

Inter-Governmental Relations between Central Government and Local Government Authorities in Tanzania



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Abstract: Tanzania in embarking the decentralization by devolution policy (D by D) as a mechanism of facilitating quick development process through the involvement of people from grass root levels has been carried out through the inter-government relations between the central government and the local government authorities (LGAs). Throughout its implementation there had been a supportive structural set up, including a constitutional mandate for local governments. Also, there has been an increased recognition of LGAs by central and sector ministries as partners rather than subordinate structures. However, the lack of a clear and effective institutional framework to govern the implementation of D by D and the lack of a shared understanding of D by D across ministries and other governmental institutions has made led to structural confusion between the Central government and the Local Government Authorities. Thus, this paper explores the undertakings of the inter-government relations between the central government and the local government authorities (LGAs) in order to forge a way forward for a inclusive and responsive governance in the country.

KEY WORDS: Decentralisation, central – local relations, governance

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Achieving sustainable development for a developing country like Tanzania, there is a need of having a system that incorporates efforts of all parties and actors on board including, the government (central government and local government authorities), local communities (individuals, Civil Society Organisations), Political Parties, Private Sector, and Development Partners.

(Venugopal & Yilmaz, 2010) stipulated that local governments in Tanzania were firstly introduced in 1926 in the then Tanganyika territory by the colonial British. However, after the country gained its independence, there are had been several phases with regards to decentralisation in the country. As elaborated by (Mwaikusa, 1996), the establishing, abolishing and re-establishing of local governments in Tanzania had been done not due to tangible locals' demands, instead as a result of some desires from the centre.

Ten years since the abolishing local governments, the government made an important decision of re-establishing them again in the year 1982 (Anosisye, 2017). The central focus, among other things, was to give the powers to local communities to determine their own development (Ngware & Haule, 1992, p. 9). This followed by series of measures in order to enhance the capacity of these local governments in provision of services required by the local communities within their areas of jurisdiction (United Republic of Tanzania, 2008). It is during this final phase whereby the government's reforms focused on promotion of decentralisation by devolution (Venugopal & Yilmaz, 2010). The current existing local government framework is a result of local government reform agenda (United Republic of Tanzania, 1996) and the policy paper on local government reform (United Republic of Tanzania, 1998). The decentralisation by devolution (D by D) has been facilitated by the local government reforms programme (LGRP) that started to be implemented since 1999.

The prevailing situation depicts that the central government sets policy frameworks for local government authorities to implement in terms of National development plans, including budget guidelines and disbursements after the budget has been approved by the Parliament; as well as sectorial policies that touch everyday life of the community at large. Additionally, based on the government structure with reference to the Constitution of Tanzania, the ruling party through its election manifesto has a mandate to enforce the course of actions not only at central level but also up to grass root levels, which are under the mandate of LGAs. With the presence of multiparty democracy, these LGAs are now under the leadership of different political parties.

2.0 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND/ CONCEPTUALISATION

One of the firm foundations towards central – local relations is the long-lasting interests of social scientists in studying these relations, and in the field of public administration there is an attendant fixation on the legal-institutional aspects of the relationship (Rhodes, 1999).

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One of the theories that elucidates central – local relations is agency theory. Agency theory forms part of the neo-institutional economics (Besley, 2006; Laffont & Martimort, 2002). This theory depicts collaboration between an agent and the principal for whom they interact, focuses being on structure incentives whereby an agent benefits from the principal (Gauld, 2018). It focuses on enabling principals to attain their anticipated outcomes while agents work on work programs and goals. Originally, this theory modelled the interaction between company’s executives and shareholders (Thiel & Smullen, 2021). This model in public administration depicts the relationships between the political principal (the central government) and the agent (the local government) and the level of reciprocity within these relationships (Miller, 2005).

