Desistance from Terrorism Forecasting: Idling Mode and Catalyst Event

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ABSTRACT: This study explains findings in the field related to the conditions faced by former terror perpetrators after undergoing a period of deradicalization. This study seeks to answer the question, "how is the forecasting of the typology of desistance from terrorism from terrorists who have stopped?" There are new findings related to forecasting conditions or events that can be a catalyst for former terrorists to return to commit acts of terror again. The forecast will include the development of idling mode conditions that tend to be experienced by former terror perpetrators. After idling mode, the catalyst event was found that encourages former terrorists to return to action. This condition is also inseparable from the influence of globalization which has resulted in a lot of information, in which former perpetrators of terror are involved and have a role in the organization of terrorism. On the other hand, there are conditions of former terrorists trapped in 'dependence states' of terrorist organizations, which causes them to be unable to escape from terrorist activities. This analysis is based on the findings of focus group discussions conducted in as many as three meetings. This focus group discussion has engaged practitioners and stakeholders related to the handling and countermeasures of terrorism and radicalism. In addition, to get comprehensive data, focus group discussion has also involved former perpetrators of terrorism as a credible choice.

KEYWORDS: Terrorism, Desistance from Terrorism, Deradicalization, Idling Mode, Catalyst Event

I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia uses two types of approaches in handling terrorism, namely the soft approach and hard approach based on Law No. 5 of 2018 dated June 21, 2018, on Changes to Law No. 15 of 2003 on The Establishment of Government Regulations instead of Law No. 1 of 2002 on Combating Terrorism Into Law. It can be explained that the hard approach generally contains an offensive framework that includes the deployment of force or military, legal approaches, and various policies and laws, as well as defensive, containing all efforts of intelligence, infrastructure protection, and border security. While the soft approach comes into contact with the social, political, communication, and ideological dimensions (Ansori, 2019).

However, it found that a soft approach implemented through deradicalization programs does not guarantee to inhibit the emergence of recidivist behavior of terrorism crimes. Previous research by Supmter (2017) explained that deradicalization programs by the Government of Indonesia are less effective, as they do not consider cooperation with community groups that already have strong grassroots networks, direct experience, and legitimacy requirements to deal with former terrorists. Widya's research (2020). found that deradicalization programs do not work well because they have weaknesses related to cooperation with institutions in Indonesia.

Being radicalized is a gradual process that requires progress through different situations and does not happen in a quick and easy time. An individual cannot become radicalized overnight even if there is an event that can speed up the process (catalyst event). Veldhuis & Staun in their paper Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model (2009) mentions that catalysts are also contributing factors to radicalization. Veldhuis & Staun (2009) also distinguishes between causal factors at the macro and micro levels (causes) with catalyst events. Following the thinking of Martha Crenshaw (1981) who distinguishes between root causes or prerequisites as a factor called 'set the stage for terrorism over the long run' from trigger causes which are specific events and chronologically precede violent activity, Veldhuis & Staun (2009) argues that the causal factors (causes) facilitate and contribute to radicalization but simultaneously also do not always have radicalism effects on individuals.

Catalyst events are often unpredictable and unstable. Catalyst events can occur at both macro and micro levels and often penetrate both levels and differ in each individual.

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They can speed up the process of radicalization but they cannot start the process of radicalization itself. Because only in interaction with other causative factors can catalysts trigger radicalization (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Thus, the catalytic event itself is not the reason for radicalization, but rather a trigger factor that affects the individual during the process of radicalization.

II. METHOD

This research will use a qualitative approach where qualitative approach can be used for gray research, so the author would like to understand in depth a complex social situation (Sugiyono, 2015). Furthermore, the qualitative approach can also address the problem of research, where researchers do not know the variables that need to be explored (Creswell, 2009). This is following terrorism studies, usually, researchers face critical methodological challenges concerning sensitive and clandestine populations (Altier, Horgan, & Thoroughgood, 2012). As Leiken and Brooke (2006) explain, covert and hidden terrorist status presents a tremendous obstacle to the objective forms of open-source data collection, given that terrorists have characteristics such as necessity, keeping secret about their operations, personal details, and membership (Leiken & Brooke, 2006).

To help answer research questions, the author will use two data sources, the first being primary data sources and secondly, secondary data sources. The role of primary data sources will dominate this research. The primary data source will come from an informant consisting of competent former terrorists. The data source in this study was chosen based on the needs and objectives of the researchers (Sugiyono, 2015). Related to this, researchers refer to former terrorists who have undergone and successfully implemented deradicalization programs. In addition, to help answer research questions, researchers also refer to samples who have experience, knowledge, and insights related to terror studies, such as government stakeholders, government, in this case, the Directorate of Deradicalization of the National Counterterrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT), and Detachment 88 to related NGOs. While the secondary data will focus on the literature that summarizes the primary sources of the first research. Secondary sources are books, previous research journals to government and NGO reports engaged in the study of terrorism and deradicalization.

The analysis of this study is based on the findings of focus group discussions conducted in as many as three meetings. This focus group discussion has engaged practitioners and stakeholders related to the handling and countermeasures of terrorism and radicalism. In addition, to get comprehensive data, focus group discussion has also involved former perpetrators of terrorism as a credible choice. Participants in the focus group discussions include:

Focus Group Discussion Participants

No	Name	Agencies/Institutions/NGOs	Signification
1	Chief Police Brigadier Anto	Detachment 88 Batam Region	Has been intervening in former terrorist inmates and families since 2017.
2	Mayor (Retd) Junaidi	Intelligence Detachment Makassar Region	Since 2008 the focus has focused on Pok Igaras in South Sulawesi, especially former terrorists.
3	Police Commissioner Adjutant Arsyad	Central Sulawesi Regional Police	Mastered the Poso issue, and become a builder of former terrorism convicts.
4	M. Taufiqurohman	Experts on Terrorism and Radicalism	Active in the identification program of former terrorism convicts.
5	Mohd AdeBakti	Experts on Terrorism and Radicalism	Actively engage in the identification program of former terrorism convicts (since the trial).
6	M. Affin Bakhtiar	Directorate of Deradicalization of the National Counterterrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT)	Has been the coordinator of the handling of terrorism convicts in various provinces since 2015.
7	First Police Inspector Suyanta	Task Force Lampung Region Detachment 88	Have experience identifying former terrorism convicts since2012.
8	Chief PoliceBrigadier Eko	Mobile Intelligence Brigade Corps of Central Java	Experience fostering former terrorism convicts, especially in fundraising since 2015.
9	M. Irwan	Class II of Watampone Correctional Agency, South Sulawesi	Handling former prisoners who are on parole in South Sulawesi since 2013.

10	Saifuddin Zuhri (Gus Aep)	Nadhatul Ulama (NU)	Guiding deradicalization targets since 2012.
11	Khoiratul Maknunan (Nuna)	Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian/YPP)	Intervene in terrorism convicts and former terrorism convicts, particularly women and children.
12	Serma Subardi	StrategicIntelligence Agency (Poso Task Force)	Intervened and rallied former prisoners in Poso since 2011.
13	M Soffa Ikhsan	Daulat Buku Home (Rumah Daulat Buku/Rudalku)	Deradicalization activists initiated the reading house for former terrorism convicts. Actively intervened with the former terrorism convicts since 2011.

Source: reprocessed by the researcher (2021)

III. RESULTS

A. Idling Mode: The Concept of Investigating Former Perpetrators of Terror

Idling mode in the study refers to terrorist groups that tend to act and survive; on the other hand, they often store resources. It can be said that under no circumstances are terrorist groups and terrorists not silent and are often active in their activities (United Nations, 2020). Idling mode is not only carried out by terrorist groups but by former terrorists, who face a busy and idle phase of life. According to Andrews and Bonta (2011), there are idle times related to criminal behavior, as well as involvement in proposed activities that can reduce crime. To show idling mode, researchers looked at the tendency of former terrorists to practice Taqiyyah or strategy. Taqiyyah can be interpreted as the practice of hiding or doing something that is not following the heart's content. Thus, former perpetrators of terror tend to be actively involved in society instead of having succeeded in desistance from terrorism, but on the other hand, they remain involved in terrorist groups. Researchers found six forms of investigating practices carried out by former terrorists.

