstreaming with moderate-friendly Islam to all beings (Azra, 2005; Machali, 2014). In this context, understanding the *aswaja* of the doctrinal-moderate (Baso, 2006) character can be one of the solutions to eliminate the extreme and intolerant understanding and attitude.

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The practice of deradicalization in the high school environment can be a solution to the reproductive tendencies of radical understanding prevalent there. The social change from globalization raises much uncertainty, thereby creating the demands of life's certainty. In a religious context, it no longer contains profane and sacred, but it is all considered sacred, giving rise to the assurance of life (Qodir, 2014). Young people in high school also feel it. This condition is then captured by a religious teacher or mentor teacher of students' religious activities (*rakhis*) exposed to radicalism to instill a radical understanding of religion (Iswahyudi, Udin Safala, 2021; Qodir, 2014).

In reality, it is crucial to provide high-level students with a tolerant and moderate religious understanding of religion. Therefore, in collaboration with *pesantren*, RMI requires students at level *Aliyah* (senior high school) class XII to participate in PKPNU (education cadres NU) activities. This effort is made to foster love and militancy towards the ideology of NU, which is considered to maintain religious tolerance and integration of the Republic of Indonesia.

Structure Domination

As a NU autonomous body, RMI has internal structural authority to perform various programs of coaching, facilitation, supervision, and development of *pesantren*, especially those affiliated with NU. It leads RMI, including in the Tegal district, to be involved by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in conducting data collection and monitoring of boarding schools in the Tegal Regency area. It also gained political authority to give recommendations and approval for the *pesantren* to obtain operational permits from The Ministry.

This authority became the political modality of RMI to gain power in a *pesantren* environment both within and outside NU. Its power area, limited initially to the construction and supervision of *pesantren* in the internal environment of NU, extends to all boarding schools affiliated with the community and religious organizations of any kind, including NU, Muhammadiyah, Salafi, etc. The scope of authority and power of RMI, which is increasingly extensive, is very beneficial for RMI. Moreover, the Ministry of Religious Affairs then formed the Forum Komunikasi Pondok *Pesantren*/FKPP (Islamic boarding school communication forum) as a medium of communication and coordination between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and boarding schools throughout the Tegal Region. The presence of FKPP is also a bridge of coordination, information delivery, and data collection of *pesantren* in the Tegal district (Nahado, 2019). Due to the limited human resources in Kemenag, FKPP accommodates the caretaker *pesantren* in the section of management and its membership (Kemenag Cilacap, 2016), mostly RMI. This condition certainly gives the opportunity and greater political structural authority for RMI to integrate the policies and interests of RMI in the FKPP. This double position in the context of supervision and logging of *pesantren* becomes more authoritative.

RMI, together with PCNU, also provides recommendations to the Ministry of Education in Tegal not to recruit religious teachers or *rohisi* (the coach of religious activities of students) who are indicated radical. This recommendation was subsequently instructed to the entire school principal in Tegal not to provide opportunities for religious teachers or religious escort teachers who are indications of extreme teaching or accompanying students' religious activities (Misbah, 2019b). Although this recommendation has not been fully accommodated in the form of rules, to some extent, the Ministry of Education's instruction stemmed from the request of RMI, indicating that the political structural authority of RMI is recognized by making its recommendation as one of its instructional references. At the structural level (Thomson, 2007), political and economic facilities can be a source of domination. RMI's political authority is a modality whose use has resulted in power not only in *pesantren* circles but also in educational institutions under the control of the Ministry of Education. Its various deradicalization efforts are accommodated and incorporated into several education policies in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education.

RMI's power modality seeks political and cultural facilities that can be utilized and used to gain power and public acceptance. Suppose Giddens only mentions the existence of two types of facilities as a modality of domination (political and economic) (Giddens, 1979) in the context of RMI Tegal. In that case, other cultural facilities can be the capital to dominate the discourse and practice of radicalism and deradicalization in Tegal. Referring to Bordieou (Bourdieu, 2007), cultural capital is one of the capitals that RMI can use to gain power and public acceptance. In this context, the position of Kyai or Habib, alone from the NU circles, is a cultural capital that can be used to dominate power. It means that as part of the NU, RMI has a cultural facility that allows it to dominate the meaning of radicalism that is accepted by the public, both state and community institutions. The cultural facilities of RMI have allowed the practice of famous people in RMI to get public acceptance. In some cases, it is an unusual practice among NU and sometimes even labeled radical. However, due to the cultural ideology, RMI and the figures in it have the capacity and religious practices of the Nahdiyyah, the practice and spiritual understanding that differs from the mainstream of the NU, received positively, even then affects religious practices or society. Thus, the second political and cultural facilities on the level of structure to be a source of RMI domination in the fight for ideology and power in the world of *pesantren* education and efforts of deradicalization in *pesantren*.