This theory paves a way for performance management to monitor and control the operationalisation of task and responsibilities undertaken by the agent. Other scholars have observed that trust and cooperation between principals and agents that has resulted from this theory can be used as a means to enhance accountability (Pierre & Peters, 2017), and it is highly inclined by the agency theory (Schillemans & Busuioc, 2015). However, their roles do not involve strict measures (Schillemans, 2013; Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 2019; Van Slyke, 2006). With reference to accountability, this theory is used to study possible hitches emerging from principals delegating responsibilities to agents (Waterman & Meier, 1998).

The theory has been accentuated further mainly with two concerns: firstly, that the interests of principals and agents diverge, and secondly, how the principal might control what the agent is doing (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). It has also been expounded that “while the principal has formal authority, the agent usually possesses an information advantage regarding the costs of performing the delegated task” (Maggetti & Papadopoulos, 2018, pp. 172–173). Some scholars worried about the deviation of policy intentions due to delegation of decision-making roles from the central (principal) to the local implementors i.e., local governments (agents) and hence resulting into accountability-related problems (Maggetti & Papadopoulos, 2018; (Schillemans & Busuioc, 2015).

It has been observed that agency theory is amongst a central foundation whereby representative democracy is built upon in the sense that local communities (principals) delegate their mandate to the elected bodies i.e., agents (Ananyev, 2020). Central-local relations in democratic countries depend on whether the same political party is in power locally as nationally, and how this affects inter-governmental cooperation (Goodfellow, 2017, p. 6).

In the context of central – local government relations in Tanzania, local government authorities are perceived as agents of the central government (principals), with a mandate of implementing national policies as well as mobilising local communities within their area of jurisdiction. The local governments and central government are mutually dependent however, their relationship is faced with one constraint of power struggle whereby each entity strive to enhance control over the other one (Kanju & Shayo, 2021).

3.0 THE RELATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN TANZANIA

3.1 The Political Administration in Tanzania

According to the Constitution of Tanzania, the country is considered as a ‘democratic, secular and socialist state’.¹ Tanzania’s well-established stability has gone through a process of nation-building in terms of more defined sense of national identity aided by Kiswahili as national language over English and other dialects as well as singular Tanzanian identity over ethnical and religious differences. This is partly contributed by introduction of one-party system in 1965, whereby President Nyerere declared that it was system aimed at identifying the whole nation and more democratic compared to the ‘Anglo-Saxon form of democracy’, which represented disjointed communities (Kweka, 1995; Nyerere, 1996).

Tanzania is a democratic unitary republic with three distinctions of governments: central that is Union government; Zanzibar devolved administration and Local Government Authorities. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 establishes the local governments by under Articles 145 and 146. Particularly, Article 145 of the Constitution stipulates that parliament will enact a law elaborating the procedure for establishing LGAs as well as spelling out their functions, responsibilities and powers.

Specific categories of local government are established by specific local governments laws of the country especially for Tanzania mainland are the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982, which provide for the establishment District Councils and Township Authorities (villages that are assuming an urban character); and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982, which provide for the establishment City, Municipal and Town councils. Other important legislation includes the Local Government Finances Act 1982; the Urban Authorities (Rating) Act 1983; the Local Authorities Elections Act 1979 and the Regional Administration Act 1997. In Zanzibar, the main legislation is the Zanzibar Municipal Councils Act 1995 and the District and Town Councils Act 1995.

¹ Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, paragraph 3, section 1,

3.2 The Structure of Local Government Authorities in Tanzania

Tanzania (Zanzibar inclusive) has got 31 regions and 148 districts, which are administrative entities charged with maintaining law and order. For the Tanzania mainland, the Ministry for Regional Administration and Local Government² (MRALG) is responsible for local government in mainland Tanzania and works within the President's Office.

In Tanzania mainland there are six (6) city councils, 19 municipalities, and 23 town councils; and, 137 district councils, which are subdivided into 3,956 wards, 4,209 *mitaa*³, and 12,337 registered villages and 64,691 *vitongoji*⁴ (hamlets, the smallest unit of a village).

