

The Role of the African Union in the Political Stability of Africa

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Abstract

The paper examines the growth and development of political stability as supported by the African union in Africa, it analyzes some of the areas in which the AU has contributed in bringing stability within the African region. Using the descriptive-historical research, findings show that, the African union has contributed immensely in peace-keeping operation in Africa, but has failed to implement some major decisions made. The paper recommends that, Africa and Africa leaders should eradicate corruption and those who take joy in it should be severely punished under the laws. This will serve as deterrent to others. This is because corruption is the major cause of conflicts on African soil. The looting of government funds that should be used for development in Africa is creating untold hardship on the masses and what we see today as conflict violent in Africa is a reaction to the poor leadership and the mismanagement of natural resources deposits in Africa.

Keywords: political; stability; Africa; union; integration; regional

Introduction

The evolution of the African Union cannot be fully appreciated without looking at the organization of African Unity (OAU), a precursor organization that gave birth to African Union (AU). As African countries attained independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were debates as to how the continent of Africa should be reorganized and strengthened so that independence could be maintained and colonialism would not occur again (Oriaku, 2000:331).

There were three main views on this, one was the radical view which advocated the setting up of a Union Government of Africa which will have Authority over all member States, have its own civil service, an African High Command (military force) and court of justice. Members of this group were called the Casablanca group and included Ghana, Guinea, Mali, The United Arab Republic, Morocco and Algeria. This group met in Casablanca in January, 1961. The next group was the Brazzaville group which comprised of most countries from the Francophone zone that included the following: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey (now Benin Republic), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagassy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper

Volta (now Burkina Faso), this group was formed in Brazzaville in 1960 (Oriaku, 2000:332).

The third group which was conservative in nature included the following countries: Nigeria, Sierra-Leone, Ethiopia, Liberia, Tunisia, Somalia and Togo. This group was known as the Monrovia group. This group and the Brazzaville group held the view that only through regional economic co-operation can the foundations of African Unity be laid, not through political union which would gradually come. They stated that the large size of the African continent, poor communication among the nations, and particularly, the language barrier among African People hinders immediate unity.

The Monrovia group favored the following as a first step towards union as highlighted by Oriaku (2000):

- a. Free trade among African States
- b. Common external tariff
- c. Common Economic development policies
- d. The setting up of an African Development Bank
- e. Improvement of inter-African communication links such as roads, telephones etc (Oriaku, 2000:334)

Following the above proposed steps towards the unity of African States, the Emperor of Ethiopia,

Haile Selassie called for a meeting in May, 1963. In this meeting, thirty-two independent African States met in Addis-Ababa to discuss how best to force a single political organization for Africa. Countries from the Casablanca, Monrovia as well as the Brazzaville groups attended. At the meeting the views of the Monrovia group had the upper hand and it was decided to set up an organization of independent African State. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on the 25th May, 1963 in Addis-Ababa.

The events that eventually led to the establishment of the African Union (AU) can be traced to the extra-ordinary summit of the OAU leaders in Libya in September 1999. At this summit, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya presented a draft charter of the proposed formation of the United States of Africa. He advocated the creation of a Union Government in Africa, with one leader, a single army, one currency, one Central Bank and one parliament that would legislate for the continent. The time frame for the realization of the proposal was the year 2000 (Oche, 2005:142).

In consideration of what was viewed as an idealistic nature of the proposal, the other leaders, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa respectively saw the need to substantially alter Gaddafi's document. The compromise and negotiations that followed led to the Sirte Declaration which eventually formed the basis for the Constitutive Act of the Africa Union that was adopted during the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Lome, Togo on 11th July 2000. The African Union (AU) was finally launched in Durban, South-Africa in July 2002 to replace the organization of African Unity (OAU) (Adeniyi, 2005:125).

Following the above processes and the final birth of African Union, the union has improved tremendously from its docile and lukewarm attitude to full involvement in African affairs, particularly in the areas of security/peacekeeping, economic integration and political issues. The chapter is divided into five sections: (i) Introduction (ii) Theoretical Framework (iii) Literature review (iv) The Peace Keeping in Africa (v) Conclusions and recommendations.

