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Risk Assessment of Women Involved in Terrorism: Indonesian Cases



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ABSTRACT: In Indonesia, the involvement of women in terrorism activities have been known as subtle until 2021. In this year of pandemic, a female lone-wolf's attacking the National Police Headquarter has raised a question if women have taken more frontline roles without direction in terrorism attacks in the country. This study is aimed to investigate the risks of women involved in terrorism organizations in Indonesia. 30 women of the Islamic State (ISIS) and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) were examined in this study. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to analyze the data. The results show that the average risk score of women in terrorism networks in Indonesia is 3,21; which is at "high" risk. Furthermore, their terrorism *Motivation* and *Ideology* are both at "high" risk; while their *Capability* is at "medium" risk. The findings could help counterterrorism practitioners in planning intervention for women in terrorism movements.

KEYWORDS: Terrorism, risks, assessment, female terrorists, extremism

INTRODUCTION

The women role in terrorism has come under critical scrutiny around the world since the emergence of ISIS (Ali, 2015; Chatterjee, 2016; Kibtiah & Tirajoh , 2019; Kneip, 2016; Martini, 2018; Pearson, 2016; Shaban, 2020; Spencer, 2016; Orozobekova, 2021). In Indonesia, before 2016 women in terror activities were widely known as supporters (i.e., messengers, recruiters, motivators) or even victims in this male-dominated society (Adji et al., 2009; Handayani & Novianto, 2008; Mulia, 2019; Walby, 2014). Nonetheless, after ISIS their role have largely moved to be more active in the terrorism movement (Istiqomah in Bisnis.com, 2021).

In 2021 while the Indonesian government was focusing on the recovery of people during the pandemic (Gugus Tugas Percepatan Penanganan COVID-19, 2021), a female lone wolf attacked the National Police Headquarter (Siregar & Rayda, 2021). The US Embassy in Indonesia consequently released an official security alert on Indonesia after this attack (US Embassy, 2021). The action has elevated the question if women have taken more front-line roles in terrorism actions (Arbi, 2021; Hukom & Subandi, 2017). The pandemic is seen by ISIS and its affiliations as a sign of the forthcoming apocalypse; hence, all means including women might be used to attack the perceived enemies (Habib, 2020; Sukabdi, 2020a).

There are ongoing discussions regarding women in the terrorism movement especially in a patriarchal society like Indonesia. Which is, whether they are victims of exploitation (Mulia, 2019) or actors in terrorism (Asiyah, Prasetyo & Sudjak, 2020; Bhakti, 2016; Musfia, 2017). The risk assessment of women in the terrorism movement is a necessity. This study aims to conduct a risk assessment of women in terrorist groups in Indonesia. 30 women were assessed in this study with both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. This study may help practitioners in planning intervention for women in the terrorism movement.

WOMEN INVOLVEMENT FOR TERRORISM IN INDONESIA

Terrorism is multifaceted in which its actors can be classified across numerous variables. Victoroff (2005) defined multiple variables in terrorist actors as seen in Table 1.


Classification
Individual vs. group
State vs. sub state vs. individual
Anti-state/anti-establishment/separatist vs. pro-state/pro-establishment
Intrastate vs. transnational
Civilian vs. paramilitary or military
Secular vs. religious
-

Table 1. Dimensions of terrorism

Financial motivation	Idealistic vs. entrepreneurial
Political ideology	Leftist/socialist vs. rightist/fascist vs. anarchist
Hierarchical role	Sponsor vs. leader vs. middle management vs. follower
Willingness to die	Suicidal vs. non-suicidal
Target	Property (including data) vs. individual vs. masses of people
Methodology	Bombing, assassination, kidnapping/hostage taking, mass poisoning, rape,
	other (e.g., bioterrorism, cyber terrorism)

Victoroff (2005, 2009) further explains the challenge in determining the process and influence of the psychological aspects in terrorist offenders because terrorist networks/organizations usually consist of a hierarchy with numerous roles within each level of that hierarchy. These roles (Figure 1) may determine the terrorist actors' behaviors. The roles include 1. *Sponsor* (i.e., state authority figures, sub-state group sponsors, and individual financial contributors); 2. *Leader* (i.e., self-imaged idealists, self-imaged messianic figure, ethnic or religious animus-driven, and entrepreneur); 3. *executive committee* (i.e., political and military policymakers); 4. *middle management* (i.e., strategist/technocrat, recruiter, trainer/dispatcher, supplier/armourer); 5. *Follower* (i.e., foot soldier, technician, surveyor, transporter, sympathiser/fellow traveller); and 6. *lone wolf/single-payer* (i.e., an actor without any connection to any terrorist organization/network). Each role may attack people with certain psychological features, resources and skills. For example, Corner and Gill (2014) describe that there is a difference between the lone wolf and group-based terrorist actors: their study reveals that there is a stronger relationship between mental illness and lone wolf offenders than that between mental illness and group-based ones. Their study also shows significant relations between offenders' mental illness and stress with around half (52.9%) of lone wolf offenders are socially isolated.

Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) suggest that terrorism actions are not committed without planning. Violence is chosen in acts of terrorism due to a viewpoint that there are no alternative methods that can be done to reach their goals and to counterbalance a greater authority's power (Crenshaw, 2010, Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009, Putra & Sukabdi, 2013, 2014). Terror actions can be viewed as a form of reaction against perceived socioeconomic deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Love, 2009; Post et al., 2003; Post, 2007; Rose, 1982; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2001).



Figures 1. Typology of terrorists (Victoroff, 2005)

In Indonesia, JI, affiliated to Al Qaeda (Sinaga, Prayitno, & Montratama, 2018), conducted terror acts in several places (e.g., churches, cafés, hotels, and embassies) (Sinaga, Prayitno, & Montratama, 2018). Their most damaging actions are the Bali bombing I and II and several vital sites including JW Marriot and the Australian embassy (Sarwono S. W., 2012) which were all committed by males as frontlines and organisers. Accordingly, women's roles in terrorism are seen by counterterrorism scholars as supporters or victims of male-dominated society (Adji et al., 2009; Asiyah, Prasetyo & Sudjak, 2020; Bhakti, 2016; Handayani & Novianto, 2008; Mulia, 2019; Musfia, 2017; Walby, 2014). Among women as supporters of terrorist acts in the JI group are Putri Munawaroh, Munfiatun, Arina Rahma, and Ruqayah Binti Husen Luceno (Bhakti, 2016). However, some actors are seen to be

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taking top-ranked roles than just supporters, such as Nurul Azmy Tibyani for hacking and stealing Rp. 5 to 8 billion rupiahs or up to USD600,000 investment and Rosmawati for terrorism financing (Bhakti, 2016). Later, the emergence of ISIS increases a long list of women's roles in terror cases in Indonesia (Amindoni, 2018; Asiyah, Prasetyo & Sudjak, 2020; Kholifah, 2017; Musfia, 2017; Widyaningsih & Kuntarto, 2020).

Women's roles in terrorist networks have been widely examined by academics or researchers (Agara, 2015; Yasefi, 2014; Martin, 2014; Nurhayati, 2015; Magfur & Muniroh, 2013). Musfia's (2017) study shows that women's roles in terrorist organizations are as important as those of men. Her study describes that ISIS has a distinct tactic in involving women in their actions compared to other terrorist organizations. That is, women's involvement in this organization is triggered by several factors: psychological conditions, significant others, personal grievances/crisis, and identity as Muslims.

Hogg et al. (2004) describe roles in a terrorist group as four: indirect supporters (sympathisers), direct supporters (followers), bombing actors (martyrs), and leaders/managers. Referring to these roles, Musfia (2017) explains that female terrorist offenders in Indonesia are involved in all four roles, as sympathizer (e.g., Ratna Nirmala), followers (e.g., Umi Delima, Rosmawati, Tini Susanti, Tutin Sugiarti, Arinda Putri Maharani), martyrs (e.g., Dian Yulia Novi, Ika Puspitasari), and leaders/initiators (of a group or movement)/recruiters (e.g., Aisyah Lina Kamelya). The limited number of women leaders in terrorist groups in Indonesia, according to Musfia (2017), is related to the culture and women's lacking opportunities and courage in making high-risked or warrelated decisions.

Referring to Hudson's (1999) study on the pathway to terrorist groups, Musfia (2017) argues that Umi Delima, Tini Susanti, Arinda Putri Maharani, and Ika Puspita Sari (women of ISIS) were involved in terrorism networks influenced by their husbands, different than Dian Yulia Novi and Tutin Sugiarti who was influenced by cyberspace/social media. Different than era prior to ISIS, the current terrorist organizations in Indonesia provide more access to information (for example, about terror plans/activities) or more inviting to women in their networks (e.g., wives, sisters, daughters) (Asiyah, Prasetyo & Sudjak, 2020; Kholifah, 2017; Musfia, 2017; Widyaningsih & Kuntarto, 2020). ISIS has set up a new strategy for terrorist actions which involves more women in the frontlines, as they can play multiple roles (multitasking) without drawing attention to themselves (Nurish, 2021; Sukabdi, 2021a, 2021b). Also, their presence would be a motivation/attract the attention of men (Musfia, 2017).