In Tanzanian context, there are number of democratic bodies to debate development needs within their area of jurisdiction that are below councils. In the district councils, there are *vitongoji* that comprises an elected chairperson⁵ who appoints a secretary and three further members, all of whom serve on an advisory committee. *Vitongoji* have no legislative or decision-making powers instead they operate as fora for transmitting orders from higher tier of governments to the community (Venugopal & Yilmaz, 2010). The main task of an elected chairperson is to mobilize residents for development, payment of taxes, and keeping records (REPOA, 2007). Decisions and proposals from this lowest level are always sent to the village executive committee which is under the leadership of the elected chairperson and a salaried public servant, that is Village Executive Officer (VEO).

On the other hand, in urban settings there is a Mtaa committees, which unlike those of the *vitongoji*, have a fully elected membership comprising a chairperson, six members and an executive officer. These committees provide a grassroots link to the ward structure and mobilise participation of local people in local development (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018). It is within this level where the committees discuss and agreed upon priorities for service delivery and development projects and afterward the final decisions sent to the ward development committee (WDC). This is also the same with the settings in the rural authorities but done through village councils. WDC incorporates chairperson (an elected ward councillor), the ward executive officer (WEO) who is a public servant as a secretary but with no voting rights; special seat councillors⁶; all village or *mitaa* chairpersons within the ward; and, all village or *mtaa* executive officers (VEOs/MEOs). Same as what is done in sub-ward levels, the WDC is responsible for coordinating development activities, planning at the ward level and linking plans with the district level.

At the district level, the council consists of the elected ward councillors, members of the parliament (MPs) representing constituencies within the council, special seats councillors, and other MPs whose nomination originated from organs of political parties within the district council jurisdiction, and the non-voting secretary who is also District Executive Director (DED)⁷. Members of the council elect a chairperson and vice chairperson from amongst themselves. The DED is a chief executive officer as well as the accounting officer to the council.

The urban authority councils consist of members elected from the wards within them, resident MPs appointed by the President, special seat councillors, up to three members appointed by the Minister responsible for local governments, and the executive director who is the administrative head.⁸ The legislative head is the mayor elected by all council members.

3.3 Implementation of Decentralisation in Tanzania

3.3.1 Historical Background on Decentralisation

Decentralisation has a long and mixed history in Tanzania dating back to the pre-colonial times, often reflecting the prevailing national philosophy and aspirations. The colonial system of indirect rule introduced by British operated in the form of chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms, whereby they encouraged indigenous participation in administration of the colony, albeit along tribal lines (Mamdani, 1996; Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998). It was during this period when a Legislative Council (popularly known as LEGCO) was established in 1926, as well as establishing Local councils and a court system as a result of the enactment of the Native Authority Ordinance of 1926 and the Native Courts Ordinance of 1929, respectively. In 1946, the Municipalities Ordinance was enacted followed by the Local Government Act in 1953 (Tordoff, 1994; Shivji & Peter, 2003).

The newly independent Tanganyika and then Tanzania, maintained and continued with the same local administrative structures that were existing during the colonial period (Max, 1991; Kessy, 2011). It was during time that the powers of the Traditional chiefs were reduced with the move to create a more representative system of local government (Kessy, 2018). However, in reality this led to imposing top down approach by means of 'deconcentration'.

² www.tamisemi.go.tz

³ *Mitaa* (plural of *mtaa*) – Swahili word stands for a small urban area or geographical division of a ward

⁴ *Vitongoji* (a plural of *kitongoji*) – Swahili word stands for hamlets, the smallest unit of a village

⁵ For the chairperson post, both men and women who are resident in the *kitongoji* and who are nominated and fully sponsored by registered political parties are allowed to contest.

⁶ Special seat councillors are women representative who has been nominated by the party depending on the elections results within the constituent. At council level they are supposed to constitute about one-third of all elected councillors.