Theoretical Framework

A theory, according to Kerlinger (1973) is a set of interrelated constructs and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the purpose of explaining and predicting the

phenomena. Some scholars who wrote on the concept of theory such as Isaak (1969), Goode and Hart (1952), Singer (1963) and Buchanan (1980) agree that theory is a set of related empirical generalizations; the relationships between facts or to the endearing of them in some meaningful way; an internally consistent empirical generalizations of descriptive predictive and explanatory power respectively.

Theoretical framework, on the other hand, is a device or scheme for adopting or applying the assumptions, postulations and principles of a theory in the description and analysis of a research problem. There are so many theories that can fit this topic of discussion such as the conflict resolution approach, democratic peace theory. But in this research work, we adopt active peace theory as our theoretical framework. Borrowing from the teachings of Norwegian Johan Gattieng, one of the pioneers of the field of Peace Research, on 'positive peace', and on the writings of Maine Quaker, Gray Cox, a consortium of theorists, activists and practitioners in the experimental John Woolman College initiative have arrived at a theory of 'active peace'. This theory posits in part that peace is part of a triad, which also includes justice and wholeness (or well-being), an interpretation consonant with scriptural scholarly interpretations of the meanings of the terms peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building to also fit into a triadic and interdependent formulation or structure. Vermont Quaker, and John v. Wilmerding (MatinLeadel 1980) have identified five stages of growth applicable to individuals, countries and societies, whereby one transcends the first 'surface' awareness that most people have of this kind of issues, emerging successively into acquiescence, pacifism, passive resistance, active resistance and finally into active peace, dedicating themselves to peacemaking, peacekeeping and/or peace building.

The relevance of this theory to our topic, however, is to show how African Union (AU) has over the years tried to build on the five stages mentioned above to maintain relative peace on African soil through its peacekeeping missions in Western countries and foster peaceful resolutions and peaceful co-existence among and between the people of Africa.

Results and Discussion

Peacekeeping is a very important concept with military origin. It was evolved by the United

Nations after the Second World War for conflict management by the super powers in the Security Council, namely, USA, USSR, China, Britain and France. The United Nations charter (1945) defines peacekeeping operation as: "An operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the UN to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict. Concise dictionary of politics (2003:400) succinctly defined peacekeeping as "intervention by a third party to separate and pacify participants in a conflict." The number of African Union (AU) peacekeeping operations has increased rapidly since the transformation from organization of African unity to African union, with involvement in Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Central Africa Republic amongst others. Peacekeeping has tended to involve the introduction of military forces that have the job of observing the implementation of ceasefire agreements and providing a buffer between combatants. There has been debate as to the extent to which peacekeeping forces could or should be involved in the active enforcement of ceasefires, the possibility and practicality of neutral intervention, and the balance between upholding the status quo and acting to change the strategic situation in order to enhance the prospects of conflict resolution (Iain and Alistair 2003:400).

The 1992 report 'An agenda for peace' written by the first African Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued for proactive peacemaking and humanitarian intervention (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The report outlined suggestions for enabling intergovernmental organizations to respond quickly and effectively to threats to international peace and security after the Cold War era. In particular, four major areas of activity were identified; (i) preventive diplomacy (ii) peacemaking (iii) peace keeping and (iv) post-conflict peace building.

Preventive diplomacy strives to resolve a dispute before it escalates into violence. Peacemaking seeks to promote a ceasefire and to negotiate an agreement. Peacekeeping proceeds after the outbreak of violence and involve 'the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:20). These initiatives are ideally coordinated and integrated to ensure post-conflict peace building, which includes programs

and activities that will sustain peace and prevent any future outbreak of violent conflict and may include addressing diplomatic political, social, military, security and economic development issues. Peace operations over the years have demonstrated that peacemaking and preventive diplomacy are much more cost effective than peacekeeping and peace building. The United Nations has served as an appropriate vehicle "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind" (UN Charter, 1945). In the argument of Adeniran (1986:75):

For nations to survive, live in peace and be secured, peaceful atmosphere has to be created and maintained. In areas where peace prevails, the United Nations has little or no problem in the promotion of greater interstate relations and collaboration for the enhancement of the peace – where dispute and conflicts arise, it has interfered by way of conciliation, mediation, the use of good offices, commissions of inquiry and peacekeeping operations.