Referring to Victoroff's (2005, 2009) study on numerous roles of offenders within a hierarchy in a terrorism group, women in Indonesia have not filled any position of a lone wolf in terrorist actions until 2021. During the pandemic, on 31st of March 2021, a shocking terror attack occurred in the Indonesian National Police Headquarter by a lone-wolf female actor who understood the basic use of a gun and its techniques (Siregar & Rayda, 2021). The US Embassy in Indonesia subsequently released an official security alert regarding travelling to Indonesia after this attack (US Embassy, 2021). The phenomenon was triggered by terrorist militants' viewing pandemic as a sign of the apocalypse (*ad-dukhon*), so they are more 'all-out' and rampant in attacking perceived enemies (Habib, 2019; Sukabdi, 2021b).

TERRORISM PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK FACTORS

Rosenfeld (2003) describes that terrorism is qualitatively dissimilar from any form of violence studied by criminologists. LaFree and Dugan (2004) clarify that there are several conceptual dissimilarities between general criminal and terrorist behaviors: terror actions usually make multiple crimes; the responsivity to terrorism usually goes beyond local governments, in contrast to general crimes; terrorist offenders are to look for extreme attention/exposure, unlike general criminals; terrorism is used as a tool for several political goals, different than general crimes; terrorists mention higher goals so that they are seen as altruists; and terrorists are to change their criminal activities to transform.

In Forensic Psychology, the application of general-criminal risk assessment to terrorism issues has been questioned (Dernevik et al., 2009a). It is because the findings of studies on mentally-troubled offenders and general criminals may not be applicable to forecast recidivism risk to those with political motivation (Dernevik et al., 2009b). Consequently, defining terrorism risk factors before performing any risk assessments on terrorist offenders is a necessity (Monahan, 2012).

In Indonesia, Sukabdi (2018) recognizes 18 psychological risk factors of terrorist offenders which are clustered into three domains: *Motivation* ('Heart'), *Ideology* ('Head'), and *Capability* (Hand'). Six risk factors of *Motivation* are *situational*, *economic*, *justice*, *social*, *power*, and *actualization motives*. Six risk factors of *Ideology* include *values*, *attitudes*, *militancy*, *understandings* of *philosophy and contexts*, *targets of missions*, and *layers in ideological groups*. Six risk factors of *Capability* contain skills in *mechanical and electrical* (*M and E*), *military*, *language*, *intelligence*, *information and communication technology* (*ICT*), and *social domination skills*. Sukabdi (2020b) releases a tool in investigating offenders' criminogenic risk factors (called as MIKRA), which later was used in this study to examine the terrorist offenders' risks.

METHODS

Participants

This study examined 30 women in terrorist networks in Indonesia. They were members of ISIS and JI. Their ages were between 18 and 59 (mean: 31). Their involvement in terrorism activities were supporters (i.e., information hiding, helping family members who

were terror actors, financing), martyrs (i.e., bombing, shooting), and organisers (i.e., recruiting female bombers, initiating terrorism virtual group).

47 field observers were involved in this study to give information about the 30 women/subjects, as seen in Table 2. These field observers know the 30 subjects in person. Furthermore, two psychologists (forensic and clinical), a counterterrorism practitioner, and a human rights activist as raters were also involved to administer the risk assessment. The four raters discussed the information about the subjects (i.e., police investigation reports/documents, forensic evidence, and observations in the field) for performing the risk assessment.

	Observers								
Subjects	Individuals	ls Descriptions							
	marviauais	(e.g., experiences, qualification, relationship with the subjects)							
	А	Chartered psychologist							
1	В	Neighbour	1.	Foren-					
	С	Prison guardian		sic psy-					
	А	Chartered psychologist		cholo-					
2	D	Local council		gist					
	С	Prison guardian							
	E	Academic researcher	2.	Clini-					
3	F	Neighbour		cal					
	G	Family member of the participant		psy-					
	E	Academic researcher		cholo-					
4	Н	Police investigator		gist					
	Ι	Local council	3.	Coun-					
	E	Academic researcher	5.	terter-					
5	J	Friend of the participant		rorism					
	К	Family member of the participant		practi-					
	L	Police investigator		tioner					
6	М	Prison guardian		troner					
	Ν	Member of a terrorist organization	4.	Humar					
	L	Police investigator		Rights					
7	М	Prison guardian		activist					
	0	Member of a terrorist organization							
	Р	Police investigator							
8	Q	Prison guardian							
	R	Member of a terrorist organization							
	Р	Police investigator							
9	М	Prison guardian							
	Ν	Member of a terrorist organization							
	S	Police investigator							
10	М	Prison guardian							
	Т	Member of a terrorist organization							
	S	Police investigator							
11	Q	Prison guardian							
	U	Member of a terrorist organization							
	V	Police investigator							
12	Q	Prison guardian							
	W	Member of a terrorist organization							
	Х	Police investigator							
13	Q	Prison guardian							
	Y	Member of a terrorist organization							
14	Ζ	Forensic psychologist							
14	AA	Graphologist]						