⁷ DED is a public servant appointed by the Minister responsible for Local Government.

⁸ City council directors are appointed by the president, while directors of town and municipal councils are appointed by the minister responsible for LGA, at the moment is the President himself.

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Deconcentration led to the introduction of three categories of local government were created: 1) the native authorities, 2) the district and 3) town councils and one municipality (Kessy, 2018). These structures as noticed by (Kessy, 2018), appeared to carry same features as those practiced during the pre-independence period, including lack of citizens' participation, weak mechanisms of accountability, and a general absence of transparency.

From 1972 to 1982, the country's decentralisation experienced more serious and radical changes that were reinforced due to the Arusha Declaration and the policy on socialism and rural development (1967-1972). The government at that period of time attempted to restructure local government in Tanzania particularly known as 'Madaraka Mikoani' for a period of ten years between 1972–1982 (Tordoff, 1994; Shivji & Peter, 2003). This instead of leading into devolution of powers to the grassroots level, it turned into a deconcentration of powers with the dissolution of local government authorities (Kessy, 2018). One of the main features of this new decentralisation reforms was the replacement of local government officers with highly qualified and experts from the central government (Mwaikusa, 1996).

In year 1982 marked a new wave of decentralisation reforms in Tanzania. It was during this year when LGAs were re-established, ward development committees revived and village governments incorporated into the district administration as a result of enactment of pieces of legislation with regard to local governance in Tanzania (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018). It was expected that the government will be able to rectify the past mistakes resulted from decentralisation reforms through greater involvement of citizens, but this was not achieved. In reality, centralisation and concentration of power continued to exist in the organs of the central government partly due to the fusion of party and government personnel which remained until the end of mono-party democratic system in 1992. (Hirschmann, 2003)hinted that the general trend between 1961 and 1998 was highly centralised government. In addition, all the changes that were introduced by the decentralised reforms in 1980s were still the same as the previous ones.

In order to address all the shortcomings and challenges resulted from decentralisation reforms, the government decided to embark on a major decentralisation programme in 1998, following the publication of the Local Government Reform Agenda in 1996 and the Policy Paper on Local Government Reforms of 1998 (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018). The new reform opted for devolution, D by D, unlike the past reforms and it has mainly been implemented through two Local Government Reform Programmes: LGRP I (2000 – 2008) and LGRP II (2009 – 2014).

With reference to (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018), there have been five dimensions to local government reform since the mid-1990s:

- a. **Financial:** Fiscal decentralisation allows LGAs to have their own sound sources of revenue, creating efficient intergovernmental fiscal transfers, providing efficient level of funding for the delivery of mandated services, improving revenue generation, guaranteeing transparency and fairness in fiscal allocations and ensuring equity in service delivery.
- b. **Administrative:** Decentralisation of personnel and restructuring of Local Government administration. Each Local Authority structured to reflect local needs and context.
- c. **Central-Local Relations:** Split in responsibilities with Central Government retaining policy making, support and facilitation, monitoring and quality assurance, and control mandated by law.
- d. **Service Function:** Improving service delivery at the local level was a key driver for the implementation of decentralisation by devolution. In theory, LGAs can be held accountable for service delivery through the 2000 Client Service Delivery Charter (CSDC).
- e. **Democratic:** Strengthening local democratic institutions and increasing public participation.

3.3.2 The Prevailing Situation

The LGRP put forward the mandate of LGAs to have the responsibility for social development and public service provision within their jurisdiction, facilitation of maintenance of law and order and issues of national importance such as education, health, water, roads and agriculture (URT, 1998). Since the inception of LGRP, there has been specific support for decentralisation from the Regional and Local Government leadership within the central government with additional support come from Non-State Actors⁹ (NSAs). These NSAs recognise the need for cooperation and shows enthusiasm for strengthening cooperation between government and non-state actors (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018).