1. Planning for the Actions of Former Perpetrators of Terror

The phenomenon of recidivism of terror perpetrators in Indonesia can be caused by the activities of former terror perpetrators, one of which is related to the planning of their actions. There have been studies that have found many former terror perpetrators took a more active role in the second round, especially if they had not previously engaged in violence. The findings also found nearly two-thirds of the recidivist terrorists studied showed increased commitment to jihad (Ismail & Sim, 2016). It is also influenced by deradicalization programs that are limper in the dynamics of handling in correctional institutions. There are findings that terrorist inmates control the activities of other terrorist inmates in correctional institutions. Therefore there is a tendency when they finish carrying out punishment or deradicalization, they do not experience disengagement. This condition is evidenced by the statement of one of the participants of FGD:

> [...] When in Cipinang prison, many of the NKRI Pledge declared themselves repentance such as Abdullah Suhata, and the prisoners involved in Suryadi Mas'ud, prisoners involved in military training cases in Aceh. And these are prisoners who are considered to have repented because they have pledged but then they play again [...]
>
> [...] Then as Mr. Taufik said that deradicalization in Lapas was very lacking and I strongly agree that two former terrorist convicts who came out of Makassar Prison namely Sutrisno were in Solo, and Azis was in Bima, and they made cadres there [...]
>
> (Interview with Junaid, Detachment Makassar, 2021)

Moreover, to establish the planning of acts of terrorism, at least the former perpetrators of terror have victims who will be targeted, and potential allies and former perpetrators can commit acts of terror. Related to the victims who will be targeted are certain groups or parties that have been targeted by former terrorists when they are still the perpetrators of terror. It also has to do with the ideology that is still attached to former perpetrators of terror. A former terrorist will have difficulty abandoning his ideology because one of the structural characteristics of ideology is guiding and justifying beliefs and a series of behaviors so that ideology can affect how a person behaves and behaves (Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 2004). This is also supported by the findings in FGD:

> [...] Especially the people in the old JI said, 'Mas, actually we are currently in a ceasefire with the government.' Maybe we can still communicate smoothly, but in their hearts, the ideology has not changed.
>
> (Interview with Irwan, Correctional Center, 2021)

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Next is the capacity of former terrorists to form planning acts of terror, where there is a tendency of former perpetrators of terror not to relinquish their motivations and ideologies to wage jihad. On the other hand, former terrorists are individuals who are free and can move into the community, this encourages the opportunity for former terrorists to gather resources to plan actions. For example, collecting tools and materials to assemble bombs to raise funds aimed at launching their charitable activities in the future. According to one of the participants of the above conditions is one strategy to plan readiness so that later when the time is right, they will commit acts of terror.

> Yes, Sir. From some of the facts on the ground, we see from the news and other authorities who made arrests of the terrorist activists. First, the development of Makassar on weaponry and others indicates there is a readiness in terms of emergence if needed with the screech of the jihad they will move. One of them that is very triggering of these ex-prisoners is the first empathy among fellow Muslims if there are social activities that are victims of persecution in Islamic groups, they automatically directly defend the group that the victim happens to be Muslim.
> (Interview with Arsyad, Poso Resort Police, 2021)

Thus, these former terrorists will tend to get involved again in the network and among others plan acts of terror until later they will become recidivists. This is due to the push factor in the form of motivation and ideology that is still deep-rooted, one of which is due to deradicalization programs that are still not effective. On the other hand, there is a pull factor in the form of affiliation with terror groups and other former terror perpetrators. When these push and pull factors are on the former perpetrators of terror, there is a tendency for former terrorists to plan until returning to commit acts of terror.

2. *'Two-Face-Two-Feet' Strategy*

When former terrorists have finished deradicalization and sentencing, they will still be monitored and intervened by the National Counter-Terrorism Agency. Deradicalization programs outside correctional institutions have 4 types of substances, namely: identification, religious development, nationality, and entrepreneurship (National Counter-Terrorism Agency, 2015). Thus, intervention and surveillance of former perpetrators of terror will continue to be carried out and is sustainable. The findings of this study data show that the dominance of former terror perpetrators participated in the development. One of them follows national activities, which have the impact they can begin to be able to engage in Pancasila values such as waving and respecting the flag. Then, the excitement of entrepreneurship was also developed into one of the efforts to meet the economic needs of former terrorists. Therefore, the target of the construction outside the penitentiary is to return former perpetrators of terror to uphold Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, and, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/NKRI).

However, according to the participants, deradicalization programs outside correctional institutions have not been successful in returning former terrorists. However, this condition doesn't guarantee the former perpetrators of terror desist from terrorism. Because some re-engage in the activities and have the behavior of terrorism radicalism. This is evidenced by the statement from one of the FGD participants:

> Well, this is what is interesting this strategy has happened from the class of 2009 or 2010. While in Cipinang Penitentiary many pledged against NKRI and declared themselves repentance such as Abdullah Suhata, prisoners involved like Suryadi Mas'ud, and prisoners involved in military training cases in Aceh. And these are prisoners who are considered to have repented because they have pledged but then they play again. The interesting thing in NK is when they are at the medium or even penitentiary with a low-risk level. They continue to carry out unlawful activities such as spreading radicalism. Then they are transferred to a high-risk penitentiary because the penitentiary has 'one man-one cell', where everything is limited until they are tortured. Finally, they think about how to get out of this penitentiary, and yes the only way out is they must pledge to the NKRI. When they have pledged, they will be moved to the medium level. After the pledge, they must be cooperative to be moved again to a low-risk penitentiary so that they can get out [...]

Furthermore, the benefits provided by the Government to former perpetrators of terror are related to benefits for welfare and getting security activities in the country and society. But on the other hand, former terrorists still need the role and support of terrorist groups. Both of the above conditions cannot simply be released by former terrorists, thus they carry out the 'two-face-two feet' strategy. This condition is supported by the findings of FGD:

But when there are demands from the government that they are safe in Indonesia, then they must stick to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/NKRI), so inevitably they have to do taqiyah. The second is related to welfare, they try to stay in society and try to take the heart of the government to constantly pay attention to the target. That's

where they do taqiyah. In addition, the funding that is done in the community is funding that may later be able to support their charitable activities in the future.

> With regards to taqiyah, we can see some examples where people who are close to the government but eventually arrested. It may be because he is really strong ideologically or wants to do Fa'I (take advantage of welfare), but it could be because he only wants to be close to the network but only to the extent of friendship.
> (Interview with Affin Bakhtiar, BNPT, 2021)

Therefore, the practice of the 'two-face-two feet' strategy in the form of the participation of former terrorists in various government programs that benefit them, such as economic assistance from the National Counterterrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT) and the Ministry of Social Affairs. Then, it's as if they support and undergo activities because it is not radical. On the other hand, this aid is not only used by former terrorists personally for their families but also used to gather resources for terrorist groups.

However, it was found that some accidents led the former terror perpetrator to implement the 'two-face-two feet' strategy. This is one of them due to the rejection of the public against former perpetrators of terror and deradicalization programs that cannot support them to develop in the community. This condition has also been supported by a statement from Ismail (2020) and the participants' statements stating that:

> [...] but it could be because it only wants to be close to the network but to be limited to friendship. But because there are indicators that are included in the indicators of Law No. 5 of 2018, he was finally arrested and imprisoned for recidivism.
> (Interview with Affin Bakhtiar, BNPT, 2021)

> Then one of the things that get them back to their network is the need for social relationships. If you look at it, their actions are not accepted by the community. So when it comes to society with their curriculum vitae, they feel rejected by society. Whereas at first, they want to stop, they want to have a social life (communicating & discussing). But it's not what they get in the environment or society in general so they feel they have no choice. Finally, they reconnected with their previous network. Because his social needs are not being met. Not only for economic needs, but elsewhere I also find it like that.
> (Interview with Gus Aeb, NU, 2021)

Thus, the 'two-face-two feet' strategy is influenced by the consideration of former terrorists to benefit from their involvement in the Government and terrorist groups. On the one hand, former perpetrators of terror need protection and welfare from the Government. But on the other hand, they still want to have social relations and support terrorist groups, voluntarily or in desperate conditions.