Table 2. Subjects' observers

	Observers		
Subjects	Individuals	Descriptions	Raters
	Individuals	(e.g., experiences, qualification, relationship with the subjects)	
	AB	Journalist	
	Z	Forensic psychologist	
15	AC	Academic researcher	
	AD	Academic researcher	
	Z	Forensic psychologist	
16	AE	Prison guardian	
	AF	Prison guardian	
	AG	Academic researcher	
17	AK	Journalist	
	AD	Academic researcher	
	AD	Academic researcher	
18	AM	Academic researcher	
	AL	Academic researcher	
	AD	Academic researcher	
19	AG	Academic researcher	
	AN	Journalist	
	AG	Academic researcher	
20	AK	Journalist	
	AD	Academic researcher	
	AG	Academic researcher	
21	AK	Journalist	
	AD	Academic researcher	
	AG	Academic researcher	
22	AK	Journalist	
	AD	Academic researcher	
	AP	Academic researcher	
23	AD	Academic researcher	
	AG	Academic researcher	
	AP	Academic researcher	
24	AD	Academic researcher	
	AG	Academic researcher	
	AD	Academic researcher	
25	AG	Academic researcher	
	AQ	Member of a terrorist organization	
	AD	Academic researcher	
26	AG	Academic researcher	
	AR	Police investigator	
	AD	Academic researcher	
27	AG	Academic researcher	
	AS	Police investigator	
<u> </u>	AD	Academic researcher	
28	AG	Academic researcher	
	AT	Journalist	
	AD	Academic researcher	
29	AG	Academic researcher	
	AT	Journalist	
	AD	Academic researcher	
30	AG	Academic researcher	
50	AU	Local council	
	110		

Procedure and material

The names of women involved in terrorism in Indonesia (subjects) were gathered from the National Police. The data about these women were collected from 2016 to 2021. The data were collected from police investigation documents, forensic evidence during prosecution, and observations in the subjects' hometowns, families, schools, military camps, and restricted online groups. The requirement for consent was waived by the university's ethics committee due to the urgency of the research to investigate risk assessment and maintain peace in Indonesian society.

The instrument for risk assessment used in this study is *Motivation-Ideology-Capability* Risk Assessment (MIKRA) patented by Sukabdi (2020b). MIKRA contains behavior checklists to assess risk factors in the three domains: terrorism *Motivation, Ideology,* and *Capability* of a terrorist offender/extremist/militant. MIKRA generates four risk levels: "low", "medium", "high", and "very high" risks (Table 3), with behavior key-codes, demonstrated in Figure 2. When designing rehabilitation for terrorist offenders, MIKRA helps in monitoring the progress of an offender during the intervention. The outcome of this is a reduction of risk (Sukabdi, 2020b, 2021).

Table 3. Scoring system of MIKRA

Risk Levels	Scores
Very high	5
High	4
Medium	3
Low	2
Zero	1

Source: Sukabdi (2020b, 2021)




Figure 2. Codes of behaviors in MIKRA terrorism risk assessment (Sukabdi, 2020b, 2021)

In terms of the administration of MIKRA, three observers were assigned/asked to witness/identify each participant's activities on a regular basis (Table 2). This was performed since MIKRA requires more than two observers in assessing a participant. The observations had occurred for five years. The observers travelled to each participant's hometown, schools, and military camps. They visited/observed the participant's families, religious sermons, and exclusive online groups. These observers' information was

reported to the four raters. The raters discussed the 30 subjects to evaluate their risks based on behavior keys given in the MIKRA risk assessment. A meeting was held every three months to rate each participant based on information collected.

Analysis

This study used both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. The quantitative method was used to define the risk scores (the general scores and scores in each domain and risk factor) and levels of risks based on the scores. A qualitative method was used to identify the uniqueness of each participant assessed in this study. Following data collection, an inter-rater judgment was held to inspect each participant based on MIKRA behavior indicators. After inter-rater judgment, each participant has the following scores: 1) general risk score to determine her overall level of risk, 2) a risk score for *Motivation* to terrorism, 3) a risk score for *Ideology* for terrorism, 4) a risk score for *Capability* of terrorism, and 4) a risk score for each of 18 risk factors. All these scores are described in the findings (Table 5). Table 4 demonstrates levels of risk based on these scores.