Accordingly, (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018) elucidated that in the last 20 years of implementing D by D in Tanzania, there has been two major reform programmes that facilitated the established structures for devolution with strong support from the government and development partners. From policy point of view, there has been an increased citizen participation, for example, through local elections and involvement in projects through volunteer labour or supervision. However, on the other hand, there has been a limited enthusiasm for devolution across sector ministries whereby the preferred models applied were deconcentration and delegation as the form of service delivery. This is revealed by the creation of several executive agencies (in roads, transport, water supply, medical suppliers, forest), with unclear coordination with local authorities and their mandates to deliver services. This is what is referred by (Kessy & McCourt, 2010) as 'long-centralized administration'. This means, the central government still hold

⁹ NSAs include Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Faith Based Organisations (FBOs), and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) like organised labour groups, youth and women's groups.

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strong vested interest of maintain control over local governments through its Regional Commissioners and District Commissioners (Kessy, 2008).

Currently, planning and resource allocation, is still a top-down drive unlike what has been provided in the legislation that establish LGAs. Local government laws underline the importance of participatory planning in Tanzania. These include Local Government Act No. 7 of 1982, the Local Government Financial (Block Grants) Act (paragraph 5). Act No. 7 of 1982 articulates the powers, responsibilities, and the functions of the various levels of LGAs in service delivery. These acts inter alia empower the local communities to participate in planning and demand the available government institutions to enable people to formulate their plans and targets (Baker, Wallevik, Obama, & Sola, 2002). However, the process of involving local community in taking part in decision making is still not well implemented whereby they are mostly allowed to observe rather than deciding their own fate.

While there are procedures in place (and often followed) including the implementation of Opportunity and Obstacles to Development (O & OD) approach that ensure plans are driven by local needs are formed, but still national priorities especially from ruling party manifesto, and centrally imposed budget priorities override the locally endorsed plans. This weakness in the budget and planning process basically impose discrepancies in the service delivery in the grassroots level where actual implementation take place (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). 2008). LGAs in several occasions lacked autonomous to make decisions to meet the needs and wants of their local communities they represent (Mollel, 2010; Ringo, Khamis, Peter, & Pazi, 2013). This can be expressed in numerous ways, including, planning and grant allocations. The central government grant to local governments on the other hand has been a package accompanied with conditions (Fjeldstad, 2010). In most cases as (Mollel, 2010) hinted, there will be no room for local communities to decide on their own fate.

According to (United Republic of Tanzania, 1998), Political decentralisation is a devolution of powers and:

- (i) the setting of the rules for councils and committees, the chairpersons etc.
- (ii) the integration of previously centralised or deconcentrated service sectors into a holistic local government system
- (iii) installing councils as the most important local, political body within its jurisdiction.
- (iv) creation of real, multi-functional governments at the local level within the framework of the national legislation (United Republic of Tanzania, 1998)

As it has been documented, D by D was introduced during first term of the third phase presidency and it was highly championed also by the 4th phase government, with support from the donor partners. The findings from assessment done by the (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018), show that some respondents considered all what has been done as technical and administrative 'fixes' rather than recognising the long-term, complex and challenging nature of deep institutional reform and behavioural change. While others considered that the speed and scope of reform was too go-getting.

During the fifth phase government administration, the autonomy of local governments in Tanzania looked to be more upwardly accountable to central government rather than to the elected members of their respective councils hence create fears of shrinking (Kessy, 2018). This can be observed through decision made by the President of Tanzania to appoint all the Council Directors unlike the past whereby apart from City Council directors, the rest were appointed by the Minister responsible for Local Government. Additionally, the executive powers of Regional and District Commissioners, who are Presidential representatives at their respective areas of jurisdiction, have been extended heavily over the LGAs. This new wave appears to weaken the spirit of the D-by-D, as stipulated in the Policy Paper on Local Government Reforms in Tanzania of 1998.