3. *Fundraising*

Fundraising is nothing new on the issue of terrorism. Where fundraising is one way to meet the terror group's resources to keep it in existence. It found that fundraising for terrorism was not only carried out by terrorists but also by former perpetrators of terror. The following is one of the pieces of evidence that shows fundraising is still carried out by former perpetrators of terror:

> [...] continued, former terrorists who are actively doing fundraising so far we have not found. The former terrorist who still helps his former group as it was, has something to do with the two-footed prisoner [...]
> (Interview with Junaid, Makassar Intelligence Detachment, 2021)

Moreover, stick to the main objective of terrorism fundraising is perpetrating terror groups, and as the initial capital for carrying out terror attacks. According to Bauer and Levitt (2020) that single and small group attacks can occur and are carried out very quickly with minimal funds and careful preparation. That is, the role of former perpetrators of terror in terms of funding large and small amounts can be very helpful to terror groups. On the other hand, the situation is still overshadowed by the development of lone-wolves to small groups that perpetuate radicalism, although indeed large groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda have begun to not exist. This is reinforced by the findings of data submitted by FGD participants:

> [...] ended up in the way of taqiyah itself to get temporary welfare for himself and his family or even to fund the actions he will take in the future [...]
> (Interview with Affin Bahtiar, BNPT, 2021)

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The type of fundraising that former terrorists do is not much different from terrorists. Windle (2018) describes 5 types of sources of terrorism financing. Among others are legitimate investments, state sponsorship, donations, charities, and crime. The findings include a type of fundraising through donations, where donations are made from voluntary donations made in places of worship and instead for humanitarian purposes, whereas these donations signify the legitimacy of terror groups. The types of charity are carried out by former perpetrators of terror, where charities or non-profit organizations have characteristics that make them vulnerable to abuse for terrorist financing.

Thus, it can be concluded that there are findings of former terrorists still carrying out one of the terrorist activities, namely fundraising. This condition directly affects the existence of terrorist groups. Former terrorists take advantage of their freedom to re-engage in terrorist groups, through taqiyah or investigative means, so that they will not be interfered with by law enforcement officials.

4. *Support Group*

The findings of this study show that former terror perpetrators are faced with the conditions to be involved in supporting terror groups. This is because at the time they undergo punishment, the families of former terror perpetrators are facilitated by terror groups, so the densest conditions of reciprocity they must pay off. On the other hand, there are still former terror perpetrators who voluntarily rejoined the terror group, because of the strong ideology. To do this practice, former perpetrators of terror must perform taqiyah, so as not to be interfered with by the government.

Taqiyah in this context is a former terrorist involved and supports various government programs, but on the one hand, remains involved in the terror group. Support provided to this terror group can be in the form of resources, such as financial assistance, tools, and materials to assemble bombs, expertise or skills, and recruit, to spread radicalism. In addition, there are conditions that former terrorists rejoin the terrorist group related to pleasure in their way of life, feeling empowered to carry and use weapons or improving reputation through membership in terrorist groups, and their interest in violent lifestyles (Kaplan & Nussio, 2016). This condition is reinforced by the statements of FGD participants namely:

> That's right if it was yesterday the group that responded the most was the FPI group under the leadership of Mr. Sugianto
>
> Kayimudin. As for the fundraiser organizer, under the leadership of his biological son Ustad Haji Adnan Arsalnudin [...] (Interview with Junaid, Makassar Intelligence Detachment, 2021)

In addition, the problem of returning the favor of former terrorists to terrorist groups causes them to re-engage. It is also affected by security threats as a reason to rejoin, often to protect yourself or your family. Indeed, being part of a radical group can provide more protection than being outside the group (Kaplan & Nussio, 2016). It is also the result of the government's unwillingness to facilitate the protection and supervision while a convicted terrorist and former terrorist. The data showed that the families of the inmates were more likely to be protected by terrorist groups than by the Government. This condition is the main reason former terrorists are forced to re-engage. It has also been supported by the participant's statement:

> For example, let alone the economy when they are imprisoned, I speak of the fact first when her husband is in prison, his wife wants to give birth to, his child wants the school that is present precisely the network. This is interesting because again they are the ones who help and fund the hospital for childbirth costs and then some children want to enter the school financed also school and back again, sometimes the school is in their network so that finally yes not going anywhere and can not be uprooted again from its roots why this network becomes strong. And I'm also very surprised actually that they are still far away this is the coolest that they are still able, let alone Ardi. Ardi will come later after his wife gave birth only to find out oh his wife gave birth but it was too late. Even though she has been helped like that Ar, she will give birth to the child of the perpetrator of terrorism crimes but her husband has died. Her husband fought back when arrested and his son was born that the network. Funding, equipment, and treatment of pain were precisely their network and it gained sympathy [...]
> (Interview of Taufik, Expert on Radicalism and Terrorism 2021)

Thus, the practice of taqiyah or investigating in this context is to provide support to terrorist groups voluntarily or because it is in desperate conditions. Support for terrorist groups can be done through financial assistance, tools, and materials to assemble bombs, expertise/skills, recruit, to spread radicalism.

5. *Activity on Social Media*

Another form of taqiyah carried out by former terrorists is by active in spreading radicalism on social media. The spread of radicalism aims to develop propaganda to carry out jihad and hoaxes aimed at developing radicalism and spreading hatred. In the context of propaganda delivered is a message of violence aimed at showing the existence of terrorist groups, and religious sentiment includes spiritual solidarity with people the oppressed by certain forces (Wijayanti, 2020). The message spread by former terrorists is indicated to encourage the spirit of sympathizers, combatants, extremists, and other former perpetrators of terror to amaliyah. This condition is also evidenced by the participant's statement:

> [...] Ardi asked and what I have said is also in one area, he packed with the propositions. So that provokes with propositions such as there is a case of persecution of a Muslim, it will be packaged "our brother must not be left alone", then use *dalil* as the proposition states "the pain of our brother is our pain, one tweet then we all have to reply", as it is the packaging informed to the groups either through WhatsApp or other social media, It is packaged at the time of the study, ta'lim-ta'lim. It will bring him back to life. And the motivation to follow the worship of jihad like that. When getting information and then good information especially related to violence, so the opportunity for him packed the propositions [...]
> (Interview with Arsyad, Poso Resort Police, 2021)

In addition to spreading the spirit of amaliyah, former perpetrators of terror create content that gives a message of division, intolerance, and hate crimes. This is done through the spread of hoax messages on social media. In general, hoaxes spread on the internet provide misinformation and disinformation (Kumar, West, & Leskovec, 2016). In the phenomenon of terrorism, the spread of hoaxes can develop hate crimes against certain groups and divisions between groups. Because, hoax messages containing hate crimes can promote hostile beliefs and supermassive against certain groups (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2020). The findings below support the above conditions:

> [...] So, for example, his wife later posted on Facebook that my husband was arrested by the police then, after a day or two my husband was arrested, and suddenly my neighbor took a flower pot from my house, I just kept quiet. So he played victim who was then embraced by others as a form of "we have been betrayed", well this is horrifying as well.
> (Interview with Ade Bakti, Expert on Radicalism and Terrorism, 2021)

> [...] Yes that's what some of which are still in a way with the ideology is very hard yes, as I said earlier, adding information, making hoaxes with the propositions are very compatible with them, that's it, Bro.
> (Interview with Arsyad, Poso Resort Police, 2021)

Thus, the type of taqiyah carried out by former terrorists is to use social media to create and develop messages that refer to propaganda and hoaxes to bring up hate crimes against certain groups. This condition has also proven that former terrorists still take a role and contribute to the existence of terrorist groups.

6. *Former Terrorists Active in Political Movements*

Furthermore, former terrorists perform taqiyah by actively returning to the political movement. In the context of this research, the form of political movements that occur in Poso and with several community organizations are indicated radically. Former terrorists are active in campaigning as well as committing violence within the influence of the broader political and social context in which it takes place in their neighborhood (Silke, 2014).