Table 4. Levels of risk in MIKRA

Scores	Levels of risk
0.00 - 1.00	Zero (Protected)
1.01 - 2.00	Low
2.01 - 3.00	Medium
3.01 - 4.00	High
4.01 - 5.00	Very high

Source: Sukabdi (2020b, 2021)

RESULTS

The findings of this study show that the average risk score of women in the terrorism movement in Indonesia is 3,21; which is considered as "high" risk. Table 5 show all the scores (of risk factors, domains, and in general) for each participant together with the percentage of interrater agreement (within four raters). The findings also show that 5 subjects are at "very high", 12 are at "high", 10 are at "medium", and 3 at "low" risk. Moreover, Table 6 demonstrated the general descriptions of women involved in terrorism in Indonesia for qualitative review.

Table 5. Risk levels of women in terrorism movement in Indonesia
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	-	otiv					Ideo							ipabi	lity						
Subjects	Economic		onal		Superiority	Actualization	Doctrines	Attitudes	f Missions	Lavers in Grown	Militancv	Philosophy and Contexts	Intelligence			Military	Social Domination	Mechanical and Electric	General Risk Scores	General Risk Levels	Percentage of Interrater Agreement
8	3	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	5	4	3	4	4	3	5	2	4,22	Very high	100
14	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	5	3	5	4	5	2	3	5	2	2	4,06	Very high	100
23	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	5	4	5	5	5	2	4	5	3	4	4,39	Very high	100
24	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	5	4	5	5	5	2	3	5	3	4	4,33	Very high	100
28	4	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	2	4	2	5	2	4,22	Very high	100
1	1	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	3	4	4	4	2	2	2	4	2	3,39	High	75
3	1	4	1	4	4	4	5	4	5	4	3	3	5	2	3	2	4	2	3,33	High	75
4	4	4	2	4	3	4	5	4	5	4	5	5	4	4	3	2	4	2	3,78	High	75
5	4	4	3	4	2	4	5	4	5	3	3	4	2	2	2	2	4	2	3,28	High	75
15	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	4	5	4	2	2	2	5	2	3,89	High	75
17	5	5	3	4	4	5	4	3	4	4	3	4	5	3	5	2	3	2	3,78	High	100
18	5	5	3	4	3	5	4	3	4	4	3	4	5	2	4	2	4	2	3,67	High	100
25	4	4	4	4	3	4	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	3,67	High	100
26	4	4	5	5	3	4	4	4	3	4	5	4	5	2	2	5	4	3	3,89	High	100
27	4	4	5	5	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	5	2	2	4	3	3	3,72	High	100

29	4	3	5	4	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	5	2	3	2	3	2	3,22	High	100
	-	-					-	-	-	-	-	-								0	
30	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	2	2	2	5	2	3,78	High	100
2	4	4	5	5	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	2,94	Medium	75
7	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	4	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2,39	Medium	100
9	1	4	2	3	3	3	2	2	4	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2,50	Medium	100
11	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2,39	Medium	100
12	2	2	2	2	4	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2,28	Medium	75
13	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2,33	Medium	100
19	3	3	4	3	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	2	2	3	2	3,00	Medium	100
20	3	3	4	3	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	2	2	2	3	2	2,94	Medium	100
21	3	3	4	3	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	2	2	3	2	3,00	Medium	100
22	3	3	4	3	2	3	4	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	2	2	3	2	3,00	Medium	100
6	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	1,89	Low	100
10	1	2	2	2	1	1	3	1	3	1	1	3	1	4	2	1	1	1	1,72	Low	75
16	1	1	4	3	1	2	2	1	2	3	1	1	2	4	2	2	2	1	1,94	Low	100
Ave	Average risk level of all subjects:3,21(Hi												(High risk)								