3.4 Challenges facing the Central-Local Relations in Tanzania

There is a high degree of central government imposition in the operations and functioning of LGAs in Tanzania. Rural and urban councils have legislative powers provided by the laws that have established them. The Local government legislation have empowered the Councils to enact by-laws, raise revenues, and prepare development plans and budgets. In reality, the Central government through its machinery at District and Regional level respectively, can intervene in the decision-making process due to the ambiguity of its role. The enactment process of the by-laws ends up to the minister responsible for LGAs who has to sign and publish them in the government official gazette thus whenever there is a disagreement between the council (that has been elected by the citizens), the minister (a presidential appointee, who is not necessarily being a constituent MP or even a special seat MP) has the final word. It should also be noted that central government appointees at the district level—the DC and Director—play an incredibly large role in local administration twisting the law-making powers against the local government. This is has brought so much complaints especially in this fifth phase government whereby there are large number of these appointees belong to the ruling party as active members contravening to the Public Service laws and regulations that stipulate all public servants must be impartial with regards to politics.

It has been observed that there has been an inadequate coordination and communication at different levels of administration due to parallel systems of executive on one hand and representative on the other hand. Even when the existing council is under the same ruling party, there have been some clashes between presidentially appointees (RCs and DCs) and the Council on the other hand. In some places there have been multiple and sometimes conflicting directives issued to the local communities that in turn damaging the perception of LGAs' competence in carrying out its mandated responsibilities. (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018), in their

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findings depicted that there are mixed responses on this issue whereby some LGAs staff commented that the situation is perpetuated by low understanding of the local leaders' boundaries of their roles and functions; while, others considered that the power vested into councillors is too much and hence weakens technical excellence.

Findings from the assessment that was carried out by (Lyon, Zilihona, & Masanyiwa, 2018), reveal that the general public lost interest on participating in community meetings due to the fact that they have continue to experience little action and/or changes on their identified priorities. This was also observed by the research findings from the Ibrahim Index for African Governance (IIAG, 2015) which revealed that since 2011, Tanzania has shown poorer performance in three out of the four governance categories (governance, rule of law, human rights and economic opportunity).

Moreover, MPs as explained in the previous sections are also councillors in their respective councils. This can be considered as a bridge between the central and local levels but on the other hand can results into conflict of interests and thus clouds accountability mechanisms. By the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Parliament is vested with the powers to oversee and advice the government on its daily businesses including the operations of LGAs through its Parliamentary Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC). Same MP who is also a councillor can be a member of LAAC, which is mandated to scrutinise LGA audit reports. Therefore, in case of any conflict of interest there is a high possibility that the decision from LAAC can be partial to some councils since MPs have a final say.

As part of the political devolution process, the number of administrative areas has increased so as to bring government and services closer to the people. The data show that between 2008 and 2017, the numbers have increased as follows: Councils from 133 to 185 (+ 41%); Wards from 2,555 to 4420 (+ 73%); Villages from 10,397 to 12,545 (+ 21%); *Mitaa* 1,755 to 4,000 (+ 128%) and, *Vitongoji* from 50,856 to 64,000 (+ 26%).

There is a high level of desire of political decentralisation as stipulated in the policy paper. The goal for a holistic system with multi-functional governments at the local level is ambitious. Additionally, there has been substantial progress made towards the devolution of powers with increased participation and some improvement in accountability. However, the speed of reform has decelerated since the end of reform programmes in the year 2014, and other factors have had an impact on how political devolution is being realised in practice. The autonomy of these LGAs has been restricted by the direct control of the central government over decision-making process in the LGAs: the LGAs are, in many cases, not consulted before policy measures are decided by the central government even when there is a little involvement still their recommendations are not directly included.

In general, it has been observed throughout that there is a substantial gap between the principles of devolution of power and actual practice and, with various, disorderly lines of accountability and possibly contradictory political agendas at work, there is little prospect of substantial change in the short run.

