

Justification Theory of Internalism VS Externalism



Supriyanto

UIN Prof. K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri Purwokerto

ABSTRACT: Claims about the truth are often still based on each person's point of view. Thus, the question arises what makes a belief true? Belief (belief) is an attitude towards a certain statement, as a relationship between the subject and the proposition. There are several types of beliefs, (1) Dispositional belief, which is a proposition that we can but not accept or consider, (2) occurrent belief, an acceptance of that proposition. In this study, two patterns of belief were found, namely internalist and externalism. The two stand in dichotomously different spaces. The debate between the two in contemporary epistemology appears focused on adequate explanations of epistemic justification. Internalists can provide justification for danya's beliefs by corresponding to their perspectives and views. Contrary to that, Externalism allows at least some justification factor of a belief to be outside the cognitive perspective of the agent.

KEYWORDS: Justification, Internalism, externalism

I. INTRODUCTION

In everyday life, one often asks about the opinion of something, be it in a trivial or serious matter. Claims are usually expressed and sometimes in a fairly convincing tone. The question rolls back around, "what makes your beliefs true"?

This question, according to Pojman is an epistemic question, which intends to investigate a person how he claims the belief is true. Some epistemologists interpret this question in two ways: (1) what is the reason for a person to believe something, or (2) a fairly justified condition for believing it. (Niiniluoto, Sintonen, and Woleński 2004, 472) the first question demands a basic explanation of that belief, while the second asks for an explanation of how it is maintained.

Belief (belief) is an attitude towards a certain statement, as a relationship between the subject and the proposition. There are several types of beliefs, (1) dispositional belief, which is a proposition that we can but not accept or consider, (2) occurrent belief, an acceptance of that proposition. (Lemos 2007, 8)

In the discourse of epistemology, knowledge is a justified true belief. Back to belief, it means that belief can be wrong and can also be right. But how is that belief considered true? The term "truth" can be studied epistemology is sometimes understood as a "proposition that corresponds to reality". (Bernecker and Pritchard 2011, 4)

If knowledge is true belief, then how to justify that truth. In general justification is finding standards of acceptance or doing the right thing. As for in the context of epistemology, the confluence between standards of acceptance and possession of epistemological status. (Pojman 2000, 15)

There is a principled difference between the nature of truth and the nature of justification. The nature of truth has nothing to do with the acceptance of the subject. This means that this truth is external, the domain of discussion in the theory of truth. While the second relates to one's acceptance of something. Sometimes something "right" (truth) is not believed by someone because it does not conform to his justification. On the contrary, something false is accepted as a belief, because it corresponds to its justification. It can also be said that justification is more psychological-perceptual, while truth is factual-realities.

Historically, the traditional discourse on justification theory is a controversy between Foundationalism and Coherentism. Both are against skepticism that has the idea of unrighteousness, or no justifiable attitude and notoriety. This principle of doubt is based on the infinite retreat argument (regress argument). (Bernecker and Pritchard 2011, 26–27)

Foundationalism exists to provide a stopping point in the form of a strong argument, which can take the form of absolute certainty or metaphysical. A foundational relationship can be insured if the foundation and what it supports have a close inferential relationship. (Bernecker and Pritchard 2011, 27) In this theory justification is subjective-individual.

Due to the nature of individuality, the school of Coherentism exists to involve linear relationships between persons with proportional value. This means that a belief is true if it is awakened from the chain of reasoning. In principle, the foundational basis is in the form of collective claims (intersubjectivity). Both of the above schools, according to Hamid Vahid, rest on the perspective of each subject's worldview. (Bernecker and Pritchard 2011, 28,145)

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The subjective nature of the above tradition gave rise to the term "internalism". This term has the meaning of a justification paradigm that emphasizes the footing of the "point of view-regardless it is true or not. One of the most prominent schools in the opposite position to it is Reliabilism, represented by Alvin Goldman, Marshall Swain and Ernest Sosa. (Poiman 2000, 135)

As a paradigm, justification theory undergoes a change in orientation. Thomas Kuhn conceptualizes that the paradigm (as: discipline matrix) is a very broad sense encompassing the entire constellation of beliefs, engineering values, and others held by a particular community. It has the following components: (1) symbolic generalizations, (2) metaphysical beliefs, (3) scientific values, (4) heuristic models, and (5) concrete examples of problem solving (puzzles). (Bird 2000, 67–68)

The theory of justification is seated in this flow positions a value embraced by a certain group, being the basis of justification and ultimately forming a peculiarity in knowledge. A community that holds certain values is alleged to have a distinctive way of accepting truth or belief. After all, these two affect the cognitive state related propositions. This condition in time became pedagogical characteristics, which resulted in the formation of a paradigmatic culture and resulted in a pattern in the development of science. (Nickles 2003, 189)

In this paper, the author wants to discuss two "theories of justification", namely internalism and externalism in the frame of the Kuhn paradigm. In order to dissect it, the author proposes two formulations of the problem. First, related to the character of the paradigm of internalism and externalism. Two, the influence of each is still in the development of science.