 Table 6. The general highlights of women in terrorism movement in Indonesia

Subjects	General descriptions
1	Raised in a religious extremist family who own several schools and business, she is the youngest sibling and determines to build an Islamic State in Indonesia. Several of her family members were
2	arrested for terrorism She was the only child in her family. Her father passed away when she was two years old. Her mother became sick and she has to be the breadwinner to support her mother. She learned Arabic and traditional medical technique to be able to heal her mother. She was interested in ISIS in 2014 and chatted with a Turkish man online. Her mother passed away in 2016, then he decided to travel to Syria. She was caught by immigration authorities in Turkey before going to Syria. She was then deported to Indonesia.
3	Her father was a personal assistant to one of the ISIS leaders in Indonesia. She and her husband joined ISIS and became propagandists of ISIS on social media. Her husband was detained for supplying weapon for a terror act.
4	She was a propagandist of ISIS and detained in Al Hol camp in Syria. She spread the news from Syria to Indonesians to recruit them to join ISIS.
5	As a propagandist of ISIS, she was 63 and arrested at a camp in Syria. She joined ISIS before retired (in Indonesia) and moved to Syria afterwards. Some of her family members (e.g., daughter and son in law) were killed during airstrikes in Syria. She is a militant who tried to recruit new members to join ISIS.
6	She was radicalised while in college. She was attracted to ISIS through social media. Failed to go to Syria, she decided to attack people in church using a Katana (Japanese sword)
7	She is a member of ISIS who supported the logistics of the group
8	She was an immigrant worker who became a recruiter for ISIS. Growing up without a father figure, she hated her mother because, according to her, she did not follow Islamic rules (sharia). Dropping out from school, she joined ISIS through social media. She gave birth to a child whilst in custody which she seldom cared for. She only had one plan in her mind, which was to be a bomber.
9	She was 18 years old when this study was held and received 2.5 years sentence for involving in ISIS' terror activities (supporting riot in prison)
10	She and her husband were deported when trying to go to Syria. She was under police custody when this study was conducted

11	As a member of ISIS, she hid information about upcoming bombing action.
	She was deported and arrested when she tried to go to Syria. As a member of ISIS, she recruited
12	two men through social media. During custody, she was involved in a physical fight with another
	ISIS member in a cell
	Being the youngest sibling in her family, she was raised by her uncle as her parents passed away
12	when she was a teen. She joined a radical group called FAH and finally was recruited by ISIS
13	through social media. She was disappointed by ISIS because they do not help her much, especially
	at the time of arrestment.
14	She joined an illegal military camp to be able to shoot. She dropped out of college, joined ISIS, and
14	planned to be a martyr
15	She was seen in JI as a godmother as she was very influential in the group. She became a motivator
15	for men jihadists in JI. Most of her sons and sons-in-law were arrested for terrorism cases.
16	Her husband was a commander in a terrorist insurgent in Mindanau, Philippines. She was detained
10	for 2 years in prison in the Philippines.
17	She was a hacker who stole around USD500,000 for supporting Majelis Mujahidin Timur (MIT),
17	a terrorist organization in Indonesia that was affiliated with ISIS.
18	She and her husband were supporters of MIT. Her bank account was used for the group for trans-
10	actions.
19	She was a wife of a famous recruiter for Al Qaida in Indonesia. Her husband was one of the de-
17	signers of the JW Marriot dan Ritz Carlton bombings.
	She was a wife of an eminent recruiter for Jamaah Islamiyah, a terrorist organization in Indonesia.
20	Her husband was involved in the JW Marriot dan Ritz Carlton bombings. She hid her husband
	during a law enforcement search and investigation.
	She was a wife of a well-known recruiter for Al Qaida in Indonesia (JI). Not knowing her future
21	husband and still in college, she obeyed her father for an arranged marriage with the terror actor.
	Her father protected and hid her husband during a law enforcement search and investigation. Her
	husband was involved in the JW Marriot dan Ritz Carlton bombings.
22	Affiliated with Jamaah Islamiyah, she was the wife of a top-ranked bomb maker. Her husband
	created a number of bombs in Indonesia.
22	She was a militant member of ISIS who was active in searching and spreading the news on extrem-
23	ism on social media. She married a top-ranked member of ISIS in Indonesia. She planned to be a
	martyr who conducted a suicide bombing. However, she was arrested before committing the action.
24	She went overseas as an immigrant worker. Her husband recruited her to join ISIS and become a quiside hombor. She was errorted before committing the action
25	suicide bomber. She was arrested before committing the action
25	She was a sympathiser of ISIS. She, her husband, and her children moved to Syria to join ISIS.
26	She was the wife of the former MIT leader. Having military skills, she was involved in fire-shooting
27	against police during battle-wagon in a forest of Sulawesi.
27	She was the wife of the current MIT leader. She joined the military camp of MIT.
28	She was a top-ranked recruiter of ISIS. She introduced women to ISIS male members and recruited
	these women to be martyrs (suicide bombers).
29	She was the first wife of one of ISIS top-ranked members in Indonesia. She helped the organization
	collect funding for bombings.
30	She initiated Baqiyah United Group (BUG), a cyber group that facilitated women to fight for ISIS.
	BUG recruited people and gathered funding for ISIS.