The Public Service (Amendment) Act 2007 led to the establishment of Public Service Recruitment Secretariat, which has been vested with all the powers to recruit human resources in the public service including the LGAs (Kinemo, et al., 2015). It is the duty of the Ministry responsible for Public Service Management to fill all the vacant posts including Council Directors, Heads of Departments and Units, and other junior and senior officers at a given LGA. Also, staff salaries are still entirely paid by central government transfers. However, recently, the process of recruitment for supporting staff cadres as well as executive officers for village or *mtaa* levels with LGAs which were once done by the secretariat are now carried out by the LGAs themselves.

During the fifth phase government of Tanzania came into power (that is 2015-2020), the central-local relations in terms of property taxation regime was somehow changed in the sense of recentralisation. Previously, Property taxes were decentralised whereby significant capacities and commitment to the tax were developed at the local level. This policy shift in Tanzania has caused in one way or the other, controversies and problems that led to the bitterness between local and central authorities because the local authorities (agents) perceived that something has been taken away from them by the central authority (principal). As pointed by (Goodfellow, 2017, pp. 6-7), the situation in Tanzania from 2008 to 2014 “, it was not so much the fact of central control as the process of rapid recentralisation and the lack of cooperation it generated that accounted for the poor outcomes”.

4.0 LESSON LEARNED AND CONCLUSION

The central and local relations have been improved by the Local government reforms carried out through harmonisation of some central and sector laws to align them with D by D; various ministerial platforms and frameworks have been introduced for coordination of local government interests; interface between sector Ministries and LGAs have been improved, as well as DPs and LGAs; integrated programme management have highly been promoted; and the reforms have been embedded in the operations of the ministry responsible for local governments, Regional Secretariats and LGAs.

Sector ministries and PO RALG are independent ministries with different responsibilities. Difficulties have been experienced with coordinating government businesses from central to local governments. Some sector ministries (education and health) have continued to transfer funds directly to local facilities rather than through LGAs. Recently, some of the sectors that were under coordination of PORALG are now under direct coordination of their respective line ministries. The decentralisation reforms have also experienced low recognition from the central and sector ministries on the coordination role of PORALG and RSs as well as the

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role of LGAs on delivery of services. These ministries continued to exert tough protectionism on significant autonomy, decisions, financial and human resources with respect to their line responsibilities.

Some key development programmes are still under auspices of line ministries. For instance, Commission for Irrigation under the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, earmarked irrigation projects; rehabilitation of government-owned old secondary schools (ministry of education), construction of dispensaries and health centres (ministry of health) and capacity development programmes at the local level (ministries of health and water). There is a confusion of roles and the potential for duplication of efforts e.g. LGA receive multiple and sometimes mismatched directives from Ministry of Education/ Health *and* the Departments of Education/ Health within PORALG.

Creation of executive agencies is seen as a 'back door' for ministries to retain their power against the thrust of Decentralisation by Devolution as it was intended in the first place (e.g. rural and urban roads, forests) in return this led to confusion, duplication of efforts and inefficiency.

Aspiring local government reform programme had support for fast-paced change. However, inadequate political will and commitment of leaders in promoting D by D in some extent made it impossible to accomplish the desired goal. It is clear that the D by D agenda has been carried out without a binding comprehensive national policy and legislation. This calls for a comprehensive national policy that will set out issues and strategies to be implemented, legal framework as well as institutional framework with responsibilities of each and every institution in the country to spearhead D by D and do away with willingness and voluntarism. Also, the experience showed that there had been a mix of devolution, deconcentration and delegation which took place across sectors. Thus, there is a need for a change of mind set and development of a shared vision of decentralisation across the government and Non-State Actors particularly the academia.

From theoretical point of view, agency theory considers agencies act as resourceful agents, whereby the principal-agent relation has low goal resemblance and scores the risk of becoming a skepticism relationship (Schillemans, 2013).

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