The Legitimacy Structure

In the legitimacy dimension, the norm is used as a modality in the area of interaction manifested using sanctions. When the agent applies sanctions, it uses norms that, at the level of the structure, become a source of legitimacy (Giddens, 1984). The legitimacy structure of RMI includes the principles and norms of RMI and NU as reference and measure in monitoring and evaluating the

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practice of deradicalization in *pesantren*. The first principle to be a reference is that the *pesantren* must continue to teach the books *turast / Kitab Kuning* (previous ulama's works), still retain the NKRI, based on Pancasila and the Constitution 1945. If boarding schools fulfill the principle, RMI will issue a recommendation letter for permission to operate *pesantren*. Otherwise, as the *pesantren* is not based on Pancasila and the Constitution 1945, pro caliphate, teach the radical ideas, RMI will not give the recommendation letter to get an operational permit from the Ministry of Religious Affairs district Tegal. If a *pesantren* meets RMI principles or requirements, they can obtain active permits and conduct education in *pesantren*. If not following the norm, the *pesantren* does not have formal legitimacy to run education and learning activities.

The case happened in *Pesantren Ash-Shaafi'iyah* in Watuagung, located in district Tegal. After the observation, the religious and educational practices did not follow the norms the RMI set. For instance, the *pesantren* perform Friday prayers in the mosque in the Islamic school, even though the quantity is not reaching 40 people. The curriculum was only the Qur'an and the translated hadith, with no study of the *Kitab Kuning* (previous ulama's works usually studied at *pesantren*). The extracurricular activities are archery and horse riding as a form of following the Prophet, and the building and access are closed. This *pesantren* is not recommended to get operational permits, but according to KH Samsul, the ticket is finally out because of political authority's support (Misbah, 2019b). Some similar cases also occur when RMI does not provide recommendations due to radical indications. Still, operational permits remain down even get a variety of assistance from the Ministry of Religious Affairs because it has a relationship with the executive or legislative. It means that the norm used by RMI by giving sanctions in the form of delays or rejection of the operational permits in some cases is not successful as a source of RMI's legitimacy. In this case, there is a higher strength that establishes a particular norm different from RMI so that it can invalidate and cancel the sanction given RMI against the boarding school that is indicated radical (Mirza, 2013).

This description suggests that legitimacy is not fixed but negotiated by power relationships. Those who have higher powers will then arrange the norm and the sanction. In this context, RMI's legitimacy is defeated by the legitimacy of a higher ruler so that boarding schools that do not pass through the verification of radicalism by RMI can obtain operational permits from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It shows the legitimacy of the ruler if the approval of the Ministry of Education also became the party that gave the political facilities for RMI to supervise and coach the *pesantren*. The Ministry of Religious Affairs also provides political facilities to other groups of different ideologies and its political interest with RMI.

Negotiating legitimacy structures also arise when RMI establishes one of the radical indicators in the form of a *cadar* (veil covering the entire face). In its system of significance, RMI is not only radicalism in its ideological sides, which is not moderate, claims of truth, anti-NKRI, but also from the performance side of the use of *cadar*. This usage scheme is also the norm to evaluate and sanction the boarding schools indicated by radicals. But when kyai at NU and RMI advisor, namely Habib Muhammad, imposed the rules of use of *cadar* for his students, RMI did not apply the norm about the *cadar* and gave sanctions because of the usage. Considering other aspects, RMI's legitimacy is negotiating with more emphasis on the substantial ideological side than on its performance. Performative norms are reconciled in their application with more substantive criteria.