INTERNALISM VS EXTERNALISM

Internalists and externalists stand in dichotomously different spaces. The debate between the two in contemporary epistemology appears focused on adequate explanations of epistemic justification. Internalists can provide justification for danya's beliefs by corresponding to their perspectives and views. Contrary to that, Externalism allows at least some justification factor of a belief to be outside the cognitive perspective of the agent. (Bernecker and Pritchard 2011, 144)

The history of Internalism starts from Plato, Aristotle, modern times to Contemporary. Rene Descartes and John Locke, who became pillars of modern epistemology and B. Russell were internalists. So do contemporary epistemologists such as Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, John Pollock, Laurence Bonjour, William Alston, Robert Audi, Richard Foley, Earl Conee, and Richard Feldman. As for externalism, in two branches, namely Reliabilism and Substantive Naturalism, it is represented by Alvin Goldman, Marshall Swain, and Ernest Sosa, along with D. M. Armstrong, W. V. Quine, Fred Dretske, and Robert Nozick. (Poiman 2000, 135–36)

Internalists are divided into two versions, namely: (1) mental/perspectival internalism and (2) access internalism. Niiniluoto, et al supplement it with (3) awareness internalism. (Niiniluoto, Sintonen, and Woleński 2004, 486) Mental internalism is the most natural form of internalism. They assume that one's justification for holding a belief is above one's mental state, so no two people are in an identical mental state. It means that one person can be right, and it can be wrong for another. The second version does not approve of the provision of privileges for certain mental states. "Access" here means not just a knowledge, it must be analyzed as direct or introspective involvement. That is, whether or not the justification is strong depends on the consciousness of the constituency of the justification of the object. (Bernecker and Pritchard 2011, 145–46) The above access according to some epistemologists is considered weak, so it takes actual awareness that makes that belief justified. This idea was pioneered by William Alston. (Niiniluoto, Sintonen, and Woleński 2004, 487)

Accessibility in justification opens up a space for investigation into our own beliefs, so that we not only know what we believe, but how we believe them. A belief may be properly based on the perceptions, memories, emotions, testimonials or conclusions of the beliefs of others. It can also be said to open up the transparency of the belief background. In addition, Poiman added a condition called "responsibility." This condition means an attitude of refraining from "rushing to believe or not believing" (dispositional attitude), and also comparing the reliability and strength of the beliefs and evidence found. (Poiman 2000, 135) In Indonesian editorial, conditions like this are likely to match "honesty" rather than "responsibility".

Justified true belief in Plato's hands depends on evidence that can justify. S knows p = S believes p, p is correct, S has sufficient evidence for p. (Nicolacopoulos and Nicolacopoulos 1990, 46) this is slightly different from Aristotle who placed more emphasis on process. S knows p only if, because q (p because q). (Burnyeat and Barnes 1980, 204). As a nonindifferent foundationalist, Descartes sought that foundation by applying the sceptical method in order to find certainty. This means that the foundation of justification must be a definite argument. To be able to justify p on the basis of a particular proposition E1, one must justify E1, by basing it on E2 and so on (S leaning E1 leaning E2). The regress argument here is intended to find an adequate foundation, not relative argument (Fumerton 2018, 1473, 1475) (but rather an a priori absolute).

Contemporary internalists might call it Laurence Bonjour and James Pryor. According to Richard Feldman, the two are in opposite "sub-camps"; traditional foundationalists and non-traditional foundationalists. Both both admit justification comes from internal attitudes, while the difference is the acceptance of "supervenience" from external facts. The formula is simple: if S is identified O, and believes its base S, and there is no "denial", then the proposition of S to O, is true for S. (Feldman 2004, 136, 138) this view of Feldman is, according to the author, a Coherent refutation to the Foundationalist camp with evidence of the requirement of "no disclaimer" (defeaters-external conditions from perspective).

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Coherentism is, in principle, a view of a proposition justified by the astonishment of the system of astonishment. (Runehov and Azari 2013, 418) this is a manifestation of the rejection of the existence of basic beliefs. The formula is simple: (1) The belief p corresponds to S. (2) the belief corresponding to the S "likely" is true. (Niiniluoto, Sintonen, and Woleński 2004, 479,281-282) The problem that arises here is the absence of foundational belief as a benchmark. This means that there is an argumentative turnaround between the members of the group, justifying each other, and finally turning endlessly.