In addition, Crenshaw (1988) also saw that the actions of terrorists were based on subjective interpretations of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment will be filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories. Therefore, there is a tendency for former terrorists will re-engage in political movements that have previously been debated. This condition is evidenced in the finding of FGD participants:

> [...] A former convict of terrorism, he was active in the political movement. This, we need to be aware of also because in the future their influence will be greater in mediating political policies and also because they can move other political movements. For example, carrying out their agenda related to the enforcement of Islamic sharia, Khilafah, or maybe even future activities that are anarchist in nature. It's a political movement [...]
> (Interview with Taufik, Expert on Radicalism and Terrorism, 2021)

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Later, it was also found that former terrorists were also involved in political movements that could muddy the balance in society. His involvement in this political movement aims to develop a narrative of hatred. Former terrorists take part in taking advantage of the political dynamics that are taking place. One of them was during the 2019 Presidential Election in Indonesia. It was found that the series of violent incidents in various regions is a picture of terrorist groups getting the opportunity to carry out their actions (Susanto, 2019). This condition aims to encourage increasingly heated political dynamics. This condition is supported by the findings of the FGD interview:

> For example, in 2019 (Presidential Election) around the first of April. I'm facing that rather strange case. There was one case of one person taking part in a demo during the presidential election. At that time his wife asked her husband where. It turned out that her husband was participating in the demonstration. Overnight. Then he went to study. When asked, it might be like there's some kind of taqiyah.
> (Interview with Soffa, RUDALKU, 2021)

The latent dangers of the above conditions are instability and increased distrust of the government, which can provide the potential for the spread of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. According to Shelley (2008) that a country's socio-political conditions, such as social inequality and poor government governance are often targets of terrorist recruitment. This can be characterized by the response of the community to the government due to the impact of certain political movements. Thus, the above explanation proves that taqiyah, or investigating is carried out by former perpetrators of terrorism. On the one hand, former terrorists support government programs, but on the other hand, it increases the potential for conflict and the spread of distrust of the government.

B. Catalyst Event: Events That Triggered Former Terrorists to Re-Engage in Terror Groups

This study found catalyst event also applies to ex-convicts who have undergone a disengagement program. According to research by See (2018), 25 out of 300 terrorists released from penitentiary have "returned to the old habit of terror behavior". There is the potential for former inmates to have left the group, but still adhere to radical ideology, and are in a state of radicalization. The catalyst event is also supported by the pendulum model of re-engagement explaining how a former terrorist experienced a catalyst to re-engage in a terrorist group. Where this model assumes that the conservation of energy towards momentum does not apply. The pendulum illustration contained in the pendulum model of re-engagement will not swing to a new position (deradicalization and disengagement), but in the opposite direction (re-engagement and re-radicalization) (figure 2.1) (See, 2018). Therefore, there is a possibility that a former terrorist remains involved in a terrorist group.

The Pendulum Model of Re-Engagement

Source: See (2018)

About the above, re-engagement and de-radicalization are some of the causes that encourage former terrorists to re-engage. Where, there are also contributions from catalyst events, to bring up conditions of re-engagement and de-radicalization. A researcher has discovered several catalyst events that can encourage former terrorists to get involved in terrorist groups. Not a few data have shown that former perpetrators of terror are active in terrorism activities, including jihad.

1. *Strategic Issues on Catalyst Event*
   a. *The Rise of Jihad*

In the context of Indonesia, events that can awaken the spirit of jihad have long been instilled by previous jihadists. The Darul Islam movement initiated by Kartosoewirjo (1945) became the foundation of hijrah and jihad, which until now is still championed by its followers. Jihad command through the establishment of the Islamic State created a spirit for protest against the many activities in the community, as well as injustice caused by the government (Darajat, 2016). On the other hand, the government has been the subject of jihad and takfir, which causes all forms of actions, attitudes, and policies of the government will always be

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contrary to terror groups. Thus, often jihad is interpreted as fighting the enemies of Islam at the highest level. This is in line with the participant's statement:

> And I see also their religious factors, their religious background. They used to be active in this political organization, this tarbiyah and that, even NII and DI, and so on. They are gathered every day as if there were no day without religion. That's what gave birth to that thought [...]
> (Interview with Soffa, RUDALKU, 2021)

Current conditions, social, political, and economic events in Indonesia become one of the formations of catalyst events. Issues that develop discourses of injustice and failure in society have given birth to distrust and fear among the public of the government. A country's socio-political conditions, such as social inequality and poor government governance are often targets of terrorist recruitment (Shelley, 2008).

Thus, former perpetrators of terror can potentially re-engage in terrorist groups. One of the sources stated that the issue of weakening the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Republik Indonesia/KPK), the establishment of Omnibus Law, and efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic can be a catalyst event for former terrorists.

> As I told you earlier, for example, the issue of weakening KPK and omnibus law issue. When in the community there are pros and cons to supporting policies carried out by the government [...]
> (Interview with Gus Aeb, NU, 2021)

> [...] related to the current condition of the Covid-19 pandemic, many people who finally (become like a domino effect) where disappointment with the government or distrust issue with government causes people who have previously been sustain and previously NKRI, then become questioned by this authority. How could he embrace, as an ex-prisoner, when he saw various issues/news on social media that became disappointment and disbelief already, "I see a chaotic government. I'd better go back to my old network which would be better off taking care of this later. And maybe I have the vision to turn this chaotic country into an Islamic state of Indonesia."
> (Interview with Affin Bahktiar, BNPT, 2021)

> Secondly, it is politics, then Mas Taufik said it's 2024, that every election is always there. Then the economy can be triggered as well.
> (Interview with Bardi, BAIS, 2021)

This catalyst event research condition is supported by the findings of research by Doosie (2013), that three variables encourage radicalization in individuals. Among them are personal uncertainty variables, related to subjective feelings or doubts and instability in the self-view and worldview provided by the state. However, radical groups provide clear answers and solutions to existing concerns. In other words, when uncertainty arises, individuals cling to a new world of culture seen or a cultural world that has previously been seen. That is, uncertainty has improved the defense of the worldview to make a sense of life on self-identity.

Thus, it can be concluded that this jihadi plant event is a condition based on the risk of not long related to the cultivation of radical ideology and extremism by the previous mujahideen related to jihad. Then, after the former perpetrators of terror have finished serving a period of punishment, they are faced with social inequality and poor governance, which are poured into social, political, and economic issues. At the same time, terrorist groups operate an efficient form of government. Therefore, this catalyst event can encourage and re-breed the jihadi spirit of former terrorists.

b. *Issues of Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and Inter-Group Relations*

Other catalyst events in the study included ethnicity, religious, racial, and inter-racial issues. In the context of the crime of terrorism, this condition is motivated by the indoctrination of religions other than Islam. Where it is easy to sentence infidels because the members of terrorist groups consider themselves to be the owners of the truth. Takfir against religions other than Islam became one of the triggers for former terrorists to re-engage. Ethnicity, religious, racial, and inter-racial issues can raise the spirit of jihad among other issues related to religious conversion and regional leaders who do not have the same beliefs and beliefs as terrorist groups. It was also supported by one of the participants:

> The content can be many, one of which is the issue of ethnicity, religious, racial, and inter-racial issues, like example 121 that they can disguise there to raise spirits.

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(Interview with Bardi, BAIS, 2021)

The events of 212 are one of the events that give a big picture of the increasing spirit of jihad. Blasphemy committed by one of the candidates for Governor led to massive protests among Muslims in Indonesia. Through these unstable conditions, one is oriented dogmatically religiously to plant the ideology of struggle that stirs the spirit of jihad to commit all acts of violence. In this process, identify the dedication and integrity of former terrorists based on their capacity and competence, then put them into the right layer position in the terrorist group (Ali, 2016).

Furthermore, the conflicts in Ambon and Poso are a clear picture of the prolonged impact of the growing ethnicity, religious, racial, and inter-racial issues. The obsession with the struggle against a particular religion encourages the rationalization of violence and intolerance (Ali, 2016). The obsession with the struggle to defend religion is in the form of issues that develop in former perpetrators of terror that evoke heroism that will later make them true terrorists. For example, recognition (pseudo) is given to a hero who has been religiously oriented into mujahideen to refine the meaning and essence of his struggle until he believes in worship following a shadow about the beauty of heaven (Ali, 2016). This is supported by the participant's statement:

> Well, if we talk back to the problem of conflict, actually it can happen because we see that this horizontal conflict is silent but not completely lost. So at any time, it could happen. Motivation is very easy. Because with the lighters such as contestation of conflicts related to religion, it can invite them back to do horizontal conflict, especially with the existing networks in Indonesia. When they see the opportunity, they will come to that and they will become stowaways and will heat the region. It may also have to do with the situation in Poso.
> (Interview with Affin Bahktiar, BNPT, 2021)

Thus, other catalyst events in this study are ethnicity, religious, racial, and inter-racial issues that specifically involve religion. The context of blasphemy, hatred in certain religions, and the obsession with struggle is a condition that drives the issue of ethnicity, religious, racial, and inter-racial issues to become one of the catalyst events of former terrorists.