In the case of *cadar* use (Mirza, 2013), RMI tends to interpret it functionally rather than ideologically by explaining the benefits of its use in the context of interactions and relationships of young people now who tend to be free. The use of the *cadar* is considerable to maintain the view of the male gaze, avoid sexual attraction and be good for health. In case, it can serve as a solution to the problem of the morality of young people today, such as courtship that encourages free sex. This opinion, in turn, criticizes the views of some feminist figures who consider the veil a harmful practice for women (Jeffreys, 2005). On the other hand, this opinion reinforces the findings of Bullock and Glapka regarding the various meanings and benefits of the hijab for women. The purpose and advantages of the hijab include liberation, protection of women from men's gazes, symbols of femininity, freedom of choice for women, and signs of religiosity. (Bullock, 2002; Glapka, 2018; Golnaraghi & Dye, 2016).

The meaning of *cadar* is functionally strengthened by the use of the rule of *usul fiqh* (Islamic legal regulations), namely, "*al-hukmu yaduru ma'a 'illatihi wujudan was 'adamant*" (the law exists with its cause in realizing and negating the law). *Cadar* is allowed to use with *'illat* (cause/reason) of the existence of increasingly uncontrollable promiscuity, especially with the intensifying use of social media. As such, *cadar* is considered for RMI as the most effective solution for young morality today.

DISCUSSION

The structure of significance, dominance, and legitimacy greatly determines RMI's social actions in the deradicalization of pesantren education (Giddens, 1979). The meaning scheme used by RMI in interpreting radicalism and deradicalization is based on RMI's fundamental principles of *tawasut* (moderate), *tasamuh* (tolerant), *i'tidal* (fair), and *tawazun* (balanced) (Misbah, 2021). This principle takes NU's principles and social ethics as a socio-religious institution that houses RMI. Based on these principles, RMI interprets the indicators or characteristics of groups and *pesantren* that indicate radicalism and develops ways to deradicalize *pesantren*.

With this interpretative scheme, people or groups indicated as radical are characterized as extreme (not in the middle/moderate) (Muzakki, 2014; Nur et al., 2020). They have a truth claim (intolerant of other opinions), exclusive and closed (do not accept other

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ideas and do not respect them and consider heretical to other groups with different views), and the use of the veil (*hijab* that covers a woman's face except for both eyes) (Glapka, 2018), and the building of the cottage that is closed

All these traits are considered contrary to the RMI's fundamental principles and the NU's social ethics, so the group with these characteristics is labeled radical (Kusmanto et al., 2015; Manurnoor, 2009). Meanwhile, the basic principles of RMI and NU are considered under the Aswaja doctrine exemplified by previous scholars and under the directions contained in the Medina charter. The tenets of RMI are following the example given by the Prophet and passed on by the salaf scholars

Meanwhile, in terms of the educational curriculum, RMI uses an interpretive scheme in the form of *pesantren* must continue to teach *turast* books (Abdullah, 2016), still maintain the Republic of Indonesia, and are based on *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. This RMI meaning scheme is also following NU principles which are centered on preserving classical scientific traditions and at the same time accommodating scientific developments and contemporary realities. This dialectical (two-way) translation, according to Baso, is only possible because of the concept of cosmology adopted by NU, namely the Aswaja worldview (Baso, 2006).

"The Aswaja tradition allows NU citizens to see everything in a balanced, twoway, harmonious manner and from various edges. Aswaja covers aspects of theology, shari'a, and Sufism (morals, ethics). Taking only one aspect and ignoring the other will undermine this balanced and harmonious cosmic order"(Baso, 2006).

In addition, NU has a national attitude in the form of protection of the Republic of Indonesia consistently by adhering to the ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Andree Feillard talks about NU's relationship with power (Feillard, 2009). Based on the political doctrines of Sunni teachings that are more moderately oriented, NU political thinking and behavior often choose the middle path, although sometimes some are militant and radical. This moderate attitude also underlies NU's partiality toward Soekarno's nationalism, making Indonesia not an Islamic State but a State based on Pancasila. In certain situations, NU experienced doubts regarding the position of Islam in a country when the country's future depended on Islamic groups, as happened in August 1945. In addition, Feillard stated that when the "upper pass" Islamization scheme failed, NU used another method, namely "bottom-pass" Islamization, through the harmonization of Islam with Pancasila, which made it an ideological backdrop for students to integrate better with the Indonesian nation. Further changes were shown by the orientation of renewal in the social, religious, educational, and political fields that allowed NU to become a driving agent for strengthening the national brotherhood (Machali, 2014).