Of course this gave rise to further controversy in the eyes of other epistemologists. Ernest Sosa claimed that this turnaround was a type of regress, which he meant as the abolition of the principle of supervenience by which he thought it was an epistemic requirement. Therefore, a second camp emerged, namely externalists, who emphasized objective factors. The two main branches of objective externalism are Reliabilism and substantive naturalists.


Reliabilism, assuming that belief is justified and gives it knowledge only if it is associated with something that makes it right, using the right way, that is, by "reliable" mechanics, methods or cognitive. (Almeder and Hogg 1989, 166) Justification is not a matter of arguments shown, but rather how to get that conviction. Alvin Goldman formulated as follows: belief S terhadap p is true if (1) belief p is the result of a reliable process, (2) relevant certain alternatives possessed by S, there is no similarity of perception that causes the error of belief, (3) belief about p is true. (Pojman 2000, 137, 144–45)

Marshall Swain, one of the Reliabilists who refuted BonJour, cited the following justification pattern: S's belief in R-based h (p) is epistemically correct at time t, only if S's belief in h is a reliable indication of h in t. (Swain 1981, 396) the difference with Goldman is the assertiveness of the indication of reliability that emphasizes the "relativeity" of belief formation. R to h in t1 could be different from R – h in t2. However this is against Internalists who emphasize the basic foundation is a certain belief that is timeless.

The later version of externalism was the rationalist substantive. They reject the notion of the need for justification in knowledge. D. M. Armstrong and Fred Dretske conceptualized that there must be a lawlike connection between the truth of what he believes in and that belief. Robert Nozick suffices only the availability of adequate counterfactual conditions. W. V. Quine and Goldman (on different grounds) advocated that epistemology be transferred towards psychology, rather than normative epistemology. Where he studied the causal relationship between sensory input and theoretical output. (Pojman 2000, 135)

Knowles in Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology, says Quine is a strong proponent of anti-foundationalism and non-normative psychologism. Anti-foundationalism rejects metaphysical claims (blasphemy on a general conception) in the formation of beliefs that result in anti-apriorism. Whereas anti-psychologism rejects the generalization of the experimental principle as a form of the human cognitive system. (Knowles 2003, 37–38) This idea seems more radical in assessing the truth of a science.

For this flow, it can be described in the scheme below:



Sumber: (Knowles 2003, 71)

The vertical arrow is the direction of justification while the thick horizontal one is the progress over time. N1 and so on is the norm (inductive rule). H1 and next is the hypothesis. Hypotheses are "ordinary hypotheses" about worldviews and norms are the result of induction. The pattern suggests that although the inductive results show the same value, it cannot be used as a logical basis for generalizing similar cases because there is no guarantee that it will be so forever. (Knowles 2003, 71–72)

The naturalist substantive camp in this case completely removes the justification from the pre-observational conception. This is blatantly against Plato's doctrine that belief is different from knowledge (knowledge). (Nicolacopoulos and Nicolacopoulos 1990, 45) belief is science, and knowledge is science. There is no belief except science.

Thus, the dynamics of internalism vs. externalism color the course of epistemological conceptions. Below, the author will use the paradigm theory of Thomas Khun to analyze the dynamics in shaping the influence for the development of knowledge.

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THE PARADIGM OF JUSTIFICATION IN THE ILLUMINATION OF THOMAS KUHN'S THEORY

Before reviewing the position of justification theory, it is important to review Kuhn's theory of paradigm shift a little. It is mentioned by Marcum that paradigms work as "guides" in individual and collective contexts in scientific work (pre-paradigm/immature science). For certain communities, it is a "standard" (assessment) for normality in a science (normal science). Sometimes in carrying out "normal science" discoveries produce things that undermine paradigm expectations, resulting in 'anomaly' in both theoretical and experimental settings. The anomaly when it reaches the top and cannot solve the puzzle (puzzle solution) then its status becomes 'crisis' (turn into crisis), which demands extraordinary science characterized by blurring paradigm boundaries and easing paradigmatic rules. It is intended for 'breeding' theory. Eventually it will become a new paradigm-science over worldview. (Marcum 2005, 59–73) Bird argues that in Kuhn's theory this sort of connects perceptions between individuals or groups of researchers with "similarity" and "cognitive habituation" (for the author prefers to call directing) research techniques, experiments and problem identification. (Bird 2000, 183–84).