For terrorism *Motivation* and *Ideology*, the results of this study identify that the subjects are at "high" risk in the two domains. Table 7 presents each participant's risks in the six risk factors of *Motivation*. The results show that 11 subjects are at "very high" risk in terms of their motivation to conduct terror actions, while 6 are at "high", 10 are at "medium", and 3 are at "low" risk. The study shows that economic motives are not always the motives these women joined the terrorism movement. Some of the subjects (1, 3, 6, 9, 10, and 16) have been financially settled prior to joining the terrorism movement.

	Domain of <i>N</i>						Risk Levels
Subjects	Economic	Justice	Situational	Social	Superiority	Actualiza- tion	in Motiva- tion
8	Medium risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high
14	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high
15	High risk	High risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high
17	Very high risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	High risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high
18	Very high risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	High risk	Medium risk	Very high risk	Very high
23	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high
24	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high
26	High risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	High risk	Very high
27	High risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	High risk	Very high
28	High risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high
30	Medium risk	High risk	High risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high
1	Protected	High risk	High				
2	High risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Low risk	Low risk	High
4	High risk	High risk	Low risk	High risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
5	High risk	High risk	Medium risk	High risk	Low risk	High risk	High
25	High risk	High risk	High risk	High risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
29	High risk	Medium risk	Very high risk	High risk	Low risk	Medium risk	High
3	Protected	High risk	Protected	High risk	High risk	High risk	Medium
19	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium
20	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium
21	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium
22	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium
7	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium
9	Protected	High risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium
11	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium

Table 7. Women's motivation for terrorism in Indonesia

12	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium
13	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium
6	Protected	Low risk	Low risk	Protected	Low risk	Protected	Low
10	Protected	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Protected	Protected	Low
16	Protected	Protected	High risk	Medium risk	Protected	Low risk	Low
Average risk level in <i>Motivation</i> :							High

Table 8 demonstrates the subjects' risks in the six risk factors of *Ideology*. Most of them are at "high" risk since they are favourable to extremism. Moreover, most of them have adopted violent ideology and planned/already stayed in conflict zones such as Syria. In the risk assessment held in this study, 9 subjects are at "very high", 12 are at "high", 6 are at "medium", and 3 are at "low" risk.

	Domain of	Ideology					Risk Levels in
Subjects	Doc- trines	Attitudes	Targets of Missions	Layers in Group	Militancy	Philosophy and Contexts	Ideology
4	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high
8	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high
14	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high
15	High risk	High risk	High risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high
23	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high
24	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high
25	Very high risk	High risk	High risk	High risk	High risk	High risk	Very high
28	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Very high
30	Very high risk	High risk	High risk	Very high risk	High risk	High risk	Very high
1	Very high risk	High risk	High risk	Medium risk	High risk	High risk	High
3	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	High risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	High
5	Very high risk	High risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
17	High risk	Medium risk	High risk	High risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
18	High risk	Medium risk	High risk	High risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
19	High risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
20	High risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
21	High risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	High risk	High

Table 8. Women's ideology for terrorism in Indonesia

7	Low risk	Low risk	risk High risk	Medium risk	risk Low risk	Low risk	Medium
7	Low risk	Low risk	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium
9	Low risk	Low risk	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium
11	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium
12	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium
13	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium
6	Protected	Protected	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low
16	Low risk	Protected	Low risk	Medium risk	Protected	Protected	Low
10	Medium	Theeleu	Medium	Wiediulii IISK	Tiolecteu	TTOICCIEU	LOW
10	risk	Protected	risk	Protected	Protected	Medium risk	Low
Average risk level in <i>Ideology</i> :							

For the domain of *Capability*, the findings show that the subjects' skills for conducting terrorism are at "medium" risk. Table 9 reveals the subjects' risks in the six risk factors of *Capability*. Subjects show experiences in activities such as cyber-hacking, financing terrorism groups, supporting logistics, translating documents of terrorism movement, generating propaganda, motivating or recruiting people in social media, manipulating prison officers, data collecting and analyzing, weapon shooting, and even bombs making. In this risk assessment, 10 subjects are at "high", 19 are at "medium", and 1 are at "low" risk.