c. Network Arrests

Catalyst events are related to the impact on the government's response related to handling terrorism. According to Crenshaw (1991), the government's response can determine the cost of terrorism, that killing or imprisoning terrorists can sometimes produce a boomerang effect in which cohesion among the remaining terrorists increases. Catalyst events are related to the strong bond between the perpetrators of terror and the loyalty of former perpetrators of terror. This is supported by the participant's statement:

> Well, yes for me one of the things that may also have to be wary of is related to arrests or law enforcement against perpetrators of terrorism crimes. That could be one of the things that should be quite wary as well, for example, yesterday there was an arrest of an activist organizer yes it was then the issue shifted [...]
> (Interview with Arsyad, Poso Resort Police, 2021)

Strong ties between terrorists and loyalty to terrorist groups are the causes of former terrorists re-engaging in their past. Similar to criminals with ties to antisocial friends and family (Andrews & Bonta, 1994), connections to active terrorist organizations can provide former terrorists with ample opportunity to re-engage, while maintaining ties with members of active terrorist organizations or those who support terrorism can increase or strengthen the beliefs of former terrorists in violence and radical ideology (Altier, Boyle, & Horgan, 2017). The network's surveillance has encouraged a sense of solidarity with Muslims or comrades-in-arms so that former terrorists are again involved in terrorist groups.

The arrest of networks that can encourage the spirit of jihad is also affected by the collapse of the terror group's leadership. Where, there is a tendency to contribute to attacks of independence, and tactical shifts and shows the toughness of terrorism and radicalism groups (Yaoren, 2019). Thus, it can be concluded that the arrest of the network can trigger former perpetrators of terror to re-engage. This is driven by solidarity with Muslims or comrades-in-arms of former terrorists, and loyalty to groups and group leaders. Therefore catalyst events are closely related to the relationship between terror perpetrators and terrorist groups.

2. Gradations Issues on Catalyst Event
a. International Issues

These international issues include conflicts and the growing networks of terrorism and radicalism in the Middle East, which were the center of global security attention throughout 2016. Various factors explain the region's chronic insecurity and persistent vulnerability to armed conflicts, such as the failure of government in most Arab countries, and the ongoing conflict (Davis, Smith,

& Wezeman, 2017). The conflict and global security issues above, affect other regions, especially the development of terrorism and radicalism networks, one of which is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the organizations that fall into the category of religious waves. Although including an international scale, ISIS has a new form of terrorism, one of which is because this wave uses technology as a form of communication globally. The existence of a culture of terror refers to the collapse of Western culture through mass killings using religion to legitimize terrorist attacks against civilians in any country considered infidels or apostates (Matusitz, 2013). Under these conditions, ISIS has been able to announce the establishment of a caliphate stretching from Aleppo. Syria became Diyala in Iraq and was renamed the Islamic State group. In 2015, ISIS expanded into affiliate networks in at least eight other countries. Its branches, supporters, and affiliates are increasingly carrying out attacks beyond the confines of its caliphate (Wilson Center, 2019).

Indonesia is one of the countries that became a network of ISIS affiliates by its sympathizers. ISIS is an external factor that plays an important role in the formation of the threat dynamics of violent extremist groups in Indonesia. For example, it provides a new impetus for Islamic political movements in Indonesia. As it relates to the history of the Islamic jihadist movement, Indonesia is a natural target for ISIS ideology. As ISIS calls and directives spread in Indonesia, jihadists began to join the jihad. Among them are hijrah to Syria to join ISIS, and carry out domestic attacks to expand the territory and legitimacy of ISIS power in Indonesia (Tobing & Indradjaja, 2019). When there is a call for a global jihad movement, its sympathizers will carry out activities following the command of the banner of jihad. It is also motivated by the ideology of ISIS and embodies the idea of an Islamic state coveted by its sympathizers. This condition is evidenced by the participant's statement:

> Then, with regards to Syria, what is interesting is the fatwas related to the Islamic State group although it has decreased in escalation, doctrinally or fatwas are still strong. What does strong mean? That there is a fatwa where tips can do amaliyah without having to go to the land of Sham. Well, that's what's dangerous. When someone like me (ISIS group) is released from prison, then I have a void against the figure, then there is the fatwa that confirms me to do the activity in my region, without having to go for example to Syria. So, there is a person's affirmation to do activities that he could not previously do, for example not only ex, deported, or returnee. Those who were previously deported when leaving and returning to this country. It becomes a threat in itself. Because with the fatwa he no longer needs to go to a conflict country. He can carry out threats or terrorist activities in their respective regions, for example in Indonesia, the Philippines, or other regions.
> (Interview with Affin Bakhtiar, BNPT, 2021)

The fact that ISIS leaders encourage sympathizers to not only create an Islamic state throughout the Sunni community in the Middle East but also applies to areas that have ISIS sympathizers. This condition is influenced by ISIS propaganda and campaign through social media, which resulted in thousands of people joining ISIS voluntarily (Tobing & Indradjaja, 2019). This condition is in line with al-Baghdadi's statement supported by Aman Abdurrahman, namely:

> "All those committed to the purity of the faith in Indonesia and all over the world to defend this State in any manner possible, whether by sending personnel, contributing wealth, spreading true news about the State, its religious precepts and its achievements, as well as exposing the conspiracies to undermine it through denials and lies."
> (Reno, 2014)

Thus, it can be concluded that former terrorists can re-engage in terrorist activities due to the encouragement of fatwas or conditions of religious problems in Syria and other regions in the Middle East. Instead of humanitarian concerns, the former terrorists are involved in the terror group. Therefore, international issues can be one form of catalyst events, because it provides new information and views for former terrorists.

b. *Regional Issues*
Regional issues in this context are conflicts and issues involving networks of terrorism and radicalism in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia have high rates of violent extremism activities involving religion and ethnicity, as well as the development of groups linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS (Chew, 2021). Therefore, this regional issue is strongly influenced by international issues.

Former terrorists can re-engage in terrorist groups because former perpetrators of terror have not completely escaped the radicalism and solidarity of the jihadists. The characteristics of today's terrorist groups also encourage the flexibility of sympathizers to engage in various conflicts related to terror groups. This condition is evidenced by terrorist groups that continue

to strive to increase their operations globally, including in Southeast Asia (Jamal, 2020). This is also supported by the participant's statement:

> Southeast Asia, for example, is an issue during the war in Marawi. That's why there are ex-prisoners who were there to join but were finally arrested continued later when the Myanmar issue rame, it was around 2016-2017 that there were ex-prisoners who wanted to organize resistance against the Myanmar government. So yes, it is true as it was said that when there are issues where Muslims are positioned as the former prisoners will be triggered again the spirit of his jihad.
> (Interview with Taufik, Expert on Terrorism and Radicalism, 2021)

Furthermore, the cause of regional issues become catalyst events, namely the existence of extremists, fundamentalists, rebel groups, and local militants, issues of unity and ethnic clashes that make regional issues still exist, so that former terrorist actors still consider the obligation to support various movements in the regional region. On the other hand, in demographic regions that are close to each other, failures in controlling and prevention across countries in Southeast Asia, will provide space for former terrorists to take advantage of the expansion of their activities (Keling, Shuib, Ajis, & Nadzri, 2009).

c. *National Issues*

The development of radicalism and terrorism network groups in Indonesia became one of the catalysts events of this research. National issues that are also influenced by regional and international issues that have given rise to homegrown radical ideology, radical Islamic organizations have sprung up under different names, but with often the same figures and the same radical ideology. By using anti-NKRI, anti-government, *thaghut*, and so on (Hikam, 2018). One of them appeared and developed violent extremist groups such as the Jamaah Anshar Daulah (JAD) group and the East Indonesian Mujahideen (MIT) group. It is known that although the group is not actively carrying out terrorist attacks, on the other hand, its sympathizers are conducting a ceasefire and remain active in the activities of radical terrorism. This condition is supported by one of the participant's statements:

> The fourth point, if I think, is from the aspects of momentum that he previously ceasefire [...] Finally they came back again, sticking out their charitable ideas.
> (Interview with Affin Bakhtiar, BNPT, 2021)

> Examples there are some cases of idling mode in Poso, namely the case of Ali Kadafi or DarDarwin Gobel who has been built several times, but because of the influence of the network, he was re-involved in the NTT Group (led by Ali Kalora).
> (Interview with Nuna, YPP, 2021)