It is within this last category of involvement that African Union has made identifiable contribution since its formation. African Union participated in peacekeeping operations alongside UN to restore peace in Congo from July, 1960 to June 1964. Though the role of OAU members now (AU) in the Congo peacekeeping operation has been regarded as controversial, For instance, several people regarded Nigeria as very conservative and used as a tool in the hands of the West to achieve their interest in Congo. On the question of Nigeria under OAU (now AU) involvement in peacekeeping in Africa, the military Head of State, General SaniAbacha (1994:113) declared thus:

Our commitment to peace and stability in Africa is demonstrated by our ongoing involvement in several peacekeeping operations. These include our role in the ECOWAS monitoring observer group in Rwanda, the United Nations verification in Angola, United Nations Observer Mission in Western Sahara and Somalia. We were also involved in mediation efforts in several African countries.

Peacekeeping in Africa has not been left in the hands of AU alone, but rather a collective effort of member states. For instance, Nigeria has equally been involved in peacekeeping in Liberia, Cote

d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone in West Africa. Nigeria initiated the formation of the ECOWAS monitoring observer group (ECOMOG), in 1990. The first real attempt at a sub-regional integration of West African states was in 1975, when the ECOWAS was formed with headquarters in Lagos. Peacekeeping operations normally presuppose that all parties to the conflict accept that the dispute be peacefully resolved and that a natural third party is required for the reason, the consent of all the parties to the conflict is usually required. African Union (AU) is filling in the gap of that third party in several crises in Africa and is the latest of Africa's broad regional cooperation. Its objectives which include strengthening the founding principles of the OAU charter are also more comprehensive acknowledging the multi-faceted challenges confronting the continent mainly in the area of peace and security. The Constitutive Act of the AU (CAAU) in its objective, places premium on the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa (Article 3(F)). Also enshrined in its principles are peaceful resolution of conflicts, the prohibition of the use of force or threats to use force, rights of intervention in the affairs of member states in case of "grave circumstance" related to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Article 4(c), (f) and (h) respectively). At the inaugural AU summit in 2002, it was agreed that a Peace and Security Council (PSC) be established and with the responsibility of preventing, managing and resolving conflict in Africa. It is as a result of the above resolve that African Union had been biting harder than ever before in the area of conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa.

Paradigm Shift in Peacekeeping Operations under the A.U.

Learning from the lessons of the OAU, the AU has adopted a much more interventionist stance through its legal frameworks and institutions. The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 2002 (AU 2002). The AU's 15-member PSC is mandated to conduct peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. Of the PSC's fifteen member countries ten are elected for a term of two years and five for a term of three years. The chairperson of the AU is assisted by a commissioner in charge of peace and security to provide operational support to the PSC and take the steps necessary to prevent, manage

and resolve conflicts. The PSC assesses a potential crisis situation, send fact-finding missions to trouble spots and is empowered to authorize and legitimize the AU's intervention in internal crisis situations. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act affirms the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in crisis situations (AU; 2000:4). Specifically, article 7(c) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council states that the PSC can 'recommend to the Assembly [of heads of state] intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. As defined in relevant international conventions and instruments' (AU, 2003:9). This represents a major qualitative difference between the charter of the OAU and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. With the adoption of these legal provisions, for the first time in the history of Africa the continental organization, working through an appointed group of states, has the authority to intervene in internal situations that may lead to atrocities being committed against minority groups or communities at risk within states. To reinforce this provision the AU is working towards the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010 to cooperate, where appropriate, with the UN and sub-regional African organizations in conducting peace operations.

In effect, the AU will maintain a working relationship with the UN and other international organizations, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The ASF is to comprise five brigades from each of Africa's sub-regions: Southern, East, Central, West and North. A Continental Early Warning System and a Panel of the Wise will also be established to assist with peacemaking on the continent (AU: 2010)

The African Union's Peace Keeping Operations

The AU has only been operational for about twelve years inherited both the assets and liabilities of the OAU. Therefore, the AU has not conducted extensive peace building operations on the continent despite the significant need for peace building. The AU did however intervene in

Burundi to build peace and enable the establishment of a more robust UN peace operation. The AU is also involved in promoting peace in the Darfur region of Sudan through the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The AU has a rather weak mandate in Darfur, namely to monitor the humanitarian crisis effectively and to coordinate efforts to advance the cause of peace. This narrow mandate does not provide the AU with the leeway to implement peace building initiatives, nor does the organization have the wherewithal to finance comprehensive peace building operations (Murithi; 2007).