Table 9. Women's	capability fo	or terrorism in	Indonesia
Tuble 7. Women a	capability is		maonesia

	Domain of C						
Subjects	Intelli- gence	Lan- guage	ICT	Military	Social Domina- tion	M and E	Risk Levels in <i>Capability</i>
4	High risk	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	High risk	Low risk	High
8	Medium risk	High risk	High risk	Medium risk	Very high risk	Low risk	High
14	Very high risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Very high risk	Low risk	Low risk	High
17	Very high risk	Medium risk	Very high risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	High
18	Very high risk	Low risk	High risk	Low risk	High risk	Low risk	High
23	Very high risk	Low risk	High risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
24	Very high risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Very high risk	Medium risk	High risk	High
26	Very high risk	Low risk	Low risk	Very high risk	High risk	Medium risk	High
27	Very high risk	Low risk	Low risk	High risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	High

28	Very high	Low risk	High risk	Low risk	Very high	Low risk	High	
	risk		Low risk		risk		Medium	
1	High risk	Low risk		Low risk	High risk	Low risk	Medium	
2	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium	
3	Very high risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	High risk	Low risk	Medium	
5	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	High risk	Low risk	Medium	
6	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium	
7	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium	
9	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium	
11	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium	
12	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium	
13	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Medium	
15	High risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Very high risk	Low risk	Medium	
16	Low risk	High risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Protected	Medium	
19	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium	
20	High risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium	
21	High risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium	
22	Medium risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium	
25	High risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium	
29	Very high risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium risk	Low risk	Medium	
30	High risk	Low risk	Low risk	Low risk	Very high risk	Low risk	Medium	
10	Protected	High risk	Low risk	Protected	Protected	Protected	Low	
Average risk level in <i>Capability</i> :								

DISCUSSION

There are continuing discussions on women involvement in terrorism in a patriarchal society such as Indonesia. The debate is centered on whether they are victims of exploitation (Mulia, 2019) or actors in terrorism (Asiyah, Prasetyo & Sudjak, 2020; Bhakti, 2016; Musfia, 2017). Hence, a risk assessment of women in terrorist organizations is a necessity. This study attempts to conduct risks profiling to women of terrorism movement in Indonesia using both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. The study may provide a contribution for practitioners in planning intervention for women involved in terrorist groups.

The results of this study demonstrate that the average risk score of women in the terrorism movement in Indonesia is 3,21 or high risk. Furthermore, for terrorism *Motivation* and *Ideology*, the subjects are at high risk, whereas for terrorism *Capability* they are at medium risk. The study reveals that there are several motives of these women in joining the terrorism movement. The motives include economic, justice, social, actualization, power, and safety motives (Borum, 2011; Horgan, 2008; McGilloway, Ghosh, & Bhui, 2015; Monahan, 2011; Pressman & Flockton, 2010; Silke, 2008). Moreover, in terms of ideology, most of the subjects have adopted violent extremism. The finding confirms previous studies on radicalization among women (Affianty, 2017; Aina, 2016; Bigio & Vogelstein, 2019; Buchanan, 2014; Dja'far et al., 2017; Jacques & Taylor, 2009; Kholifah, 2017; Knop, 2007; Leede et al., 2017; Maghfur & Muniroh, 2013; Mulia & Farida, 2013, Taskarina, 2018).

In terms of capability to conduct terrorism, the subjects are experienced in cyber-hacking, financing, translating documents, generating propaganda, recruiting people, manipulating officers, weapon shooting, and even bombs making. The study includes findings by previous authors about terrorism capability (i.e., Asal et al., 2012; Gilmore, 2004; Hardouin, 2009; Irwin & Slay, 2010; Koblentz, 2011; Tucker, 2010). The study demonstrates that the women involved in the terrorism movement and groups are more of actors than simply victims of patriarchal society.

The study tries to reach the accuracy of information and avoid social desirability/bias regarding terrorists' risk assessment by applying 'multiple-angle' hidden observations to subjects. The observation was conducted due to terrorist offenders' capacity in manipulating self-reports (called as '*taqiyya*' or the terrorists' art of deception towards the perceived enemies) (Ibrahim, 2010; Mariuma, 2014; Pisoui, 2019; Rudner, 2010; Zagorin, 2013). Despite its originality, this study has limitations. The first limitation is centred on the complex process for administrating the risk assessment to obtain the accuracy of information regarding each participant. Numerous observers were assigned to observe the subjects/the women involved in terrorism on daily basis and for a long period of time. The second limitation lies in the costly resource allocation. The administration process could be monetarily consuming which include providing needs (e.g., basic logistics and training) for each observer when residing near subjects' domiciles. Recommended further studies are to analyse and compare risk assessments of women and men, women and children, and women in certain levels of age, who are contributing to the terrorism movement in Indonesia and beyond. The studies will provide comprehensive profiling to design a blueprint for rehabilitation.

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