Furthermore, the issue of terrorism-related activities by the MIT group can be a trigger for former terrorists to re-engage. Where these groups provide space and facilities for former terrorists. It is also influenced by the oath of allegiance to the leader until the strategy and objectives of jihad are not yet implemented. Therefore, the former perpetrators of terror are re-involved. This is supported by the participant's statement:

> Yes, since the establishment of MIT commanded by Abu Wardah alias Santoso which leaves the strong military who are currently ex-prisoners but currently some do not enter former convicted of terrorism are militants of the field people Abu Wardah alias Santoso and their sympathy for the events in the Philippines and Afghanistan they responded and even became a trigger for them, A trigger for his high solidarity.
> (Interview with Junaid, Makassar Intelligence Detachment, 2021)

Furthermore, when former terrorists re-engage in conflicts in Poso and Ambon, it is not merely due to ethnic and religious reasons. However, former terrorists want to have their ties back and be accepted by certain groups that are not found by them in society. As found by researchers in the data findings that former perpetrators of terror re-engaged because of broken home family situations, no work opportunities, and strong social ties of fellow sympathizers. With the availability of Poso and Ambon as jihadi land, former terrorists are again involved in radical terrorism networks.

Thus, it can be concluded that the national issue becomes one form of catalyst event, namely the availability of opportunities to engage in terrorism groups, because the terrorism network in Indonesia has not disappeared, and even tends to grow. On the other hand, the conflicts that occurred in Poso and Ambon have given space that is not given by the community to former terrorists. Therefore, it becomes commonplace that former terrorists are re-engaged because it is encouraged by the existence of regional issues that continue to grow.

d. *Local Issues*

Local issues as catalyst events refer to events that occur in a local scope in a region that is not too broad and only occurs in one region. This can apply to former terrorists who engage in acts of terrorism in one region. Where this condition can occur because there is communication between former perpetrators of terror with each other. This communication resulted in a strategy to bring about a terror attack. This condition is explained by the participant:

> Around 2019, when Salemba Correctional Institution & LPKA Jakarta was put together on a place basis, there happened to be six children who were together with Darwin Gobel. Among them is Sofyan Una, there is a child from the Ciawi case who I forgot was arrested for wanting to bomb one of the police posts in Ciawi. Then there's the one from Lamongan. Then there were the brothers from Pontianak, Haibin, and Hussein. Then there was one child terrorism prisoner from Sukabumi, hamzah's concealment case at that time who was already free. Two months after being released it was collected communication with Darwin Gobel at LPKA Jakata or Salemba Penitentiary at that time and they often visited or visited there. When I visit, sometimes I can also listen to the chats of the contents of their conversations because they feel close to me and they do not feel disturbed. From these conversations, I have been able to photograph that these children have the potential to become perpetrators again, let alone Darwin Gobel.
> (Interview with Nuna, YPP, 2021)

In addition to communication, denial in the community and the condition of families still involved in terrorist groups can be part of a growing local issue and fuel terrorist activity. Therefore, catalyst events through local issues refer to events involving former perpetrators of terror carrying out other terrorist activities. Such as recruiting, and providing radical da'wah to fundraising (Tobing & Indradjaja, 2019). This was explained by one of the participants:

> So that provokes with propositions such as there is a case of persecution against a Muslim, it will be packed "our brother, our brotherhood, it must not be left alone" then use dalil as the proposition states "the pain of our brother is our pain, one is whipped then we all have to reply", as it is the packaging informed to the groups either through WhatsApp or other social media, It is packaged at the time of the study, ta'lim-ta'lim. It will bring him back to life. And the motivation to follow jihad worship, yes like that.
> (Interview with Arsyad, Poso Resort Police, 2021)

Thus, local issues that can be catalyst events include issues that only appear in one region or one condition. Like the condition of the family that still involves terror groups, communicating with terrorism networks to the involvement of former terrorists with terrorism activities.

C. *Storm of Information*

Today, society faces a massive and global exchange of information. The Internet and social media make information a social interaction that is done continuously. The Internet, as a global and open communication network, provides social media as a platform that provides a platform to participate, interact and share with individuals and groups around the world. However, the widespread information on social media gave birth to new problems. Among others are misinformation (Wu, Morstatter, Carley, & Liu, 2019), the spread of fake news (Talwar, Dhir, Singh, Virk, & Salo, 2020), and other problems.

In connection with this study, the information storm has had an impact on the development of provocative information, false information, and the spread of false narratives, which have other impacts on certain groups, one of which is a former terrorist. Thus, former terrorists are faced with a situation that encourages them to re-engage in terrorist groups and radicalism.

1. *Provocative Information*

Provocative information spread through social media is used as one of the terrorist group's strategies. This is in line with Kydd and Walter (2006) who explained that provocation is one of the five main strategies of terrorism. Bloom (2005) explained that terrorist groups tend to use terror tactics provocatively as part of the process of gaining support. Researchers have determined provocative information indicators based on the writings of Arifiansyah (2020) which states that there are indicators determining information said to be provocative, namely:

➢ A title is said to be provocative if the title contains several indicators. Indicators such as using inflammatory word selection. In addition, using persuasive communication in the form of words of invitation, embedding data, using sympathy, showing acceptance, and giving impressions are some of them. Not infrequently titles like this can lead to opinions and even result in judging without reading the contents of the news text first.

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➤ A text is said to be provocative if it contains several indicators in the selection of diction, quotations, or words. Indicators such as using inflammatory word selection. Then, using persuasive communication in the form of words of invitation, embedding data, using sympathy, showing an attitude of acceptance, and giving an impression are some of them. Not infrequently text like this can lead to opinions and even result in judging without reading the content of the news text as a whole first.

The study found that provocative information consisting of social, political, and economic issues raised by terrorism groups encourages former terrorists to re-engage in terrorist activities. The participant stated that:

> [...] As I told you earlier, for example, the issue of weakening KPK and omnibus law issue. When in the community there are pros and cons to support the policies carried out by the government, and then they read that many communities are counter, that's where they try to develop a narrative to influence the parties who are counter to the government. They read the situation and make their opportunity to act. Maybe that can be seen from the dynamics of their movements.
> (Interview with Gus Aeb, NU, 2021)

The above conditions indicate that such information can be maintained because public opinion data shows that collateral damage caused by the state has a significant and lasting effect to still giving the preference of former perpetrators of terrorism to agree with the use of violence. In line with this, the strategy of information provocation can serve to correct the imbalance between the group and the state (Lake, 2002). Social, political, and economic problems that develop in society, are utilized by terrorism groups to encourage the birth of the seeds of hatred and violence in former perpetrators of terror so that these terrorist groups benefit to achieve the political goal of gaining support, creating, training independent terrorists, and to achieve the goal of terror, namely spreading fear (Huda, Runturambi, & Syauqillah, 2021).

2. *False Information*

As well to provocative information, false information is also one of the starts of a terrorist group to achieve its political goals. Along with one of the problems on social media, false information is used by terror groups to develop the reach of their terror groups. Where, they have created and reinforced misleading content on a large scale by taking advantage of the vulnerability of the social media ecosystem and manipulating people through conspiracy narratives and fake news (UNICRI, 2020).

There are several characteristics of false information that are often developed by terrorist groups. Structurally, false information appears to be shorter, less informative than real news, less complex, has more personal language, is created with fake content, and relies heavily on social media webs and online platforms for its dissemination More comprehensively, false information becomes seven typologies: false connections, fake context, content manipulated to deceive, misleading content to frame an issue or individual, False content, fake content, and satire/parody (potentially deceptive but no intent to harm). Typologist Distilling Wardle (2017) describes fake news as completely false or contains misleading elements that are intentionally included in the content or context (Iwuoha, 2020).