African Union Peace Building Operations in Burundi

In 1993, Mohammed Quid Abdallah, then special representative of the UN secretary-general to Burundi, wrote a book entitled *Burundi on the brink: a special envoy reflects on preventive diplomacy*. More than two decades later Burundi is still 'on the brink' and requires substantial peace building initiatives. The AU, UN and other partners have made a concerted effort to prevent the genocidal tendencies that have so devastated the Great Lakes region from resurfacing in this country. The 2003 AU peace operation in Burundi, also known as the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), was the first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members. It represents a milestone for the AU in terms of self-reliance in operationalizing and implementing peace building. As far as Burundi is concerned, the AU mission was effectively mandated to build peace in a fluid and dynamic situation in which the country could relapse into violent conflict. In this regard, the AU mission was a peace building initiative (Murithi; 2007:70).

In April 2003, the AU deployed AMIB with more than 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique to monitor the peace process and provide security (Murithi 2005:91-95). The AU appointed Mamadou Bah as its special representative in Burundi to assist with the peace building effort. One of the tasks of the AU force was to protect returning politicians who would take part in the transitional government. Other peace building tasks included opening secure demobilization centers and improving the ability of AMIB to reintegrate former militia into society. These demobilization centers supervised the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process that is a fundamental pillar of

peace building. AMIB was also involved in creating conditions that would allow internally displaced persons and refugees living in the eight Burundian provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania to return to their homes. This was very much in keeping with the AU and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) policy frameworks that were subsequently developed (Murithi; 2005).

AMIB also had the task of establishing conditions that would allow for a UN peace operation to enter the country (The UN was reluctant to enter a situation that had the potential to relapse into conflict). AMIB's crucial role in this case was to create conditions through which peace, albeit fragile, could be built in the country. By the end of its mission AMIB had succeeded in establishing relative peace to most provinces in Burundi, with the exception of the region outside Bujumbura where armed resistance, in the form of the *Forces Nationales de Liberation* (FNL), remained a problem. In the absence of the AU Mission Burundi would have been left to its own devices, which probably would have resulted in an escalation of violent conflict. AMIB was therefore engaged in peace building through preventing violent conflict and trying to lay the foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction. Throughout its period of operation AMIB succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile situation and in February 2004 a UN evaluation team concluded that conditions were appropriate for establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in the country (Murithi; 2007).

As the UN was planning to take over, a host of challenges remained in Burundi, including the reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees into their communities. This included ensuring that returnees would have access to land in order to ensure their own livelihood. On 21 May 2004 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1545 to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Burundi. On 1st June 2004, Kofi Annan, then UN secretary-general appointed a special representative, Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, to head the mission. The former AMIB troops were incorporated into the UN Peace Operation in Burundi (ONUB). As of October 2006 some 20,000 military personnel have been demobilized, but many still lack economic opportunities and could pose a potential security threat (Nhlapo 2006). Therefore, there are

clearly still peace building challenges in Burundi (UN: 2007)

Whether or not the foundations laid by the peace building process will be sustained remains to be seen. ONUB departed in December 2006, and was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) which is coordinating international assistance. BINUB is providing technical assistance in developing a comprehensive security sector reform plan that includes the training of Burundi's national police and army. BINUB is also completing the national program for the demobilization and integration of former combatants, as well as providing training for employment and access to micro-credit schemes (Nlapho; 2006:3). Even though the UN took over from the AU, the case of Burundi demonstrates that the continental body can in fact make useful peace building interventions on the continent. The AU, UN and its partners will of course need to continue their concerted effort to ensure that peace prevails in Burundi.

The African Union's Peacemaking Efforts in Sudan

The Darfur situation has become the AU's most significant test to date and defies simplistic analysis. The root causes of the conflict extends back at least to the 17th century when Arab incursions led to the establishment of a sultanate amongst the indigenous Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa people of the region. A history of coexistence among the pastoralists and the agrarian societies in the region was put under pressure by drought. Social and economic marginalization of Darfurians by the ruling regime in Khartoum laid the foundations for the rebellion that was launched in February 2003. The government retaliated with a combination of its own military offensive and a proxy fighting force, today known as the infamous Janjaweed. Darfur has become an unwilling and unlikely victim of the legacy of Sudan's history and culture of violence, notably the nearly 50 years of North/South conflict. This protracted conflict was interrupted between 1972, when the Addis Ababa peace agreement was signed, and 1983 when the South Sudanese People's Movement/Army (SPLM/A) launched their armed resistance (OAU; 1983).