In the development of science, epistemology in both the context of discovery (the construction of novelties) and the context of justification (validation of novelty) (Gunstone 2015, 299) occupies a central role. Experimental discoveries, directly or indirectly, will open up new horizons in the worldview.

Regarding the theory of justification, Internalism places novelty in the lens of perspectives brought from the realm of the metaphysical world. This means that the general-universal term acts as a conceptual denotative umbrella must first be established in order to gain the legitimacy of truth (non-sceptical). (Feldman 2004, 140) (Sceptical) Fundationalists, one of them Descartes, with pure rationality would force new things into greater conceptual territory, and on its basis the foundation should be general, logical, definite and absolute. (BonJour and Sosa 2003, 173) We do not deny the merits of Certesian logic in turning argument regress into a method of finding its basic postulates. However, it is still very closed from the external world. So is Coherentism, the similarity of perspectives on which it is based, the position of the paradigm of knowledge locked in its community, and may not be able to see the advantages of other paradigms that might just be more relevant to be used as a methodological graft. When the 'Internalist paradigm' is used as a standard of justification, it will continue to revolve around itself, without being able to "marry" the theory with another theory, which may be relevant or alternative. Also, the arguments expressed may also only be acceptable to the group.

In this state, the mismatch between the conception of Internalist justification and reality will lead to an anomaly in the form of a gap between the world of personal and collective perception. This anomaly is felt because fundationalist justification is only 'individual', then coherentism exists to homogenize beliefs in an 'intersubjective' manner. In a more radical state, locked internalist patterns not only reduce factual reality, but also hinder the development of experiential acceptance. This is in line with the increasingly intensive exploration of science. The culprit is the 'anti-supervenience' that ushers that anomaly into a knowledge crisis.

As 'extraordinary science', a group called externalism is trying to overhaul the structure of justification from closed to open. The guardrail tried to be broken into by presenting 'factual accommodations' derived from limitation and naturalization. The author supposes that these two forms are a limitation of time and space for the formation of beliefs to have reliability. Being naturalized boils down to the use of experimental media as justification itself.

Externalists are increasingly increasingly criticizing internalists. This is an effort to transform extraordinary science into normal science. As reviewed in the naturalist above, that anti-fundamentalism tries to undermine the basic structure of fundamentalism because it is not objective, just as anti-psychologism tries to discard understanding as a cognitive activity.

PERSONAL OPINION

Kuhn's theory of paradigms, in the author's reading has an advantage in reading paradigmatic models of the intellectual work of researchers, one of which has the potential to find novelty judged by the theory of justification. However, perhaps in some ways (due to several factors, one of which is the author's lack of understanding of Kuhn's theory comprehensively) has certain limitations. Perhaps Kuhn's theory can read paradigmatic shifts in one particular region, meaning in the same science or person.

If that is the case, what happens in this stream is not covered by Kuhn's theory. This is because internalist vs external departs from a different point of view. Internalists are theoretical-metaphysical, while externalists depart from empirical-naturalists. So the "anomaly" that the author mentioned earlier is actually falsification. Mistakes found by others who disagree.

The theory of justification in the view of the above philosophers seems 'universal'. This means that one conception of justification is used in assessing any assessment of scientific discovery. According to the author, the two schools above have advantages on several sides in their respective regions, as well as their shortcomings. Internalism is suitable for constructive analysis, which assumes that all detractors have their own side of truth. It is also the postmodernist who outlines that any knowledge, including perception is formed by social constructions, and perhaps also in studies involving heterogeneous societies.

Meanwhile, externalism is suitable for experimental-based natural studies. The study of physics certainly cannot be built with doxa or relying on internal ideas. Because the development of science at this level is determined by the context of discovery. If you look at the externalist camp, even this "context of discovery" becomes the standard of acceptance (context of justification)-

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although there are general conditions such as the induction rule for the discovery to be acceptable. Realist and empirical epistemology may correspond to this.

CONCLUSIONS

Dynamics of Internalism vs Externalism comes in a dichotomous format, this is due to differences in points of departure. Internalism departs from subjective principles in general, fundasionalist internalists have an individual subjective pattern, coherntis internalists have an intersubjective pattern. On the one hand, The externalism of objectivity; externalist reliabilitis is cognitive objective, and substantive naturalist is naturalist object. If traced, the two have their own historical roots that converge in the supervenience anomaly. Both have their own disadvantages and advantages. Internalists excel in theoretical discourse but are weak in acceptance of experimental findings. In contrast, Externalism is more in experiential acceptance, yet weak in a priori theoretical discourse.

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