In the findings of the study data, false information disseminated by terrorist groups aims to reinforce their affirmations. In particular, false information relating to government injustice issues and issues related to amaliyah is used as a trigger that encourages former terrorists to get involved. The data showed that:

> The domino effect due to the pandemic, the disillusionment with the government was then supported by increasingly advanced technology so that he did not need to interact much with people. Just look at a little in social media more and more spread narratives and hoaxes etc. that strengthen and confirm himself that the government is not good, and in the past, the charitable struggle that I had left behind turned out to be what I should support.
> (Interview with Affin Bakhtiar, BNPT, 2021)

> If the former prisoners who have not repented are still anti-government then his behavior is like the behavior of the opposition that spread such hoaxes. And the chimney is a former prisoner who has NKRI and he often advises other former prisoners not to spread hoaxes. For example, about vaccines.
> (Interview with Taufik, Expert on Radicalism and Terrorism, 2021)

This false information also contains misleading content, in which terrorist groups use information that is then framed in such a way that the original content disappears and is replaced with the aim of herding perceptions that refer to radical ideology. For former terrorists, the content of false information has manipulated and deceived them, so that indirectly they will easily re-engage

in terrorism networks. Where false information has become a counter-discourse for deradicalization programs that have been run by former terrorists.

3. *Spread of False Narratives by Former Terrorists*

In addition to terrorist groups, former terrorists actively spread false narratives to propagate radical ideology. The determining indicator of a false narrative is part of propaganda, among others, related to the art to influence, controlling, promoting, changing, persuading, securing, or defending accepted opinions (European Parliament, 2019). Where such activity can be carried out by individuals involved in terrorist groups. In addition, one of the most relevant indicators is that terrorist groups use public communication not only to reassert demands but also to seek to legitimize the existence of their actions, as well as to distribute information related to the goals and priorities of the group (Torres-Soriano & Ricardo, 2017).

Furthermore, the findings of this study show that there are still former perpetrators of terror who spread false narratives. Former terrorists tend to develop and spread propaganda that intends to instill in people's minds to engage and normalize radical extremism (Lieberman, 2017). This condition is also supported by the participant's statement:

> Well, yes for me one of the things that may also have to be wary of is related to arrests or law enforcement against perpetrators of terrorism crimes. That could be one of the things that should be aware of as well, for example, yesterday there was an arrest of an activist organizer yes it was then the issue shifted. There was the perpetrator's house, as the neighbors were inhumanely taken pots, it became material for them to ostensibly call for resistance. So, for example, his wife later posted on Facebook that my husband was arrested by the police then, after a day or two my husband was arrested, and suddenly my neighbor took a flower pot from my house, I just kept quiet. So he played victim who was then embraced by others as a form of "we have been betrayed" well this is horrifying as well.
> (Interview with Ade Bakti, Expert on Radicalism and Terrorism, 2021)

Propaganda in the form of false narratives becomes content that is often used by former perpetrators of terror. The creation of this false narrative content uses content that tends to refer to religious instructions including references to fatwas of prominent scholars and religious figures, or excerpts from scriptures that are changed following the goals of former perpetrators of terror (Klausen, 2015). False narratives can be content reporting from battle-related to provocative information on the conditions of combat, injustice, and other conflict references added to false narratives.

4. *Victims of False Information*

The definition of victims is those (i.e. individuals, groups, or governments) who suffer corporeal and spiritual as a result of the actions of others who seek the fulfillment of self-interest or others that are contrary to the interests and human rights that suffer (Gosita, 1993). In this context, victims of false information who have the status of former perpetrators of terror do not know that they are victims. Where the conditions and opportunities of terrorism encourage them to consume false information.

The victims of this false information are former perpetrators of terror because there is a tendency for false information to mislead and manipulate former perpetrators of terror. In addition, false information can provide can undermine an individual's trust in an individual, group, or organization. Therefore, former terrorists will easily be involved in terrorism networks. This condition has also been supported in the participant's statement:

> The most important issue is that we realize which news is the truest, which news is wrong, and which is a hoax. And it can not be done immediately because it takes extraordinary effort, let alone again with friends who have problems with the ideology of former prisoners. But friends who claim that he is very Indonesian, still like to be very easily consumed by issues that are not true. This means that the challenge is not only interesting precisely what is done by friends who are in Batam but how to take an approach that I think is the single most perfect approach, in my opinion, to deradicalize ex-prisoners.
> (Interview with Irwan, Correctional Center, 2021)

With the data above, it has been shown that former terrorists are faced with situations that encourage them to re-engage. This situation is driven by information disseminated by past terrorism networks. This false information can provide inspiration and preference for former terrorists who finished deradicalization. On the other hand, false information can be a motivation for former terrorists to re-active in terrorism activities, especially when they are not accepted by the public and have no post-deradicalization goals.

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D. Network Trap

Today's terrorist organizations are showing a shift in the organization of national systems, by changing and developing systems that are more like business enterprises. New terrorism has an organization that is structured and operates using a network system. Where, members in the network system can carry out their duties without having the authority of the center or commander (Nazala, 2019). According to Tom Parker (2019), terrorist organizations can turn themselves into their own worst enemy, namely violent extremism. In addition, turning people into terrorists is done through the opportunity of selective empathy and the search for self-actualization, where the terrorism network supports or listens to the problem so that individuals feel that the terrorism network can accept them.

In the findings of this study, the authors see that terrorist networks in Indonesia have developed a network trap strategy, where organizations help, facilitate and continue to foster terrorist convicts and their families so that when terrorist convicts have completed their sentences, they can be active again. Under these conditions, terrorist organizations can expand resources, avoid direct engagement with law enforcement, and prolong the conflict. This is in line with the concept of the terror trap, which is a strategy used to exploit the polarization of society. Forms of terror trap include promoting the practicality of certain actions, to attract significant support, where a terrorist group must be able to make a persuasive case that it can achieve a real and feasible goal (Parker, 2019).

1. The Active Role of Former Terrorists in Terrorism Networks

Researchers found that there are still former terrorists who are active in terrorism networks caused by network trap strategies. As previously explained that individual preferences and motivations become one of the factors a person becomes recidivist. It found that supporters of terrorism were motivated more by religious values and goals than secular ideologies. The necessity of religious doctrine in terrorism is of the utmost importance to the characteristic of terrorist activity (Nazala, 2019). Therefore, it was found that former terrorists re-engaged in terrorism activities. This happened while the former terrorist was still in the penitentiary and after leaving the community institution. On the other hand, there are also findings that former terrorists are involved in the network in conditions where they are still communicating with law enforcement. This was stated by one of the participants:

With regards to taqiyah, we can see some examples where people were close to the government but were eventually arrested. That may be because he is really strong ideologically or wants to do Fa'i (take advantage of welfare), [...].
(Interview with Affin Bakhtiar, BNPT, 2021)

The above conditions show that the radical ideology of extremism of former terrorists remains ingrained in them. This is what causes them to remain involved in various kinds of terrorist activities. In addition, at a time when former terrorists are terrorist convicts, they can still communicate with terrorists and other terrorist convicts. This according to Hegghammer (2012) is related to social factors, where peers who tend to be radical are a large part of terrorist organizations. The study findings also showed:

> For example in the case of Darwin Gobel, we found that one day he was still communicating with his colleagues outside. Communication was done via mobile phone and telephone at LPKA on the day when there was a crowded demo issue about the weakening of the Omnibus Law if I was not mistaken. [...] On that day, he (Darwin Gobel) tried to collect children who had been involved in terrorism (who were already free), then they were included in a group. Then, he (Darwin Gobel) tried to spread the narrative to the children with a narrative that he was still in LPKA, then he piloted the narrative to evoke that they also had to be involved as young people who still have passion and so on. [...] The next moment that shows that he (Darwin Gobel) still has the power and spirit to return (commit acts of terror) is when he several times asked children involved in terrorism crimes who are free to visit him or if they gathered in prison.
> (Interview with Gus Aeb, NU, 2021)

As previously explained, communication with terrorists and former terrorists can also encourage someone to engage in a terrorist organization. Similar to the initial process of radicalization, weak social control and the influence of radical friends can involve the participation of individuals in illegal activities. Media to communicate today facilitates social interaction between former terrorists and other former terrorists.