To date, the war has displaced at least two million people into more than 100 camps in Darfur and in neighboring Chad. Despite a peace deal signed with one of the three main rebel movements in

May 2006, new fighting has made a further 50000 homeless. In early 2008 Sudan is still under intense international pressure over the four-year conflict in its western region after the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for 20000 UN troops to replace the African Union's 7,000-strong force (UN: 2008).

Throughout 2007, the government of Sudan - also known as the Government of National Unity because it is composed of members of the National Congress Party and the SPLM - was quite adept at maneuvering against the establishment of a UN-peacekeeping force. In 2007 it had indicated that the UN would be given humanitarian access and that a peacekeeping force would be accepted. The Khartoum regime doggedly rejected the presence of a UN force in Darfur. During this intervening period President Omar Al-Bashir regularly categorically stated that the presence of a UN force would be tantamount to the re-colonization of Sudan. What emerges from the situation in Darfur is that there are at least three overlapping and interlocking dimensions to the situation (UN, 2008):

First, there is the national dimension in that the Khartoum regime sees the Darfur situation as a purely internal affair. It argues that the long-held principles of nonintervention in the affairs of states and of territorial integrity should not be discarded.

Second, the regional or continental perspective under the leadership of the AU seeks to find a political solution while undertaking peace operations to alleviate the suffering of Darfurians. The AU's monitoring mission leaves much to be desired and a more robust peacekeeping force is required to effectively dissuade the silent genocide that is taking place in Darfur. However, the AU's peacemaking initiative in Abuja, Nigeria, under the tutelage of the former secretary-general of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. That only the MinniMinnawi faction of the SLA signed the agreement means that the DPA was by no means a comprehensive peace agreement in the mould of the South Sudan agreement. The recent failure of the peace talks convened in Tripoli, Libya, in October 2007 is a further indication that there is no peace to keep in Darfur. Essentially the conflict is not over since a durable ceasefire has not been established. The armed resistance groups have even begun to fight each other, and the situation

has deteriorated into a military, political and diplomatic conundrum (AU, 2006).

The international dimension has so far been spearheaded by the UN, since a former envoy to the North/South dispute became embroiled in the conflict in Darfur. The UN resolution authorizing the establishment of a peacekeeping force has not yet been implemented. Key players in the international community have their own reasons for wanting a resolution of the Darfur issue. NATO is assisting with the provision of logistical support, particularly airlift in Darfur. In October 2006, some senior U.S. and British envoys travelled to the capital Khartoum to urge the ruling coalition government to allow peacekeepers access to the region. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with the Sudanese regime in Khartoum several times in 2007, yet the regime is persistently intransigent in showing good faith and allowing the operationalization of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

In the United States Darfur has become a *cause célèbre*. With a number of celebrities throwing their hats into the ring and picking up the fight for the people of Darfur, we are effectively witnessing the 'celebration' of an international conflict. However, it is still important to try to unravel the competing and multilayered agendas of some of these actors and governments.

In addition al-Qaeda has allegedly issued a statement on Darfur stating that any UN troops entering Darfur, which they see as Muslim territory, will represent the forces of global imperialism and should be repelled with all means. Of course, we have to recall that Osama bin Laden spent some time in Sudan prior to relocating to Afghanistan. Consequently, in the eyes of regional and international actors Darfur is viewed through the lens of the post-9/11 world and the so-called war on terror. Whether or not we agree with this view, it will definitely begin to affect peace efforts in Darfur (Murithi; 2007).

In Darfur, the AU found itself with a test case that it was ill-equipped institutionally and under-resourced to resolve successfully. The politicization of the situation in Darfur means that there are now no easy answers. Certainly, it is right and proper for the AU to be in Darfur, or for some form of international peace operation to be staged there. Regrettably, while the AU's peacemaking efforts are to be applauded, its monitoring peace operation is floundering and enabling government forces, the Janjaweed, and the armed resistance

groups to continue fighting amongst themselves and to continue the carnage and destruction of the lives and property of Darfurians.