The same thing is also stated by Mawardi (Mawardi, 2006) that nu's sociopolitical thinking and work, especially in 1942-1945. NU's social fiqh prioritizes a moderate and tolerant attitude toward religion, a political stance to uphold Islamic sharia and the benefit of the people, as well as concern for the empowerment of society; NU takes a seemingly paradoxical attitude. Contrary to the enforcement of Islamic law, NU is resistant to Japan in certain situations. It accommodates Japanese policies tailored to NU's social fiqh in situations that endanger society socially and politically.

The practice of deradicalizing *pesantren* carried out by RMI is based on NU's social fiqh. This practice reproduces the structure of NU's meaning by using a modality scheme of importance based on NU's fundamental principles and social ethics. In RMI's belief, the Aswaja doctrine becomes the central reference for him in the meaning of radicalism discourse and the practice of deradicalization of *pesantren* as a whole. For example, when RMI believes that radicalism is the lack of religious understanding from Aswaja, the solution for deradicalization is providing Aswaja's cognitive and affective experience.

Another example is indications of radicalism that do not recognize the symbols of the Republic of Indonesia. The RMI organizes PKPNU, oriented towards not preparing cadres who have insight into NU-an organizationally but also NUdriving cadres who have sense and militant national attitudes to protect the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, education in schools also organizes activities that foster the spirit of nationalism, such as flag ceremonies, singing the song

Indonesia Raya, reading *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution, and respect for state symbols. With activities like this, RMI is consistent with NU's political stance to foster a spirit of nationalism to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in the domination structure, RMI uses political and cultural modalities to gain power and public acceptance personally, socially, and institutionally. In this realm, the RMI also reproduces the nu's domination structure with its political and cultural modalities. In this case, the political facilities owned by RMI are inseparable from its institutional status as an autonomous NU body engaged in managing Islamic boarding schools. Thus, the cooperation between RMI and the Ministry of Religion in providing political structural authority to provide recommendations as a condition for the reduction of Islamic boarding school operational permits from the Ministry of Religion is part of the cooperation between the Ministry of Religion and NU.

In addition, the existence of cultural facilities owned by RMI is also a social reproduction of artistic modalities from the religious structure in the NU environment. According to Baso, kyai do not act as passive *cultural brokers*, as Clifford Geertz said, but also look more like translators or active interpreters who live at the *crossroads of cultures* (Geertz, 1989). On the one hand, they act as translators or interpreters of NU discourse in the context of nationality and modernity. But on the other hand, it also translates and interprets the discourse of ethnicity and modernity in the context of NU-ness (Baso, 2006). This act shows that the kyai have a significant translational capacity in the life of contemporary religious societies. At the same time, this capacity is an effective cultural modality in the community and, therefore, can be used to gain power and public acceptance in people's lives.

CONCLUSION

The structure of the practice of deradicalization of *pesantren* education carried out by RMI covers three domains. Firstly, the sign structure is in the form of an RMI interpretation scheme for its deradicalization practices that refer to the basic principles of RMI and NU's social ethics, such as moderate, tolerant, balanced, and gradual. The number of deradicalization efforts undertaken is to instill reasonable understanding and religious attitude through seminars, organizational regeneration, and the formation of commissions in *pesantren*, and supervision and assistance to *pesantren* in the region.

Second, a domination structure with the modalities of political and cultural facilities resulted in the RMI's strength in fostering and supervising Islamic boarding schools, including formal and informal education. RMI's political facilities given by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, generating power in determining the presence of a *pesantren*, getting operational permits, and intervening in the policy of the Ministry of Education in the recruitment of religious teachers and religious assistants in schools (*rokhis*). Meanwhile, RMI's cultural facilities allow the practice of Kiai or religious leaders affiliated with NU to gain public acceptance from RMI. For example, in some cases, the emerging techniques that are not common among NU are sometimes categorized as radical for RMI, such as law enforcement for female students.

Thirdly, the legitimacy structure containing the norm's modality made RMI by referring to the basic principles and NU's social ethics; the direction that the *pesantren* must continue to teach the books *turast*, still retain the NKRI, based on Pancasila and the Constitution 1945. Compliance with these principles will determine the granting of recommendations for issuing *pesantren* operational permits and *pesantren* development assistance from the Ministry of Religion.

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