The condition of the former terror perpetrator's involvement in terrorist activities is also related to environmental factors. The environment, society, and family become important to former combatants and can counter the possibility of recidivism (Kaplan & Nussio, 2016). Anti-social and radical environments can affect former perpetrators of terror, it is also related to stigmatization and rejection of former perpetrators of terror making them involved in radical groups. In addition, the dissatisfaction of former terrorists with reintegration programs is the cause of recidivism. The findings show that:

> Then one of the things that get them back to their network is the need for social relationships. If you look at it, their actions are not accepted by the community. So when it comes to society with their curriculum vitae, they feel rejected by society. Whereas at first, they want to stop, they want to have a social life (communicating & discussing). But it's not what they get in the environment or society in general so they feel they have no choice. Finally, they reconnected with their previous network. Because his social needs are not being met. Not only for economic needs, yes, but elsewhere I also find it like that.
>
> (Interview with Irwan, Correctional Center, 2021)

2. *Economic Activity That Still Depends on Terrorism Networks*

According to Kaplan and Nussion (2016), the opportunities for recidivism have to do with the economic and security context of former militants. Where the decision to re-enter into illegal activity relates to an incentive-based context for former perpetrators of terror. Economic tensions, security dilemmas, and criminal opportunities are among the determinants of re-engaging opportunities. The data findings show that economic activity such as government assistance is a factor that drives a person's desistance from terrorism. However, when the aid stops, there is the potential for former terrorists to return to their group. This was stated by the participant:

> [...] When they have been privileged when they have been facilitated like their families assisted by BNTP, Densus, and others. And when the aid comes out it stops and economic conditions are difficult like this, which in Poso it needs to be watched out for.
>
> (Interview with Taufik, Expert on Radicalism and Terrorism, 2021)

The above conditions are also exacerbated by the contribution of terrorist groups that also provide ongoing economic assistance to former terrorists. In addition, the families of terrorist convicts and former terrorists get economic assistance from terror groups. Other research shows that terrorist organizations supplement loans and donations to the wives of terrorist convicts, provide incentives for members in need of treatment, including their family needs, offer cash to orphans, and so on (Laksmi, 2019). Under the above conditions, former perpetrators of terror should return the terror group's favor, so that they voluntarily re-engage. That is, former perpetrators of terror are motivated by relative economic deprivation. Where, economic shortages can cause frustration and anger, so it can trigger illegal behavior and attitudes. In line with Kaplan and Nussion (2016) that the relative economic outlook of individuals is deteriorating, it can encourage increased individual participation in illegal activities. This condition is also strengthened by findings that show:

> When he returns from the community and the beginning has indeed been picked up by the network, and given attention by his old network it will then become a debt/return of gratitude. Maybe ideologically it is not strong, but in terms of debt/return will be its bonding against the network. Well, that's the first one so in the end, he returned to being a recidivist.
>
> (Interview with Affin Bakhtiar, BNPT, 2021)

The terrorist group seized the opportunity to help the terrorist inmate and his family as one of the strategies to maintain its human resources. Where, human resources have a very expensive value because it is not only related to the individual himself but includes knowledge, experience, information, and other things inherent in the individual. Economic deprivation is relatively a deficiency utilized by terrorism groups to encourage the involvement of former terrorists in terrorist activities.

3. *Family Ties to Terrorism Networks*

As with the initial process of recruiting into armed groups, families are one of the factors driving former perpetrators of terror. Where families and social environments tend to encourage the birth of criminogenic. In recidivism theory, it has been explained that family ties can serve as a very powerful restraint to prevent recidivism, or vice versa (Kaplan & Nussio, 2016). In the Indonesian context, often found that the family is the cause of someone involved in terrorism crimes. There is social pressure from radical groups and families, so they indirectly join jihadism (Gunaratna & Hennessy, 2012). Therefore, there are conditions where former perpetrators of terror are encouraged by radicalized families to re-engage in terrorism networks.

Research conducted by IPAC (2020) found that a former terrorist can re-engage by marrying a woman who comes from a radical family. Where, all the extended families of women are involved in various acts of terrorism (IPAC, 2020). It is also found in the study, that one of the participants stated:

> [...] input for Mr. Arsyad, that there is a building located in Palu named M. Irham who has just been released on parole 2020 then until 2022. Because of the work permit now he is in Palu working in the trench oil business. The interesting thing about terrorist convicts I was informed that in September she will marry her son Santoso.

(Interview with Junaid, Makassar Intelligence Detachment, 2021)

This type of commitment provides an obligation for this individual to continue to be involved in his organization, including moral obligations because the organization has increased the qualifications and needs at a time when former perpetrators of terror become convicts of terrorism, including assisting his family. Thus, the development of a motive to return the favor by involving themselves and serving terrorist groups. This condition is supported by the participant's statement:

> When he returns from the community and the beginning has indeed been picked up by the network, and given attention by his old network it will then become a debt/return of gratitude. Maybe ideologically it is not strong, but in terms of debt/return will be its bonding against the network. Well, that's the first one so in the end, he returned to being a recidivist.
> (Interview with Affin Bakhtiar, BNPT, 2021)

Thus, radical family ties and terrorism networks cannot simply be ignored. The data also found that terrorism networks had used the families of former terrorists to pull them back. On the other hand, radicalized families will not necessarily ignore the qualifications and experiences of former terrorists. Therefore, the family became one of the causes of a former terrorist being re-involved in a terrorist network.

4. *Educational Facilities Still Linked to Terrorism Networks*

Related to the factor of close familial ties to the network, it has also been found that educational facilities encourage former terrorists to re-engage. Where educational facilities that internalize radicalism and extremism also involve former perpetrators of terror. Islamic education facilities such as madrasah, are often educational facilities that prepare sympathizers and terrorists to keep their networks in check. At least for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asia, radical madrassas are important for terrorist attacks (Magouirk, 2008). In addition to radical madrasah, pesantren can also be an educational facility that advocates violence in any form, be it terrorism or violent jihad. This is following the findings of research data:

> Because the activities of terrorism and radicalism are related to the cultivation of culture and ideology in themselves. So we cannot deny that the facts on the ground are like that. Then, there is a high spirit of ukhuwa, because of the former terrorism prisoners, we do the raising and construction of their intentions that there is the intention of the Islamic State. Then, this group will also continue, because they have a high cadre and intensive, may need to be re-examined there are certain huts that are currently ecosystem and accepted by the community, because in them they have jihadi ideological material, and this is cadre from the age of middle school and high school, to the campuses.
> (Interview with Arsyad, Poso Resort Police, 2021)

Previous studies have found that terrorism networks such as JI have an explicit and implicit link between madrassas and radical pesantren and JI organizations. Where this linkage runs the extension of the affiliate of the dreamer to the indirect, namely radical madrassas who have known and voiced JI sympathizers to their teachers and apply the JI teaching curriculum (Magouirk, 2008). In a model developed by Magourik and Atran (2008) it was found that the involvement of terrorist sympathizers is not only top-down indoctrination but also the development of bottom-up networks, which include the formation of focal points and leadership training (Magouirk, 2008). In this formation, some teachers and leaders have been involved in acts of terrorism. Where the process includes teachers giving their interpretation of radical material. Indirectly, this teacher monitors the learning process and sees who is intelligent, diligent, and interested in radical understanding. Therefore, the role of former terrorists who are still active in radical education facilities is radicalization and recruitment, so that they are directly involved in terrorism activities and networks.

IV. CONCLUSION

Through this research, it was found that the idling mode is not only carried out by terrorist groups but by former terrorists, who face a busy and idle phase of life. There are conditions where idle time is related to criminal behavior, as well as its involvement in activities that can reduce crime. To show the condition of idling mode, researchers examined the tendency of former perpetrators of terror to practice taqiyyah or strategy. Taqiyyah is a condition when terrorists or former terrorists do something that is not following the heart. Thus, former perpetrators of terror tend to be actively involved in society instead of having succeeded in desistance from terrorism, but on the other hand, they remain involved in terrorist groups. Therefore, the phenomenon of recidivism of terror perpetrators in Indonesia can be caused by the activities of former terror perpetrators, one of which is related to the planning of their actions. The finding in this study is that many former terror perpetrators take a more active role in the second round, especially if they were not previously involved in violence.

**Desistance from Terrorism Forecasting: Idling Mode and Catalyst Event**

Furthermore, the researcher also found that former terrorists carry out a 'two-face, two-foot strategy', in the form of the participation of former terrorists in various government programs that benefit them. For example, they still take economic assistance from BNPT and the Ministry of Social Affairs. Then, it's as if they support and undergo activities because it is not radical. On the other hand, this aid is not only used by former terrorists personally for their families but also used to gather resources from other terrorist groups. However, this condition also occurs because some occurrences make former terror perpetrators implement the strategy. One of them is due to the rejection of the public against former perpetrators of terror and deradicalization programs that cannot support them to develop in the community. Therefore, the role of the government and society is needed in embrace former perpetrators of terror more humanely so that this condition can be minimized.

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