The African Union Peace Mission in Somalia

The collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991 came after years of dictatorial rule by Siad Barre, which had fostered civil war. After 26 years of difficult peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives Somalia is still in search of peace. Recent violent confrontation, in May 2007, caused tremendous damage and loss of life and prevented humanitarian relief operations.

Ethiopia launched an incursion into Somalia, with US backing, ostensibly to route the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Previously, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia had been established in Nairobi. The TFG is one of the transitional federal institutions (TFIs) of the Somali government defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), the legislative branch of the TFG (AU, 2004).

On 6th December 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006) authorized 'IGAD and Member States of the African Union to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia', which was dubbed IGASOM. IGASOM was never deployed to Somalia. On 19 January 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In July 2007 the Somali National Reconciliation Congress was launched so that representatives of the various parties and stakeholders in Somalia could discuss national peace and reconstruction. The Congress will continue deliberations and outline a roadmap for the remaining transitional process until the elections were held in 2009 (UN, 2006: 1725).

African Union Peace and Security Council Decision on Somalia

Following a report of the chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Somalia (PSC/PR/2(LXIX)) and the evaluation and recommendations of the AU Military Staff Committee, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized the deployment of AMISOM, which is still operational in Somalia, with the following mandate:

- i. To provide support for the TFIs in their efforts to stabilize the situation in Somalia and to further dialogue and reconciliation.

- ii. To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance
- iii. To create conditions conducive to long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia.

On 20th February 2007, the UN Security Council adopted SC Resolution 1744, authorizing the deployment of AMISOM. The UN supports AMISOM by means of an assistance cell to the AU in Addis Ababa and by providing military planners. The UN Security Council met with the AU Peace and Security Council on 16 June 2007 to discuss the modalities for deeper collaboration. In particular, both bodies discussed the importance of stabilizing Somalia. AMISOM was launched in March 2007 with 1 700 Ugandan troops. Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi and Burundi have also pledged to deploy troops. The AU's PSC indicated that 'the concept of logistic support for AMISOM shall be based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)'. This effectively means that 'the AU Commission shall mobilize logistical support for the TCCs, as well as funding from AU member states and partners to ensure that TCCs are reimbursed for the costs incurred in the course of their deployment, based on AU practice' (AU Peace and Security Council 2007).

AMISOM is trying to stabilize parts of Mogadishu and Baidoa and has a role to play in creating the security conditions required to enable the complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. AMISOM is also supporting dialogue and reconciliation.

The European Union is supporting the deployment of AMISOM with €15 million. In June 2005 the UK pledged to finance AMISOM with €1.3 million. The UK is also providing planning assistance to several potential troop-contributing countries and logistical support for the AU military cell in Addis Ababa. The AU has requested NATO to provide air transportation in support of AMISOM troops.

United Nations and African Union Partnership

UN Security Council Resolution 1706 requested the secretary-general 'to take the necessary steps to strengthen AMIS through the use of existing and additional United Nations resources with a view to transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur' (UN Security Council 2006:1). On 31 July 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1769 authorized and mandated 'the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months, of an AU/UN

Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)'. UNAMID 'shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, and shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising of up to 140 personnel each' (UN Security Council 2007:3). There are efforts to reassure observers that this is not an effort to reestablish the asymmetrical relationship that prevailed in the early decades of the UN, but rather an effort to create something new — a hybrid partnership. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is already supporting AMIS through its UN Assistance Cell in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia where the AU has its headquarters. More specifically, the DPKO and the AU Peace Support Operations Division signed an agreement to develop a joint action plan. In July 2006, the UN created a dedicated integrated capacity to oversee the implementation of the action plan. The integrated capacity will involve the 'collocation' of UN staff within the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. This innovative approach of embedding UN staff within the operational structures of a regional organization represents a completely new form of partnership. There is an emphasis on the fact that this is not an asymmetrical partnership, but an entirely new arrangement established through the mutual consent of both parties.

According to Murithi (2007), chapter VIII of the UN Charter is not explicit on the possibility of establishing such a hybrid partnership; therefore there is significant leeway to operationalize such a relationship if both the UN and the regional organization are compliant. In fact, article 52 states that 'the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council' (UN;1945). This provides a legal basis for embedding UN staff within the AU. Even though the UN-AU partnership is taking a new direction, it is important to determine what the new relationship represents. Is the hybrid partnership in effect a hybrid form of paternalism in that AU troops and personnel will do the basic and dangerous work on the ground guided by the all-wise and 'fatherly' coterie of UN advisors? Does this evolution in the UN-AU partnership represent a paradigm shift in relations between

both organizations, or is it a case of old wine in new bottles? Certainly, it remains an asymmetric relationship due to the fact that the UN is a much older institution with more resources and experience than the AU. In this relationship advice and resources are more likely to be unidirectional - flowing from the UN to the AU. Naturally, as the regional organization, the AU has an important role to play in orienting efforts in a way that respects local sensibilities. However, it is not clear to what extent the AU can declare total ownership of the conceptualization, design, planning and implementation of its peace operations, when 'collocated' UN personnel maintain a dominant presence in its affairs. It is too early to pass a definitive judgment on this emerging hybrid partnership. The AU has to remain vigilant to ensure that it does not descend into a relationship of hybrid paternalism. In particular, the AU should guard against allowing the UN's historical paternalism to re-manifest under a new guise, with UN brawn being used to direct African bodies on the ground (Murithi; 2007).

Resource Mobilization for African Union Peace Operations

African leaders need to commit money to back the institutions of the African Union. The AU should strive to take a stronger stand and mobilize the necessary resources where required. To confront its peacekeeping challenges, the AU will need to address issues of financial and logistical weakness and the lack of political consensus among African leaders on collective security norms and practices. Due to the limited availability of resources to implement peace operations the AU should explore how it can demarcate a division of labor among Africa's security actors and sub-regional organizations, as envisaged in the establishment of the ASF.

Donor Support

In terms of the Tenth European Development Fund (EDF) the EU has pledged support for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and will provide €300 million towards the facility for an initial three-year period, from 2008 to 2010. The EU seeks to support long-term capacity building, including military and civilian crisis management, to enable of Africa's ability to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. This includes the establishment of an EU fund to support AMIS (Murithi, 2007).

Conclusion

The AU has begun to take a stronger stand on conflicts and peace initiatives in Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Darfur and Somalia. The relatively early stage of the African Union's development means that we cannot pass a definitive judgment on the organization. It is evident that specifically with regards to peace operations the AU has already acquired substantial experience, but it has faltered in its ability to monitor and implement its own decisions. The AU's experience in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia suggests that the organization has much to do to improve its ability to deliver peace and security to African citizens. However, it goes without saying that the AU's peace and security architecture will be a vital component of Africa's strategy to consolidate order and stability on the continent. The AU will need to seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring successful peace operations will not be met.

Recommendation

Peace is a function of justice, whenever there is no justice, peace cannot thrive. African leaders over the years have shown blatant disregard to the rule of law and the use of force to annihilate political opposition and silence the press, which was supposed to hold government accountable. As a result, people tend to react violently to such oppressive governments and leadership. We recommend that African Union should encourage democratic tenets, which allows criticism as part of democracy and passing into law the press freedom in African countries. When this is done, most of the conflicts in Africa would be avoided because it is cheaper to avoid crises than mobilization of peacekeeping forces.

Secondly, Africa and Africa leaders should eradicate corruption and those who take joy in it should be severely punished under the laws. This will serve as deterrent to others. This is because corruption is the major cause of conflicts on African soil. The looting of government funds that should be used for development in Africa is creating untold hardship on the masses and what we see today as conflict violent in Africa is a reaction to the poor leadership and the mismanagement of natural resources deposits in Africa.

Another important point is the paying of leap service by African leaders towards the funding of African Union peacekeeping operations should be stopped. Peacekeeping is very expensive and should not be left in the hands of few countries in Africa to shoulder the responsibility while African Union commission should be prudent in the management of funds allotted to it with all sense of sincerity and responsibility.

Finally, African Union should not watch helplessly when crisis is looming. There should be an intervention plan to avert some of these crises from growing into full blown war. The sit-tight syndrome of some of the African leaders should also be discouraged. When these are done, Africa will experience relative peace, as crisis cannot be completely eliminated in the world.

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